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The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the U.S. response—the 
global war on terrorism—have changed the world, and the terrorist 
enterprise that we know as al-Qaeda has changed with it. The cur-
rent status of al-Qaeda’s network remains unclear, but it is certain 
that it and other terrorist groups continue to threaten the lives and 
well-being of Americans, at home and abroad, and the security of 
our friends and allies. This continuing danger leads to ongoing U.S. 
and international eﬀorts to monitor, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist 
groups before they can cause large-scale destruction to our people or 
our interests. 
The objective of this RAND Corporation study, undertaken 
as part of a project entitled “Beyond al-Qaeda: Countering Future 
Terrorist and Other Nontraditional Threats to U.S. Security,” is to 
understand the shape of future threats to the United States and U.S. 
security interests from terrorist and other extremist organizations. We 
do this through analyses that draw together the various threat strands 
that are informing current U.S. thinking in the war on terror. The 
study looks speciﬁcally at four sources of threats: 
1. Al-Qaeda. We examine how al-Qaeda has changed since 
September 11, the loss of its operating base in Afghanistan, and 
the death or capture of key operatives; and we assess what forms 
the al-Qaeda threat to the United States and U.S. interests take 
now and might take in the future.
2. Terrorist groups that may not be formally part of al-Qaeda but 
that have assimilated al-Qaeda’s worldview and concept of mass-
casualty terrorist attacks. This, we believe, is where the center of 
gravity of the current global terrorist threat lies.
3. Violent Islamist and non-Islamist terrorist and insurgent groups 
without known links to al-Qaeda. These groups threaten U.S. 
regional interests, friends, and allies, as well as other nontradi-
tional threats.
4. The nexus between terrorism and organized crime. In each case, 
we examine how the presence of these threats aﬀects U.S. secu-
rity interests, and we identify distinct strategies that the United 
States and the U.S. Air Force may take to neutralize or mitigate 
each of these threats.
The results of the study are reported in two volumes. This book is 
the seccond of the two; the ﬁrst, by Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Kim 
Cragin, Sara A. Daly, Heather S. Gregg, Theodore W. Karasik, Kevin 
A. O’Brien, and William Rosenau, is entitled Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 1, 
The Global Jihadist Movement. 
This research builds on previous RAND Project AIR FORCE 
work on counterterrorism, notably the following:
Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Peter Chalk, Christine Fair, 
Theodore Karasik, Rollie Lal, Ian Lesser, and David Thaler, The 
Muslim World After 9/11, MG-246-AF, 2004
Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with 
Europe, NATO, and the European Union, MR-1746-AF, 2003
Kim Cragin and Sara Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An 
Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing 
World, MR-1782-AF, 2004 
Lynn Davis, Steven Hosmer, Sara Daly, and Karl Mueller, The 
U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: A Planning Framework to Facilitate 
Timely Policy Adjustments, DB-426-AF, 2004 
David Ochmanek, Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups 
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The “al-Qaeda universe” does not incorporate the entirety of the ter-
rorist or extremist threat facing the United States. Clearly, Osama bin 
Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders hope that their eﬀorts will persuade 
other Islamic militant groups to join the global jihad. But what about 
the terrorist or extremist groups that are not part of the al-Qaeda net-
work and do not adhere to its agenda? The temptation for policymakers 
is to set aside groups that have not chosen to join al-Qaeda as less dan-
gerous. Yet these Islamist groups, non-Islamist terrorists, and criminal 
organizations still pose a threat to the United States, its interests, and 
its allies. This volume, therefore, addresses the threats outside the al-
Qaeda universe.
Islamist Groups
The ﬁrst category of groups examined in this part of the study con-
sists of terrorist groups that articulate an Islamist agenda for their own 
country but are not part of the global jihadist movement. Two consid-
erations guide the analysis of these groups: the threat that they pose to 
U.S. friends and allies and U.S. regional interests, and the conditions 
under which they could rise to the level of global threat. 
Of the groups in this category, Lebanese Hezbollah is perhaps the 
best known and the most capable. This group was responsible for the 
1983 suicide attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, which 
inaugurated the era of mass-casualty terrorism, and for two terrorist 
attacks in the Western hemisphere, both in Buenos Aires: the 1992 
xiii
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bombing of the Israeli embassy and the 1994 bombing of the Jewish 
Community Center. In addition, since the early 1980s, Hezbollah has 
established a far-ﬂung ﬁnancial network, stretching from the tri-border 
area of South America (where the borders of Brazil, Argentina, and 
Paraguay intersect), to North America, to West Africa, and Southeast 
Asia. So Hezbollah has the potential to inﬂict damage on U.S. interests 
and allies across the globe. Yet this group remains relatively detached 
from the al-Qaeda network and has not directly threatened the United 
States since the 1983 attack. Today, Hezbollah projects an image of 
political legitimacy in Lebanon. At the same time, the group main-
tains its terrorist network of 20,000–25,000 members, conducting 
some limited attacks on Israeli forces and supplying military aid to 
Palestinian groups. 
Although Hezbollah is predominantly a Shi’ite group, its leaders 
articulate a universalistic view of the Muslim community, the umma,
that incorporates Shi’ites, Sunnis, and even secularists. Hezbollah’s 
universalism is tempered by pragmatism. The ideological foundations 
of Hezbollah, therefore, explain at least part of the group’s reluctance 
to join the al-Qaeda network. Its leadership might feel some spontane-
ous sympathy with wider pan-Islamist, Sunni agendas, but these move-
ments do not necessarily align with Hezbollah ideologically. However, 
just because Hezbollah does not align with other Islamist groups ideo-
logically, it may still coordinate with them. Despite the ideological 
disparities between Hezbollah and the al-Qaeda network, some par-
allel interests exist. In particular, Hezbollah historically has opposed 
“Western domination” of the Muslim world and the United States spe-
ciﬁcally. So although the ideological background of Hezbollah might 
explain its lack of aﬃliation with the al-Qaeda network, Hezbollah’s 
strategic objectives pave the way for possible cooperation in the future. 
(See pp. 5–15.)
After Hezbollah, the most capable of the groups in this category 
is the Islamic Resistance Movement, known by its acronym, Hamas. 
Hamas’s fundamental objective is to establish a Palestinian Islamic 
state in Israel proper, the West Bank, and Gaza. To achieve its strate-
gic objectives, Hamas has followed a two-pronged strategy: One part 
of the strategy, designed to secure a Palestinian state, involves a terror 
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campaign against the Israeli government and citizens. A key tactic in 
this campaign is suicide bombings. Although Hamas was not the ﬁrst 
Palestinian terrorist group to adopt the tactic of suicide bombings, it 
has made the most extensive use of this tactic—even though at times 
the wider Palestinian community has been highly critical of it. The 
second part of the Hamas strategy requires the group to pursue its 
Islamic agenda vis-à-vis al-Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. 
Like many Islamic movements in the Arab world, Hamas’s ideol-
ogy is ﬁrmly grounded in the teachings of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. 
One key ideological diﬀerence between the Brotherhood and Hamas 
is that Hamas believes in the use of violence in addition to religious 
proselytizing and political activity. In addition, Hamas’s ideology is 
strongly nationalistic, in contrast to the Brotherhood’s pan-Islamism. 
Hamas presents an interesting contradiction in strategic and oper-
ational objectives, especially when it comes to potential shifts. On the 
one hand, an assessment that the U.S.-Israeli relationship is the center 
of gravity of its opponent might encourage Hamas to take on a more 
global agenda, attacking the United States and U.S. targets overseas. 
On the other hand, Hamas’s leadership appears to be pragmatic enough 
to realize that widening the conﬂict may alienate its own support base, 
bring in a strong U.S. response, and jeopardize its political advances. 
After the the January 2006 Palestinian elections in which Hamas won 
an outright majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council, the group 
was warned by al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to con-
tinue the struggle against Israel, and was criticized in jihadi forums for 
participating in elections and not pursuing an Islamist agenda. The 
jihadist criticism lays bare the rift between the global jihadist move-
ment, with its supra-national goals, and local groups and organizations 
that have more limited objectives and are open to tactical use of the 
political process. (See pp. 15–24.)
Other Islamist groups examined include Algeria’s Armed Islamic 
Group, known by its French acronym, GIA; Egypt’s al-Gama’a al-
Islamiyya and al-Wa’ad; South Africa’s People Against Gangsterism 
and Drugs (PAGAD); and the Eritrean Islamic Jihad–Islamic Reform 
Movement. The GIA saw the establishment of an Islamic government 
in Algeria as its primary goal; to that end, the group employed meth-
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ods so extreme and brutal that they went beyond those employed by 
some of the most virulent terrorist organizations operating today. As a 
result, the GIA alienated its potential support base. Unlike its splinter 
faction, the Salaﬁst Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the 
GIA never established a solid relationship with al-Qaeda outside the 
few members who were veterans of the Afghan war and who knew or 
had met bin Laden in that context. The GIA has not conducted any 
attacks outside Algeria since 1996. (See pp. 25–30.)
Egypt’s al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, like other Islamist terrorist groups, 
began as an oﬀshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Gama’a gained 
a renewed sense of purpose after the return of its members from the 
Afghan jihad. Al-Gama’a leaders were energized by what they believed 
was a moral victory of Islamism in Afghanistan and were convinced 
that they could accomplish in Egypt what the mujahidin achieved in 
Afghanistan by ousting the “illegitimate” governing power. As a result, 
al-Gama’a put its theories into practice in Egypt by attacking a wide 
variety of targets—including Coptic Christians, banks, police, politi-
cians, tourists, and the media—with the goal of undermining Egyptian 
state power, secular institutions, and the economy. Al-Gama’a’s opera-
tional leader, Rifa’i Taha Musa, signed bin Laden’s 1998 declaration of 
war against “Jews and Crusaders.” However, Taha Musa was unable 
to recruit many of his cadre to support bin Laden and join the global 
jihad. Al-Gama’a witnessed how the Egyptian Islamic Jihad had suf-
fered signiﬁcant setbacks because of its decision to join al-Qaeda. In 
1999, the group’s historic leadership declared a unilateral ceaseﬁre and 
in 2002 issued a statement renouncing the use of violence. 
Al-Wa’ad (“the Promise”) is a shadowy Islamic extremist orga-
nization based in Egypt about which not much is known. According 
to press reports of the recent trials of al-Wa’ad members in Egypt, the 
group is rather small and made up largely of Egyptian citizens with 
dual nationality, including Russians (Chechens), Dutch, Germans, 
Canadians, and reportedly even Americans. The group was accused in 
a 2001 indictment of raising money for international jihadist causes, 
including Palestinian and Chechen groups. Although the arrests may 
have eliminated or reduced the potential al-Wa’ad threat, some press 
reports indicate at least two new terrorist groups have formed in Egypt 
Summary    xvii
as of this writing—the Jihad Group for the Victory of Muslims at Home 
and Abroad and Jundullah, a faction of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. 
The Egyptian investigation of Jundullah’s activities found that it had 
ties to al-Zawahiri and was in contact with leaders in other extremist 
organizations in Europe, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. (See pp. 30–37.)
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) was formed 
in 1996 as a community anticrime group to ﬁght drugs and violence 
in South Africa. By early 1998, PAGAD had also become violently 
antigovernment and anti-Western. It is closely associated, if not inter-
twined, with a South African Iranian-inspired Islamic group, Qibla. In 
addition to the few hundred estimated criminal victims of PAGAD’s 
targeted violence, PAGAD’s bombing targets have included South 
African authorities, moderate Muslims, synagogues, gay nightclubs, 
tourist attractions, and Western-associated restaurants. There are indi-
cations that South Africa could become a haven for jihadists from other 
parts of the world and a source for radicalizing Muslim youth to mobi-
lize against Western interests globally. (See pp. 37–44.)
The last group examined in this category is the Eritrean Islamic 
Reform Movement (EIRM), also known as the Islamic Salvation 
Movement, a Sunni Islamist group. The group has been active in 
the Horn of Africa in various guises since the mid-1970s and seeks 
the violent overthrow of Eritrea’s secular government and its replace-
ment with an Islamic government. The leadership of the ERIM and of 
the umbrella organization to which it belongs, the Eritrean National 
Alliance (ENA), has indicated that it sees its struggle against Eritrea’s 
government within the wider context of a push for a new Islamic caliph-
ate, but the focus of the group remains ﬁrmly ﬁxed on overthrowing 
the government. There is a possibility that the EIRM could become 
involved with other like-minded Islamic organizations throughout 
the Horn of Africa to promote common interests and perhaps seek to 
establish an Islamic federation in the Horn. (See pp. 44–49.)
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The Iraqi Insurgency
The nonaﬃliated part of the Iraqi insurgency—that is, the component 
that is outside of the al-Qaeda and al-Zarqawi networks—is diverse and 
widespread, and composed of groups of both nationalist and religious 
provenance. In response to the insurgents, both the Shi’ite and Kurdish 
communities have continued to rally around their new national leaders 
and have apparently refused to engage in sectarian revenge. (However, 
Shi’ite revenge killings against Sunnis have been on the rise since the 
bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra on February 22, 2006.)
This section focuses on the Sunni insurgents. We do not place the 
Shi’ite militiamen associated with Muqtada al-Sadr in the same cate-
gory, because—even though al-Sadr’s militiamen, organized in the so-
called “Mahdi’s Army,” share the Sunnis’ hostility toward the United 
States and have certainly engaged in violent activities—these activities 
generally do not rise to the level of Sunni terrorism. Moreover, al-Sadr 
must operate within the broader framework of Shi’ite politics in Iraq. 
(Other Shi’ite and Kurdish militias are in fact the military arms of 
political organizations that are part of Iraq’s legitimate political spec-
trum. Nevertheless, we discuss them here because they are outside of 
the Iraqi government’s control and could become engines of sectarian 
conﬂict.) (See pp. 51–60.)
At least 28 diﬀerent insurgent groups have formed from 2003 
through 2005. Some—but not all—are based in the Sunni triangle 
north and west of Baghdad. The danger of bloodshed is intensiﬁed 
because some of these groups increasingly embrace tactics imported 
by foreign ﬁghters, such as the car bombings of civilian targets. It goes 
without saying that the universe of insurgent groups in Iraq is both 
dynamic and ﬂuid. Groups appear, change, merge, divide, and dis-
appear, operate under diﬀerent names and sometimes under no name 
at all.
This insurgency, certainly one of the most complex and chal-
lenging ever faced by the United States, presents no single coherent 
enemy against which the United States can mass its superior military 
strength. The insurgency’s various components, generally characterized 
more by their heterogeneity than by their homogeneity, ﬁght for their 
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own unique reasons and have little in common other than a desire to 
remove the U.S. and coalition presence from the country. In general, 
they seek to create a crisis between the Iraqi government and the Iraqi 
people in the hopes that outside support for the government will wane, 
forcing the withdrawal of foreign forces. 
The strategic and operational objectives of these groups vary widely. 
The jihadists, as discussed in the ﬁrst volume of this study, are seeking 
to foment a religious war between Sunnis and Shi’ites, who—until the 
February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra—largely 
refrained from engaging in sectarian revenge. Former regime loyalists 
believe that they have no option but to continue ﬁghting and are also 
convinced that the United States and its coalition partners will tire 
long before they do. These groups are trying to apply the experiences 
of other guerrilla and terrorist organizations to their operations. Their 
objective is to restore the former Ba’ath party establishment to power. 
Nationalists do not necessarily support the return of the Ba’ath—some 
actively oppose it—but they resent what they consider to be the occu-
pation of Iraq and are angered by the coalition’s failure to restore order 
and security. Iraqi Islamists have emerged after decades of suppression 
by the Ba’thist regime but have the experiences of Islamist organiza-
tions in other countries to help them. Their objective is the establish-
ment of an Islamic state in Iraq. (See pp. 54–56.) 
As of the time of this writing, the Iraqi insurgency is in a transi-
tional stage. It is evolving in response to transcendent political events 
in Iraq—the January 2005 elections, the approval of a new Iraqi 
constitution, and the January 2006 elections for a permanent Iraqi 
government—which center, of course, on the rise of the Shi’ites and 
the Kurds to a dominant position in the state. (See pp. 58–60.) In 
the end, terror alone cannot guarantee success for the insurgents. The 
insurgency can continue to wreak havoc but will become an exercise 
in political futility. In these circumstances, three general scenarios are 
possible:
In the most benign case, signiﬁcant elements of the Sunni com-
munity realize that a return of the status quo ante is no longer viable 
and accept a minority role within a democratic Iraq. The Sunnis 
might ﬁnd a common interest with the Kurdish parties in balancing 
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Shi’ite predominance, and a rough balance of power could develop, 
allowing for what we called in another study “democracy with Iraqi 
characteristics.” 
In the second scenario, the representatives of the Sunni commu-
nity are too alienated or terrorized to enter into a political arrangement 
with the Shi’ites and the Kurds. The insurgency could continue, per-
haps at high levels of violence, but would be unable to transcend its 
narrow social base or to prevent the nascent government from gradu-
ally consolidating its control over the country.
In the third scenario, if the new government is unable to con-
tain the insurgents and terrorists, or to win broad support among the 
diverse ethnic and religious communities in Iraq, it will be no match 
for local warlords and will have to contend with the growth of terrorist 
infrastructures. A failure of central authority could lead to a formal or 
de facto partition of the country. 
The wild card in Iraq’s political evolution is external interference. 
There is the potential for non-Iraqi state and nonstate actors—particu-
larly Iran—to interfere more actively in Iraqi politics. The activities 
of Iranian operatives in Iraq suggest a long-term strategy by Tehran 
to create an Iranian sphere of inﬂuence in southern Iraq. Matters are 
complicated by the existence of Iraqi Shi’ite political parties that have 
varying degrees of loyalty to Iran. The key question is whether they will 
identify themselves as Shi’ites ﬁrst, united with their Iranian brethren, 
or as Iraqis, threatened by Iranian encroachment. The answer may not 
become clear for years.
Non-Islamist Threats 
U.S. friends and allies and regional interests are not threatened by 
Islamist extremist and terrorist groups alone, of course. There are sev-
eral capable non-Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups seeking to 
overthrow governments friendly to the United States or to carve out 
separate ethnic-based states. (See pp. 61–84.) These groups include the 
following:
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The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, one of 
the world’s most innovative and successful terrorist-insurgent groups. 
It is one of the few that has institutionalized a permanent, highly 
trained martyr wing—the Black Tigers—as a formal component 
of its overall organizational structure. Although the LTTE does 
not presently threaten the United States, it does provide a bench-
mark of the sophistication that a substate insurgency can achieve 
given the right combination of circumstances. (See pp. 68–78.) 
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, or ETA), a 
Marxist group that uses terrorism in hopes of forming an independent 
Basque state in parts of northern Spain and southwest France. 
Although the ETA has not targeted U.S. interests, an increas-
ingly anti-American tenor within the ETA after Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and connections with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s terror 
network could make U.S. citizens and interests an ETA target in 
Europe. (See pp. 78–80.)
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 
National Liberation Army (ELN), Marxist armed groups that have 
operated in Colombia since the 1960s. The FARC, the most impor-
tant of the two, has not deviated from its original strategy of “pro-
tracted people’s war,” a strategy based on Maoist and Vietnamese 
precepts that involves gradually extending the organization’s pres-
ence and control in the countryside and eventually isolating the 
government forces in the major cities. This strategy of territorial 
control is linked to the FARC’s involvement in the cocaine drug 
trade that generates much of the revenues that fund the organi-
zation’s operations, together with extortion and kidnapping. (See 
pp. 61–65.)
Maoist insurgencies. This rubric refers to the “People’s Army” phe-
nomena found in Peru (Shining Path), Nepal (Communist Party of 
Nepal), India (Naxalites), Bhutan (Ngolops), and the Philippines 
(Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army). These 
groups are Marxist-Leninist-Maoist entities that practice the “van-
guard” philosophy, which holds that a small armed group (some-
times through the employment of extreme violence) will lead the 
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threat to the United States, these groups are terrorists inherently 
hostile to the international order and may ﬁnd common interests 
with al-Qaeda and associates. They are also increasingly partici-
pating in drug traﬃcking to fund their activities. Factors that 
could move the Maoists to become a larger threat include U.S. 
support for governments under attack by Maoists, spillover eﬀects 
from insurgency, and recruitment and indoctrination of native 
peoples against urban elites and governments. (See pp. 65–68.)
To complete the picture of the universe of terrorism, actual and 
potential, this study provides an overview and assessment of anarchist 
groups, the “New, New Left” and right-wing extremists in Europe and 
North America; movements in Latin America; and ecoterrorists and 
other niche extremists on the even farther fringe of the movement. In 
the context of this analysis, we examine the possibility of a tactical alli-
ance between non-Islamic fringe extremist groups and Islamist extrem-
ists. Al-Qaeda, according to some accounts, has shown some interest 
in reaching out to non-Islamic militant groups, with anti-Semitism, 
anti-Americanism, and anti-Westernism serving as a common ground. 
The possibility of tactical alliances cannot be discounted and warrants 
carefully watching. However, although neo-Nazis, Islamists, and the 
New, New Left share an anti-Zionist stance (and a deep well of anti-
Semitism), opposition to Israel remains a relatively minor component 
of the non-Islamic extremists’ agenda, and so is unlikely to serve as the 
foundation for any real partnership. (See pp. 85–99.)
The Convergence of Terrorism and Crime
An analysis of the future of terrorism cannot be complete without a 
discussion of the convergence of terrorism and crime. Criminals gen-
erally seek economic gain through illicit means, while terrorists seek 
political or ideological goals and use criminal means to achieve those 
ends. Nevertheless, the important fact is that these two sets of actors 
are joining forces against the state and society. This phenomenon is 
growing because similar conditions give rise to both terrorism and 
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transnational crime and because terrorists and organized criminals use 
the same strategies to promote their operations and sometimes engage 
in strategic alliances.
During the Cold War, many of the insurgent and terrorist orga-
nizations were largely dependent on great-power support. The end of 
the Cold War brought an eﬀective end to external support for these 
groups. The Soviet Union disappeared, and the United States simply 
lost interest in the fate of many of its former clients. The post–Cold 
War survival strategies of these groups hinged on their ability to gen-
erate new sources of revenue to support their operations. Some groups 
were unable to make the transition and disbanded or made peace with 
the governments that they were seeking to overthrow, as in the case of 
the Salvadoran and Guatemalan rebels. Other groups, however, tapped 
into locally available sources of revenue and grew in strength. The most 
successful in making the transition were those that operated in coun-
tries that produced high-value commodities, legal or otherwise—for 
example, diamonds in West Africa, minerals in Central Africa, cocaine 
and heroin in Colombia, and opium and heroin in Southwest Asia and 
the “Golden Triangle” of Southeast Asia.
Other groups were able to fund themselves successfully from 
smuggling and arms traﬃcking, kidnapping and extortion, piracy, 
compact disc counterfeiting, and a variety of other criminal activities. 
These commodities provided easy targets of opportunity for terrorist or 
rebel movements. The groups had the ﬁrepower to deal themselves into 
the trade. They could trade the commodities themselves, as in the case 
of the Liberia-backed Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone and 
“conﬂict diamonds”; or protect and “tax” them, which is the preferred 
approach of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); or 
set themselves up as middlemen in human and arms traﬃcking. 
This transition from more conventional forms of ﬁnancing to 
crime has also been a feature of the evolution of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda’s 
eﬀort to hide assets and capitalize on trade in West African conﬂict dia-
monds appears to date from September 1998, following international 
eﬀorts to freeze al-Qaeda and Taliban accounts after the August 1998 
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. As mentioned 
previously, Lebanese Hezbollah is known to maintain a global network 
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to support fundraising and operational and logistical requirements for 
its operations abroad. Hezbollah has raised signiﬁcant amounts of 
funds through drug traﬃcking and diamond sales from Sierra Leone, 
and through smuggling, black market activity, and money-laundering 
operations in the tri-border area of South America. We examine several 
other case studies of the convergence of insurgent and terrorist organi-
zations and crime in this study.
The criminal activities of these groups tend to weaken and cor-
rupt political and social institutions, particularly when traﬃcking in a 
lucrative and social destructive commodity such as cocaine is involved. 
To the extent that they are successful, these groups also displace state 
and government institutions, usually weak to begin with, in the areas 
where they establish a foothold. Unchecked, the groups will expand 
their resource base, increase their recruiting pool, and generate greater 
capacity at the expense of the state. Therefore, there is a high correla-
tion between the development of these groups and failed or failing 
states. (See pp. 101–160.)
Conclusions and Recommendations
From a policy perspective, the ﬁrst-order question is whether the trajec-
tory of insurgent and terrorist groups outside the global jihadist move-
ment will bring them closer to that movement. To answer this question, 
we examine what factors could aﬀect this outcome and what the U.S. 
policy response should be. The second-order question is what level of 
threat these groups represent for U.S. regional interests, including the 
security of U.S. friends and allies, and what the U.S. policy response 
should be. (See pp. 161–166.)
With regard to convergence with al-Qaeda, the groups that gen-
erate the greatest concern are the Islamist groups that share aspects 
of al-Qaeda’s worldview. Of the groups examined, only two—Egypt’s 
al-Wa’ad and the Iraqi insurgents—have developed since bin Laden’s 
notorious 1998 Khost fatwa against “Jews and Crusaders.” The other 
groups were well established and active, and had articulated their own 
agendas prior to al-Qaeda’s emergence in the international arena. 
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Therefore, they can be assumed to be less receptive to al-Qaeda’s ideol-
ogy of global jihad than the groups that have emerged since that time. 
Among these groups, the majority interpret their jihad much more nar-
rowly than groups aﬃliated or associated with al-Qaeda. Hezbollah’s 
interests center on Lebanon and its immediate vicinity; Hamas is 
focused on the Palestinian issue; and the GIA on overthrowing the 
Algerian government. In the groups for which association with al-
Qaeda might be operationally attractive, external and internal factors 
have held such tendencies in check. For example, Hezbollah appears to 
be inﬂuenced by its ties to Syria and Iran, as well as by its involvement 
in Lebanese politics. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya appears to be concerned 
about carving out some political space to operate in Egypt. 
Even some of the non-Islamist groups could also decide to coop-
erate with al-Qaeda or other Islamist groups for their own reasons. For 
example, many of these militant groups now maintain representatives 
in the criminal and black market world. This interconnectivity allows 
terrorists to acquire weapons as necessary, perhaps even to expand their 
capabilities. It is also important to stress that some terrorist groups 
could shift their worldview, thus adopting an agenda similar to al-
Qaeda’s. Alternatively, others could simply capitalize on a perceived 
anti-U.S. trend, shifting the focus of their attacks toward U.S. targets 
to increase their own potential through alliances with more capable al-
Qaeda aﬃliated groups or simply to gain greater recognition. 
A recent RAND study analyzed factors that caused terrorist 
groups to adjust their intentions (e.g., ideology or worldview) and their 
capabilities. Speciﬁcally, the study isolated the following three key fac-
tors that cause terrorist groups to shift from their chosen paths: (1) 
counterattacks by security forces; (2) external support from states or 
other militant organizations; and (3) gain or loss of popular support. 
To those, we add a fourth: general shifts in the international secu-
rity environment—such as that brought about by the U.S.-led global 
war on terrorism. Some extremist organizations, such as the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), have tried to distance themselves 
from al-Qaeda to reduce their exposure to the global war on terrorism. 
Similarly, according to a well-informed Sri Lankan source, the global 
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war on terrorism has reduced international tolerance of LTTE terror-
ism and inﬂuenced the LTTE’s decision to enter into peace negotia-
tions with the Sri Lankan government.
A potentially dangerous shift can be seen in the emerging Hamas-
Hezbollah nexus, as seen in the March 14, 2004, attack in the Israeli 
port of Ashdod. The signiﬁcance of this attack was not the number of 
casualties; indeed, Hamas has killed many more in single suicide bomb-
ing attacks. But rather, it demonstrated—especially to Israeli counter-
terrorism experts—Hamas’s ability to hit more strategic targets.
Given the qualitative leap in Hamas’s eﬀorts, it might not be a 
surprise that Hezbollah ﬁnanced and, indeed, allegedly planned this 
attack. Yet this degree of aid and coordination is greater than anything 
seen before in the Hamas-Hezbollah relationship. From an Israeli 
viewpoint, some security oﬃcials have stated that this attack motivated 
the government to assassinate Sheikh Ahmad Yasin. But the Ashdod 
attack also holds other, more global implications for the war on terror-
ism. First, it demonstrates that Sunni and Shi’ite militants will work 
together, given a mutual enemy. In this case, the enemy is Israel, but 
this does not preclude cooperation between Sunni and Shi’ite mili-
tants against the United States. Second, up to this point, Hamas was 
facing signiﬁcant counterterrorism pressure from the Israeli govern-
ment. Thus, it could have been more willing to take strategic guidance 
from Hezbollah: not just aid, but actual suggestions for types of attacks 
and targets. Parallel counterterrorism eﬀorts by the United States and 
its allies in the war on terrorism could provoke other nonaﬃliated ter-
rorists to accept guidance from al-Qaeda in the future, as Hamas did 
from Hezbollah. Finally, in the case of Hezbollah, one potential expla-
nation for the shift in its aid is that Hezbollah may be struggling to 
sustain attention and support now that Israel has pulled out of southern 
Lebanon. Greater involvement in the Palestinian resistance could help 
Hezbollah increase its momentum and support. It is therefore possible 
that Muslim anger at the U.S. presence in Iraq could similarly provoke 
shifts in the agenda of Hezbollah or other groups vis-à-vis the United 
States, as these groups continue to vie for local recruits and support.
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The bottom line is that these groups have political aspirations as 
opposed to outright murder and mayhem. Because of their political 
agendas, they are more likely to accept political rules and social norms 
acceptable to a majority than are al-Qaeda and its aﬃliates.
Beyond the question of convergence, it is important to keep in 
mind that just because some of these groups have not joined the global 
jihadist movement, they should not be dismissed as unthreatening. 
Some represent deadly threats to the states that they seek to subvert; 
others, like Hezbollah, could suddenly emerge as global threats. 
Implications for the U.S. Military and the U.S. Air Force
In Part 1, we discussed the use of air power as an option to attack terror-
ists in diﬃcult or inhospitable terrain, as well as the use of air transport 
in counterterrorist or counterinsurgency operations in countries with 
widely dispersed populations and poor land transportation infrastruc-
ture. These considerations apply as well to many of the cases discussed 
in this volume, with the diﬀerence that, with the exception of the Iraqi 
insurgency, the United States is not—and as a general principle should 
not—be involved in direct military operations against these groups. 
(See pp. 164–166.)
Therefore, the emphasis should be on strengthening the capa-
bilities of friendly governments to confront insurgents, terrorists, and 
other extremist groups. U.S. Air Force Special Operations Forces (active 
duty, Reserve and National Guard units)—at approximately 11,000 
personnel, second only to Army SOF at 29,000—can be particularly 
pertinent for the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism training role 
required by the new environment. 
The judgment in Part 1 of the study—that these local wars must 
be fought and won by the local governments and security forces with 
the United States in a supporting role—is even more valid in the case 
of local conﬂicts, some of which are driven by legitimate (or at least 
rational) grievances and in which the rebel movements enjoy signiﬁcant 
support. By the same token, because some of these groups have limited 
political agendas, under the right circumstances they can become part 
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of a negotiating process leading to a political solution of the conﬂict—a 
major diﬀerence from groups that are part of the global jihadist move-
ment, which have to be destroyed or forced to leave the ﬁeld. 
To develop eﬀective strategies against insurgent and terrorist 
groups, it is important to look at these groups in a broad context, even 
if they operate locally, because the migration of tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) is creating a globalization of violence. They are 
learning what works and adopting best practices. Their tactical models 
contribute to the proliferation of eﬀective styles of unconventional 
warfare throughout diﬀerent zones of conﬂict. Innovations include the 
use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and their evolution into 
sophisticated weapons designed to interrupt supply lines by Hezbollah. 
Hamas has been known to use ambulances as a cover for bombs or 
logistical support. Man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and 
now suicide bombers with suicide vests, ﬁrst used against Israeli targets 
in Israel and in the Palestinian territories, are now used as mass casu-
alty weapons by Chechens against Russian military and civilian jets.
The ﬁrst implication for the U.S. military and the Air Force is 
that they must understand clearly that the tactics, techniques, and pro-
cedures used by all groups, whether part of the global jihad or not, 
are beginning to mimic each other. This means that, from a tactical 
standpoint, U.S. military doctrine must anticipate the dissemination 
of these tactics across theaters in the war on terror.
The second implication is that, although the United States has 
a supporting role in opposing the groups in the “al-Qaeda universe,” 
the potential role for the United States in countering those extrem-
ist groups beyond al-Qaeda is even more indirect. The challenge for 
the U.S. military is to be prepared either to provide increased levels of 
support to key allies should they require it or to engage these extrem-
ist groups should they shift their attention toward the United States, 
while at the same time avoiding direct involvement in these conﬂicts. 
This strategic challenge has particular relevance to the U.S. Air Force. 
Understanding the circumstances that might stimulate change in 
extremist groups, for example, may require the allocation of intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources. It may also neces-
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sitate broad global readiness, incorporating regions such as Southeast 
Asia and Latin America in addition to the Middle East, in the war on 
terrorism.
For the U.S. military and the U.S. Air Force in particular, there are 
tools for targeting terrorist groups that can also be used in cooperation 
and coordination with host state operations against terrorist, insurgent, 
and criminal groups. It is important to note that the criminal transport 
of narcotics, arms, illegal migrants, explosives, etc., occurs in hubs and 
spokes concurrent or collocated with terrorist groups. This argues for 
the “dual use” of U.S. security assistance for both counterterrorism and 
counternarcotics purposes. Older aircraft with high-tech intelligence-
collection capabilities can be used to mitigate both terrorist havens and 
criminal nodes. In addition, air support for host country coast guard 
operations in and around waterways that harbor terrorists or criminal 
activity is a critical component of coastal and riverine surveillance and 
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1CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Part 1 of this study describes and analyzes what has become of al-
Qaeda after the removal of its safe haven in Afghanistan and the death 
or capture of a signiﬁcant part of its leadership, as well as what we call 
the “al-Qaeda nebula.” This concept includes aﬃliated or associated 
militant groups that have adopted al-Qaeda’s worldview and vision of a 
global jihad and its methodology of mass-casualty terrorist attacks.1
Yet the “al-Qaeda universe” does not incorporate the entirety 
of the terrorist threat or potential threat. A number of other militant 
groups threaten U.S. regional interests or allies and pose a potential 
direct threat to the United States. We did not include these groups in 
Part 1 because they neither share al-Qaeda’s view of a global jihad nor 
rise to the level of a global threat. 
Clearly, Osama bin Laden and other leaders of al-Qaeda hope 
that their eﬀorts will persuade other Islamic militant groups to join the 
1 As discussed in Part 1 of the study, the global jihad has a universal goal—the reconquest 
of Muslim lands usurped by inﬁdels and the eventual global expansion of Islam—and incor-
porates groups and cells that no longer consider themselves bound to concrete territories 
and populations. Although jihadist ideology is full of atavistic elements, the global jihad is 
a modern phenomenon that reﬂects what Oliver Roy calls “globalized Islam,” a “universal” 
Islam valid in any cultural context and detached from the cultures in which Islam has been 
historically embedded. This reformulation of an imaginary universal umma leads also to the 
reformulation of the jihad as a cataclysmic confrontation between the Islamic world and the 
West. Of course, in the view of jihadists, these two objectives—the global jihad and the top-
pling of “apostate” Muslim regimes—are closely interrelated. For al-Qaeda and the groups 
that share its ideology, governments in the Muslim world primarily exist because of U.S. sup-
port; their destruction thus is contingent on removing that support by expelling the United 
States from the region.
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global jihad. Moreover, it would seem logical that terrorists with simi-
lar ideological beliefs would be inclined to enter into a cooperative rela-
tionship with al-Qaeda or other elements in the global jihadist move-
ment, since such cooperation could enhance their own capabilities. But 
what about the terrorist group that is not part of the al-Qaeda network 
and does not adhere to its agenda? The temptation for policymakers is 
to set aside terrorist groups that have not chosen to join al-Qaeda as 
less dangerous. Yet these groups still pose a threat to the Unites States, 
its interests, and its allies. 
This volume, Part 2 of the study, focuses on three categories in this 
“second circle” of terrorist groups: (1) terrorist groups that articulate an 
Islamist agenda for their own country but are not directly linked to the 
global jihadist movement; (2) Muslim terrorist groups whose agendas 
are primarily separatist or ethno-nationalist but that present a threat 
to the stability or territorial integrity of U.S. allies, although not to the 
United States directly; and (3) highly capable, non-Islamist terrorist 
groups. By examining these groups, we hope to establish a framework 
for evaluating the threat that these groups currently pose and assess-
ing the likelihood and the conditions under which some of them could 
evolve into regional or global threats. We also examine antiglobaliza-
tion threats. Some of these groups have risen to the level of terrorism; 
others have not, but could. Finally, we discuss the nexus between ter-
rorism, insurgency, and crime.
Anaytical Framework
We begin with the assumption that terrorist groups move along the 
same path—sustaining their ideology, objectives, and tactics—until 
some outside force causes them to shift. Our analysis, therefore, 
requires that we ﬁrst classify terrorist groups’ current paths and then 
determine what factors might aﬀect change. Four characteristics can 
be said to inﬂuence terrorists’ strategic choices: ideology and leadership 
mindset, lack of internal restraint, opportunity, and technical capac-
ity. This framework provides a starting point for the analysis in this 
section. Because we are interested in how these categories of terrorists 
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might threaten the United States in the future, it is important to deter-
mine which characteristics are the most likely to indicate a change in 
behavior or strategic path. Part 1 of this study provides an overview of 
terrorist groups in the tier below the al-Qaeda “nebula,” their ideologi-
cal foundations, their strategic and operational objectives, and the key 
environmental factors that have shaped their evolution.
Because of the potential of some antiglobalism movements to pose 
a violent threat to the political, economic, and social order, we identify 
and analyze antiglobalization threats and their convergence with ter-
rorist groups. Our evaluation takes into account the local context in 
which these groups develop and linkages among the groups and with 
other extremist and terrorist organizations and rogue states.
The last chapter of this volume addresses the connections between 
terrorism, insurgency, and crime. We examine a number of speciﬁc case 
studies in areas ranging from the tri-border region of South America 
to the southern Philippines to identify the characteristics of this nexus 
across regions and diﬀerent types of terrorist and insurgent movements, 
the conditions that give rise to this phenomenon, and its implications 




Hezbollah, Party of God
Hezbollah is perhaps the best known and the most capable of the 
Islamist militant organizations that employ terrorism yet are not aﬃli-
ated with al-Qaeda. This group was responsible for the 1983 suicide 
attack against the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 
U.S. and 58 French servicemen who were part of a multinational 
peacekeeping force in Lebanon at that time. In addition, since the early 
1980s, Hezbollah has established a far-ﬂung ﬁnancial network, stretch-
ing from the tri-border area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil to the 
United States and to Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines. Hezbollah thus has the potential to inﬂict damage on U.S. 
interests and allies across the globe. Yet this group remains relatively 
detached from the al-Qaeda network and has not directly threatened 
the United States since the 1983 attack. It therefore represents an inter-
esting and important case study.1
From September 1970 to August 1982, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) used Lebanon as its political and military base 
of operations.2 Around that same time, the minority Shi’ite popu-
lation was engaged in a struggle for national power with the coun-
try’s Maronite Christians. In this local struggle, the Israeli military 
1 For more information on Hezbollah’s criminal activities, see Chapter Seven.
2 See Black and Morris (1991); and Bickerton and Klausner (1995).
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sometimes sponsored or provided support to the Maronites, while the 
PLO helped train and equip Shi’ite militias in southern Lebanon.3
These militias were the precursor to Hezbollah. 
After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Shi’ite mili-
tias shifted their focus from internal rivalries to Israeli forces. 
Hezbollah was aided, in part, by Iran. Approximately 1,500 Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards helped to train and organize the Shi’ite militias, 
which allowed Hezbollah to expand its activities and its capabilities.4
Despite frequent assassinations and attacks by Israeli forces, Hezbollah 
continued to expand its inﬂuence and presence in southern Lebanon 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.5 In May 2000, in part as a result of 
Hezbollah’s continued guerrilla campaign, the Israeli military pulled 
out of southern Lebanon.6 Many Islamist terrorist groups—especially 
the Palestinians—view the Hezbollah campaign as a model. In a 2001 
interview, Marwan Barghouti, a key leader of the militant branch of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization, al-Fatah, said, 
To be candid, I must say that Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon 
was indeed one contributing factor to the [al-Aqsa] Intifada. I 
won’t say that it was the single reason, but the Palestinians looked 
on carefully as the army pulled out of Lebanon. They asked how 
could it be that Israel was able to withdraw from an entanglement 
of nearly 20 years—all in one night. Not one soldier remained 
behind. So I say that if that was accomplished literally overnight 
in Lebanon, the retreat from Ramallah to Tel-Aviv should require 
no more than three nights at most.7
3 Jaber (1997), p. 17. 
4 For information on the impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Shi’ite militias, see Saad-
Ghorayeb (2002), pp. 14–15. See also, “Baalbek Seen as Staging Area for Terrorism,” The 
Washington Post, January 9, 1984; and Wege (1994), pp. 151–164.
5 Black and Morris (1991), pp. 394–399.
6 Some counterterrorism experts in Israel suggest that the Israeli reluctance simply to pull 
out of the Gaza Strip, without inﬂicting signiﬁcant damage on Palestinian terrorist groups, 
is, in part, a result of their experience in southern Lebanon. Cragin interview, Israeli coun-
terterrorism experts, April 2004.
7 Marwan Barghouti, quoted in “Hizballah Lends Its Services to the Palestinian Intifada” 
(2001). 
Hezbollah and Hamas    7
Today, Hezbollah has obtained a degree of political legitimacy in 
Lebanon—its political party won eight seats in the 1992 parliamentary 
elections, and in 2000 it won nine aﬃliated and three nonaﬃliated 
seats.8 At the same time, the group maintains its armed wing, conduct-
ing some limited attacks on Israeli forces and supplying military aid to 
Palestinian groups. 
With the advent of the second (al-Aqsa) intifada9 (2000–2004), 
Hezbollah also appeared to take a greater—or at least more direct—
role in the Palestinian conﬂict with Israel. Although Hezbollah had 
provided weapons and training in the past, some believe it was also 
beginning to provide some strategic direction to Palestinian groups as 
well as helping various factions match needs with skills. To illustrate 
this point, some Israeli counterterrorism experts point to the March 
2004 Ashdod attack. Two Hamas suicide bombers hid in a commer-
cial container, which allowed them to exit the tightly guarded Gaza 
Strip and travel to Ashdod. Upon arriving at the port, one of the sui-
cide bombers managed to enter the guarded compound, detonating his 
explosives among a number of workers near a warehouse. The second 
bomber detonated outside the port’s security fence. In total, the attack 
killed 10 Israelis and wounded an additional 18. The signiﬁcance of 
this attack was not the number of casualties; indeed, Hamas has killed 
8 For an overview of Hezbollah and Lebanese elections, see Usher (1997).
9 Intifada literally means “throwing oﬀ.”
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many more in single suicide bombing attacks. Rather, it demonstrated 
(1) Hezbollah’s willingness to help Hamas pick its targets and plan its 
attacks, and (2) Hamas’s ability to hit more strategic targets.10
Ideological Foundation
Hezbollah articulates a universalistic view of the Muslim community, 
the umma, which incorporates Shi’ite, Sunnis, and even secularists.11
In 1995 the Journal of Palestine Studies published an interview with the 
spiritual leader of Hezbollah, Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. 
In the interview, Sheikh Fadlallah stated:
The Muslims are having diﬃculty bringing forth the kind of 
Islamic resistance to which they aspire. . . . Speaking in general 
terms, you could say they are seeking what could be termed a 
concrete expression of Islamic reality—a movement, a way of 
life, a political position in particular. There is a visceral Muslim 
identity, even among secularists who may not be consciously 
aware of it. This involves a spontaneous identiﬁcation with other 
Muslims—in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, wherever—
irrespective of the merits of the case.12
10 Usher (1997) and Cragin interviews, Israeli counterterrorism experts, April 2004. The 
research for this book was conducted immediately following the March 2004 Ashdod attack. 
That attack spurred more counterterrorism analysts within Israel to focus on the nexus 
between Hezbollah and Palestinian militants. Since that time more information has come 
to light. What has been discovered is that Hamas has been reluctant to allow Hezbollah too 
much foothold in the Palestinian Territories. But the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades has accepted 
more and more help from Hezbollah. For example, in March 2004, Israel’s Ministry of 
Foreign Aﬀairs issued a press release on the arrest of Shadi Abu Alhatzin, the leader of an 
al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades cell in Khan Yunis (Gaza Strip). The release stated that Alhatzin 
had revealed to Israeli security oﬃcials that a Hezbollah representative came to Khan Yunis 
in 2003 to provide training in communications security. “ISA arrests head of Gaza Strip 
Hezbollah cell,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il (as of March 
10, 2004). Similarly, subsequent interviews with Israeli security oﬃcials suggest that Qeis 
Ubeid, an Israeli Arab from Taibeh associated with Hezbollah, aided the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ 
Brigades cell in Nablus. Interview with authors, Israeli security oﬃcial, June 2005.
11 For more on the ideology of Hezbollah, see Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), pp. 69–87.
12 Soueid (1995), p. 61.
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Some have argued that this universalism is somewhat paradoxi-
cal, given that Hezbollah is a Shi’ite group and that clear divisions 
exist between the minority Shi’ites and majority Sunnis in the Muslim 
world. To a degree, this argument holds true. Since its inception, 
Hezbollah has maintained its belief that the Ayatollah Khomeini was 
the divinely inspired ruler of the umma and that his successor, Ali 
Khameini is the true “Legal Guardian of the Muslims” today.13 This 
concept, referred to as Velayat al-Faqih, places Iran’s religious leader 
at the center of Hezbollah’s religious and pan-Islamic worldview—a 
position that Sunnis oppose. Additionally, it is important to note that 
Hezbollah combines this Islamic outlook with strong Lebanese nation-
alistic rhetoric. In this sense, Hezbollah is not purely pan-Islamic in its 
outlook. 
Hezbollah may publicly sympathize with Islamic revolutions in 
countries such as Algeria, but it has not adopted these movements into 
its lexicon of “our umma.” Indeed, the only Muslim community that 
in Hezbollah’s view requires a pan-Islamic jihad on its behalf is the 
Palestinians.14 The universalism of Hezbollah’s ideology, therefore, 
appears to have pragmatic overtones that allow the group to pick and 
choose the Islamic movements with which it publicly associates, such as 
the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Palestinian national movement. 
Hezbollah’s adoption of the Palestinian movement is also 
fairly complex. Palestinians are predominantly Sunnis, not Shi’ites. 
Moreover, the PLO contributed to the chaos and civil war that aﬄicted 
Lebanon for much of the 1970s and 1980s. Hezbollah appears to jus-
tify its support for the Palestinian movement by rationalizing that the 
Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, rather than Palestinian nationalism per 
se, is the epitome of a pan-Islamic cause. Thus, Jerusalem is a symbol 
of the umma itself, and its liberation is a Muslim duty, not a Palestin-
ian duty.15 This justiﬁcation allows Hezbollah to support the Palestinian 
jihad but not other Muslim struggles. 
13 Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), pp. 64–65.
14 Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), pp. 75–76.
15 Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), p. 73.
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Not all the help that Hezbollah provides the Palestinians, how-
ever, can be tied directly to the status of Jerusalem. For example, in 
February 2004, Hezbollah successfully negotiated a prisoner swap with 
the Israeli government—the return of Israeli soldiers (or their remains) 
for the release of Hezbollah and Palestinian prisoners. By including 
Palestinian terrorists in its negotiations, Hezbollah gained legitimacy 
with the sympathetic Lebanese and Palestinian population. Similarly, 
Hezbollah has reportedly encouraged Hamas and the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad to shift its attacks toward more strategic targets (such as 
the Israeli port in Ashdod).16 So Hezbollah’s ideological base for sup-
port clearly gives way to more pragmatic purposes at times.
The ideological foundations of Hezbollah, therefore, explain at 
least part of the group’s reluctance to join the al-Qaeda network. Its 
leadership might feel some spontaneous sympathy with wider pan-
Islamist, Sunni agendas, but these movements do not necessarily align 
with Hezbollah ideologically. Sheikh Fadlallah continues in the afore-
mentioned interview to say:
Despite this strong identity, the Islamic world is suﬀering from a 
lack of clear and objective understanding of the true situation of 
Islam and Islamic thought. This is evident from the proliferation 
of Islamic movements, some reactionary, wanting to live as if it 
were ﬁve hundred or six hundred years ago, some archaic, some 
resorting to violence in situations when peaceful means can be 
pursued, some with a sound grasp of reality and whose tactics, 
whether violent or peaceful, are guided by objective analyses.17
In this interview, Sheikh Fadlallah is strongly critical of many 
Islamic movements. Yet he does not name speciﬁc deviant groups. Part 
of the reason for this reluctance to criticize other movements may be 
strategic. Even though Hezbollah does not align with other Islamist 
groups ideologically, it may still coordinate with them. We will discuss 
the issue of pragmatic strategies in other chapters. Here, we empha-
size merely that, despite the ideological disparities that appear evident 
16 Cragin interview, Israeli counterterrorism experts, April 2004.
17 Soueid (1995), p. 62.
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between Hezbollah and the al-Qaeda network, some parallel inter-
ests exist. In particular, Hezbollah has historically opposed “Western 
domination” of the Muslim world in general and U.S. inﬂuence spe-
ciﬁcally. According to Sheikh Nassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of 
Hezbollah, “They are primarily responsible for all Israeli crimes.”18 So 
while the ideological background of Hezbollah might explain its lack 
of aﬃliation with the al-Qaeda network, Hezbollah’s strategic objec-
tives pave the way for cooperation.19
Strategic and Operational Objectives
Until May 2000, Hezbollah’s primary objective was to remove the 
Israeli military presence from southern Lebanon. In addition, Hezbollah 
has gradually expanded its support base in Lebanon in order to gain 
political legitimacy and power. Yet unlike many of the Islamist mili-
tant groups, Hezbollah’s terrorist and guerrilla campaigns are directed 
outward toward Israel, rather than at its political adversaries inside 
Lebanon. This pattern is likely due to Syria’s strong inﬂuence both with 
Hezbollah and more generally in Lebanon.20 Hezbollah’s support for 
the Palestinian movement represents a ﬁnal strategic objective. Indeed, 
in April 2001, Sheikh Nasrallah made this statement at a conference on 
the Palestinian intifada in Tehran:
18 Quoted in “Lo, the Party of God Still Vows Victory,” Time, August 9, 1993, p. 33.
19 In August 2003, CNN reported that U.S. intelligence oﬃcials were concerned about 
a potential alliance between Imad Mugniyah and Mussab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. Mugniyah 
has been linked with Hezbollah since the early 1980s, while Zarqawi has been linked with 
al-Qaeda. At the time of writing, this link does not appear to be a strategic alliance, rather 
a practical arrangement between two individuals. “New Terrorism Alliance Suspected in 
Iraq,” CNN, 13 August 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/13/iraq.
terror (as of Mach 10, 2006). 
20 In the late 1980s, Hezbollah and Amal (another Shi’ite insurgent group) fought for 
supremacy in Lebanon. Syria stepped in and forced a truce between the groups. See “Syria 
Troops Enforce South Beirut Truce; Inter-Shiite Fighting Ends,” World News Digest,
LexisNexis, June 3, 1988. 
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We should look at the Intifada as the spearhead of the nation that 
needs our support. The Palestinians are defending our nation as 
well as its dignity and holy shrines.21
Hezbollah’s militant activities follow its strategic objectives closely. 
For example, Hezbollah conducted the bulk of its suicide bombings 
against U.S., French, and Israeli targets from the spring of 1983 to the 
summer of 1985. After the summer of 1985, Hezbollah began to move 
toward more guerrilla-like warfare against Israeli troops in southern 
Lebanon. This shift appears to be the result of Syria’s intervention in 
the Lebanese civil war in 1988 and 1989. At this time, Hezbollah’s 
main competitor, Amal,22 was forced to give up its weapons, while 
Hezbollah negotiated to keep its weapons as long as they were used to 
dislodge the Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon. Yet even 
though Hezbollah radically decreased its use of suicide bombings in 
the summer of 1985, it did not lose its capabilities to conduct such 
attacks. Indeed, after Israeli forces assassinated the group’s leader, Abbas 
Musawi, in February 1992, Hezbollah apparently retaliated with a sui-
cide attack against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. Two years later, 
Hezbollah apparently conducted a similar attack against the Jewish 
Cultural Center in that same city (see Chapter Seven).23
Israeli experts submit that Hezbollah conducted the attacks in 
Argentina only after it appeared to be losing ground in the ﬁght against 
Israel.24 For the most part, however, Hezbollah has remained focused 
on its regional agenda. Hezbollah is also known for launching Katyusha 
21 Taken from the Hezbollah Web site, http://www.hizballah.org  (as of January 19, 2003).
22 The Amal movement was established in 1975 by Imam Musa as Sadr, an Iranian-born 
Shi’ite cleric of Lebanese ancestry. It is a ﬁerce competitor of Hezbollah for leadership of the 
Lebanese Shi’ite community.
23 Hezbollah is generally accepted as responsible for these two attacks, but it has not 
claimed them. After a long investigation by oﬃcials in the Argentine Supreme Court, secu-
rity authorities issued a warrant for the arrest of Imad Mugniyah in 1999, for ordering the 
1992 attack in Buenos Aires. For more information, see “Argentina Issues Warrant in Israeli 
Embassy Bombing,” International Counterterrorism Center, September 4, 1999, http://www.
ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=318 (as of March 10, 2006). 
24 Cragin interviews, Israeli counterterrorism experts, April 2004.
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rockets across the border into northern Israel and for kidnapping Israeli 
soldiers along the border. Throughout most of its guerrilla campaign, 
Hezbollah was able to keep one step ahead of the Israeli military.25
Some argue that this ability was due to the nature of the Israeli military 
position, which was predominantly defensive and static. 
Environmental Factors
The degree of inﬂuence that Syria and Iran have over Hezbollah’s 
behavior is still in question. Clearly, Syria has played a signiﬁcant role 
in the development of Hezbollah. But the beneﬁts that Hezbollah 
derives from its relationship with Syria are more than just the sum total 
of weapons and money received. Hezbollah has been able to utilize 
support from Syria in its escalation-counterescalation warfare with the 
Israeli military. For example, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) noticed 
in the early 1990s that Hezbollah forces had begun to use remotely 
detonated explosive devices in southern Lebanon. Guerrillas would 
plant these bombs along the roads and detonate them as IDF patrols 
drove by. In response, the IDF began to detonate the bombs early, 
using the same radio frequency as Hezbollah. Rather than give up the 
tactic, Hezbollah went back to Syria to obtain a weapons upgrade. The 
result was a remote-detonated bomb with scrambling devices as well 
as a bomb detonated by a computer that provided multiple-frequency 
transmissions.26 Additionally, analysts point out that Syria “checked” 
Hezbollah’s guerrilla activities in southern Lebanon during peace talks 
between Syria and Israel in the late 1990s. Syria has also acted as arbi-
trator between Hezbollah and the rival Shi’ite movement Amal in the 
past.27 These examples appear to demonstrate signiﬁcant Syrian inﬂu-
ence over Hezbollah’s activities. 
25 See, for example, the 1998 interviews with IDF oﬃcials published in the Jerusalem Report.
Leslie Susser, “IDF Plans to Beef Up Lebanon Intelligence,” The Jerusalem Report, LexisNexis, 
September 14, 1998.
26 For more information, see “Hizballah and Israelis Wage Electronic War in South 
Lebanon” (1995).
27 Jaber (1997), pp. 210–211.
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With regard to Iran, the hierarchical nature of Hezbollah is the 
result of its ties to Iran. For example, each unit has a “ﬁghting cleric.” 
Trained in religious and military warfare, these clerics derive their 
authority from Hezbollah’s Shura Council and, to a certain extent, 
Iran.28 Thus Hezbollah’s core leadership can be assured that its orders 
will be followed, as ground units receive both spiritual and operational 
oversight. In addition, Fadlallah has strong ties with Iranian clerics. 
The strategic relationship between Iran and Hezbollah is perhaps best 
illustrated by the fact that Hezbollah followed Iran’s example in its 
reaction to the 9/11 attacks, denouncing these attacks but continu-
ing to support Palestinian terrorism.29 Iran and Syria therefore appear 
to be the most signiﬁcant external factors that inﬂuence Hezbollah’s 
behavior.
Hezbollah also has demonstrated sensitivity to its support com-
munity in southern Lebanon. During the Israeli occupation, the IDF 
attempted to disconnect Hezbollah from its supporters by penalizing 
the latter. The IDF reasoned that the Shi’ite community would blame 
Hezbollah for its situation and reduce its support for the group. While 
this counterinsurgency strategy worked initially, Hezbollah soon devel-
oped an extensive relief and charity network in southern Lebanon.30
Since May 2000, Hezbollah has used this network to strengthen its 
political base. In this context, Hezbollah’s lack of Islamist-like goals 
within Lebanon could be attributed to attempts to broaden its support 
community. Lebanon, with a population of 3.5 million, has 18 diﬀerent 
religious sects. The result is a fragmented society. To expand its support 
base to include Christians and Sunni Muslims, therefore, Hezbollah 
must tone down its Shi’ite ideology and rhetoric and emphasize its 
social and charitable activities. Nizar Hamzeh, a terrorism expert at 
the American University in Beirut, oﬀered this explanation in 2000, 
28 Cragin interview, Hezbollah expert, Tel Aviv, April 2004.
29 Sobelman (2001).
30 Wege (1994), pp. 157–159; Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), pp. 7–33; and Bruce W. Nelan, 
“What’s Peace Got to Do with It?” Time, August 9, 1993, pp. 32–33.
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“Hizballah is pragmatic and has decided to perform a contract with the 
wicked, but the achievement of an Islamic state will always be there as 
a goal.”31
Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement
The Islamic Resistance Movement, known by its acronym Hamas, has 
its organizational roots in Gaza’s al-Mujamma al-Islami, also known as 
the Islamic Centre, which the late Sheikh Ahmad Yasin began in 1973. 
Sheikh Yasin used the Centre to draw together the eventual founders of 
Hamas, including Isa al-Nashshar, Dr. Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Abdulfattah 
Doukhan, Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi, Mohamad Hassan Shama’a, and 
Salah Shehade (Rantisi and Shehade, as well as Yasin, were killed in tar-
geted assassinations). According to Hamas leaders and Israeli oﬃcials, 
this Islamic Centre was registered with the Israeli military authori-
ties that administered the Gaza Strip in 1978.32 This registration also 
explains a common argument made by Israeli authors that the Israeli 
government, in eﬀect, “sponsored” Hamas in an eﬀort to undermine 
Yasser Arafat and the PLO.33 The spiritual-reformist organization sput-
tered to a halt in 1983 when Yasin was arrested for gun smuggling.34
After that, the organization apparently focused its activities on build-
ing schools and mosques, scholarship programs for university students, 
and other charitable activities. 
Hamas leaders have also said that around this time, Centre mem-
bers began to consider an eﬀort to launch militant activities against 
Israel.35 It was not until 1988, after the beginning of the ﬁrst intifada 
,that the organization formally presented itself as “Hamas.” Its mili-
tary branch was named al-Qassam, after a Palestinian activist from 
31 Quoted in “Hizbullah Heroes Face the Test of Peace,” The Guardian, June 1, 2000.
32 For more information, see Charbel (2003). See also Israeli (1993).
33 Charbel (2003); Israeli (1993).
34 Charbel (2003); Israeli (1993).
35 Charbel (2003).
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the 1936 Arab Revolt. The original leader of al-Qassam was Salah She-
hade; he was killed by the Israeli military in July 2002 and replaced by 
Muhammed Dief.36
Hamas derives its legitimacy from claims that it was the pri-
mary instigator of the ﬁrst intifada, which began in December 1987. 
More likely, it managed to capitalize on this wider movement, along 
with Arafat and the PLO. For example, Hamas issued its charter in 
January 1988 and would subsequently publish 30 communiqués out-
lining its positions and philosophy over the subsequent eight months. 
These communiqués provided Hamas with the opportunity to estab-
lish itself as an Islamic alternative to the secular PLO. In addition, 
Hamas derives legitimacy from its local activism and charitable activi-
ties, which began in 1973 and continue today. The combination of 
these activities established Hamas as a credible player in the Palestinian 
political and militant arena.37
In May 1989 the Israeli government arrested Sheikh Yasin. 
Hamas’s Gaza spokesman, Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi, and Yasin’s acting 
deputy, Ismail Abu Shanab, assumed leadership of the group with-
out much diﬃculty. This seamless leadership handover would even-
tually become a key characteristic of Hamas. Indeed, in December 
1992, former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin deported over 400 
Palestinian activists to the Marj al-Zahur camp in southern Lebanon. 
Although Hamas members—including Dr. Rantisi and former West 
Bank leader Salah Darwaza—made up a substantial portion of the 
deportees, Hamas continued its militant activities.38 Some analysts 
argue that the deportations actually caused the organization to become 
more militant. Two years later, Hamas carried out its ﬁrst suicide 
bombing when it attacked a bus in Afula, killing eight and injuring 
36 IDF Spokespersons Unit, “Salah Shehadeh—Portrait of a Hamas Leader,” Novem-
ber 10, 2002, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/government/communiques/2002/ﬁndings+of+the+
inquiry+into+the+death+of+salah+sh.htm (as of March 10, 2006).
37 For more information on the evolution of Hamas, see Mishal and Sela (2000). 
38 Jarbawi and Heacock (1993), pp. 32–45. See also Bedein (1999).
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approximately 44 persons.39 This attack marked the beginning of a 
violent campaign waged by Hamas against the Israelis, which also was 
intended to undermine the secular Palestinian Authority.40
Hamas’s campaign of violence is aimed at the Israeli government 
and population, not the United States or other allies. Despite its oppo-
sition to the Oslo Accords, the Wye Agreement, and the Road Map 
for Peace, Hamas has remained aloof from bin Laden’s appeal to join a 
global jihad, even though Sheikh Yasin expressed anger over the U.S. 
government’s support for the government of Ariel Sharon, as well as the 
U.S.-led war in Iraq.41 Indeed, many Palestinian Islamist leaders have 
been critical of bin Laden’s use of the Palestinian cause in his rhetoric. 
Ideological Foundation
Hamas’s ideology, like that of many Islamic movements in the 
Arab world, is ﬁrmly grounded in the teachings of Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood (for more information on the Muslim Brotherhood, see 
the section in Chapter Three on al-Gama’a and the Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad). Indeed, Sheikh Yasin was the leader of the Gaza Strip branch 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s and early 1980s.42 One key 
ideological diﬀerence between the Brotherhood and Hamas is that 
Hamas believes in the use of violence in addition to passive resistance 
and charitable evangelism. Hamas’s ideology is also strongly nation-
alistic, in contrast to the Brotherhood’s pan-Islamism. Despite these 
diﬀerences, Hamas is still considered a militant faction of the wider 
Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza. As such, 
a number of Hamas’s objectives—promoting traditional Islamic values 
and reducing Western inﬂuence—remain consistent with those of 
39 For more information on Hamas’s terrorist activities, see the RAND Terrorism Chronology 
and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp. 
40 For more information on the conﬂict between the PLO and Hamas, see Saikal (1994), pp. 
28–30.
41 In October 2003, Sheikh Yasin expressed the view that the United States is lying to the 
world about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and misinterprets Hamas’s struggle with 
Israel. “Hamas Leader Talks Strategies,” BBC News, October 29, 2003.
42 Hroub (2000), pp. 32–36.
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al-Qaeda and the broader Islamist movement. This belief system can be 
seen in an interview with Hamas’s chief spokesman, Mahmud Zahhar, 
in 1994: 
A pebble tossed in a pool leaves a series of concentric circles. I live 
in the Rimal quarter. This quarter is in Gaza. Gaza is in Palestine. 
Palestine is in the Arab world. The Arab world is in the Islamic 
world. The error arises when you try to substitute a little circle 
for a bigger one, for instance, making the small circle of narrow 
nationalism a substitute for the large circle of the great commu-
nity of believers.43
Thus, in many ways the ideological foundation of Hamas would 
seem to indicate a strong parallel between its interests and that of 
global jihadists. Hamas’s leadership clearly views itself as one of many 
Islamist movements throughout the greater Islamic community. At 
the same time, the group has been reluctant to join the al-Qaeda net-
work. Why? Hamas could beneﬁt from al-Qaeda’s support, especially 
given the cyclical attacks and counterattacks that have occurred during 
the most recent intifada. These continued operations have stretched 
Hamas’s resources, even as Western governments have clamped down 
on its network of support organizations in the United States and 
Europe.44 Additionally, the Israeli military has killed over 20 Hamas 
leaders since October 2000. Therefore, at this seemingly low point in 
Hamas’s development, a tactical alliance with global jihadists would 
seem to have some appeal.
The charter published by Hamas in 1988 perhaps clariﬁes the 
group’s reluctance to join the al-Qaeda network. It makes a clear dis-
tinction between global Islamist movements and the Hamas move-
ment in Palestine:
43 Quoted in “Interview with Mahmud Zahhar” (1995), p. 84.
44 After 9/11, the U.S. government shut down a number of Hamas charities and has pres-
sured other governments, especially the UK, to do so as well. This pressure appears to have 
aﬀected Hamas because the quality of its weapons and explosive devices used shows a 
decrease over the past three years. In addition, Hezbollah has been attempting to augment 
the Palestinian uprising by providing its own weapons. 
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The Islamic Resistance Movement is an outstanding type of 
Palestinian movement. It gives its loyalty to Allah, adopts Islam 
as a system of life, and works toward raising the banner of Allah 
over every inch of Palestine. Therefore, in the shadow of Islam, 
it is possible for all followers of diﬀerent religions to live in peace 
and with security over their person, property, and rights. In the 
absence of Islam, discord takes form, oppression and destruction 
are rampant, and wars and battles take place.45
So while al-Qaeda and Hamas have similar ideological roots, 
Hamas’s interpretation of its role in the Islamic community is nar-
rower and focused fundamentally on the Palestinian question. This 
narrow focus is an important element in Hamas’s ideology. Moreover, 
the group has been consistent in its beliefs. Nevertheless, a shift in its 
focus toward the United States is possible under some circumstances, 
given Hamas’s strategic and operational objectives.
Strategic and Operational Objectives
Hamas’s fundamental objective is to establish an Islamic Palestinian 
state. That objective has two subsets: 
to create a separate Palestinian state 
to assert an Islamic form of government in that state.46
To achieve the ﬁrst strategic objective, Hamas has focused its 
attacks on the Israeli government and citizens. A key tactic in this 
campaign is suicide bombings. Although Hamas was not the ﬁrst 
Palestinian terrorist group to adopt the tactic of suicide bombings, 
it has perhaps been the most successful. Hamas initially conducted 
these attacks (the ﬁrst, as mentioned above, took place in 1994) against 
bus passengers. Since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000, 
Hamas has also targeted shopping malls, cafés, and pedestrian markets. 
Many terrorism scholars argue that Hamas uses this tactic because of 
45 Hamas charter, translated and published in the Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 
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its shock and media value. While that argument seems logical, Hamas 
spokesmen continue to state that the purpose of these attacks is to 
retaliate for Israeli assassinations of its leaders. Hamas makes this argu-
ment not only through interviews with media representatives, but also 
with announcements over mosque loudspeakers in the West Bank and 
Gaza.
Hamas is careful to explain its motivations because the wider 
Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza has, at times, 
been highly critical of the use of suicide bombers. For example, after a 
series of suicide bombings in 1996, a public opinion poll taken in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip indicated that a majority (59 percent) of 
Palestinians believed that the Palestinian Authority should take steps 
to stop the suicide attacks.47
Hamas’s second strategic objective is the establishment of an 
Islamic Palestinian state. To achieve this objective, Hamas must oppose 
the Palestinian Authority and al-Fatah organization. The Hamas 
leadership, therefore, decided to abstain from Palestinian National 
Authority elections in 1995 and instead to focus on municipal elec-
tions in the Palestinian territories.48 It continues to argue that it does 
not want a civil war in the territories and will pursue its Islamic agenda 
through democratic means after the creation of a Palestinian state. Yet 
there have been a number of clashes between Hamas and al-Fatah since 
1988.49 Similarly, Hamas has been criticized within and outside the 
wider Palestinian community for undermining the peace process and, 
with it, any chance of independence for the Palestinians. Mahmud 
Zahhar addressed this criticism in 1995:
The problem is that we always use as our starting point interna-
tional acceptance of power rather than the people’s acceptance. 
What’s the use of having a state that is accepted by the Arab and 
Western states if the people are against it? Isn’t that the case of 
Algeria? Or Sudan? It seems that the world is looking for civil 
wars . . . What if the people support their state and the whole 
47 For more information, see Cragin and Chalk (2003).
48 “Interview with Mahmud Zahhar.” See also Mishal and Sela (2000), pp. 113–146.
49 See, for example, Ahmad (1994); and Kattub (1992).
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world is against it? Isn’t the most important thing to be in har-
mony with one’s people? What is the source of legitimacy—the 
general will of the people or acceptance by America and the 
Western powers? I leave you to choose which is preferable.50
Hamas, therefore, presents an interesting contradiction in stra-
tegic and operational objectives, especially when it comes to potential 
shifts. On the one hand, evidence indicates that Hamas’s leadership is 
focused exclusively on Israel and ending the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. This leadership appears to be pragmatic 
enough to realize that widening the conﬂict may alienate its own sup-
port base, bring in a strong U.S. response, and harm its ability to com-
pete politically with al-Fatah. That said, an argument could be made 
that, from Hamas’s point of view, the United States has not prevented 
the Israeli government from pursuing a policy of targeted assassina-
tions, bulldozing the houses of families linked to terrorist attacks, or 
building the new security fence. It is also arguable that the Israeli gov-
ernment could not aﬀord to continue these policies without military 
and ﬁnancial support from the U.S. government. So it is not unimagi-
nable that Hamas could shift some attention to U.S. targets, however 
unlikely that may be. 
Environmental Factors
Several environmental factors inﬂuence Hamas’s choice of tactics, 
targets, and strategic objectives. The primary inﬂuence, as discussed 
above, appears to be its relationship with local Palestinian communi-
ties and, to some extent, the Palestinian diaspora. But there are other 
important factors. For example, during the Gulf War, Arafat chose to 
side with Saddam Hussein. Hamas leaders, in contrast, openly crit-
icized Saddam’s occupation of Kuwait. As a result, Hamas received 
an inﬂux of monetary support from charities and individuals in the 
Gulf States in the early 1990s.51 Though not rising to the level of state 
50 “Interview with Mahmud Zahhar.”
51 For examples of such reports, see Ramati (1993), p. 2; and Emerson, (1992), p. 27.
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sponsorship (as in the case of Lebanese Hezbollah), these funds helped 
Hamas sustain its charitable and military activities. 
More important is the Hamas relationship with al-Fatah and 
the Palestinian Authority. At the beginning of the second intifada, 
Palestinian secular and religious terrorist groups formed a uniﬁed 
command to help coordinate activities against Israel.52 This relation-
ship, more than any other, exempliﬁes the pragmatic nature of Hamas. 
Though it is an ideologically based group, it is willing to cooperate with 
potential antagonists if it will help further the group’s long-term strate-
gic or short-term operational objectives. Notably, in the spring of 2004 
the cooperation between Hamas, al-Fatah, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ 
Brigades (a terrorist group linked to al-Fatah) became strained. In 
part, this was the result of Hamas’s declaration that it was ready to 
govern in Gaza after a unilateral Israeli withdrawal. Similarly, the al-
Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade has begun to challenge the old power structure 
within al-Fatah. Internecine violence broke out in July 2004, which 
included kidnappings and violent riots in Ramallah as well as in the 
Gaza Strip. 
Epilogue
The research for this study was conducted prior to the January 2006 
Palestinian elections in which Hamas—or more correctly, Hamas’s 
Change and Reform Party—won an outright majority (74 out of 132 
seats) in the Palestinian Legislative Council. In those elections, Hamas’s 
platform focused primarily on internal issues and corruption within 
Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Indeed, since winning, Hamas 
leaders have continued to argue that they want to introduce domestic 
economic and political reforms before returning to the issue of the 
peace process. That said, international pressure may force Hamas to 
address the peace process before the group would prefer.
For the most part, the analysis provided in this chapter has held 
true even given those elections. Hamas’s leaders have continued to 
balance an internal religious agenda with a pragmatic approach. For 
example, Hamas’s leaders have made an eﬀort to reach out to Fatah to 
52 For past coordination, see leaﬂets republished in Mishal and Aharoni (2004).
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form a more cooperative government. Hamas also appointed an inter-
nal party personality, Ismail Haniyeh, as prime minister, and Abed 
al-Azia Duaik as the head of the Palestinian Legislative Council.53
(The political head of the organization, Khaled Mashaal, is based in 
Damascus.) Duaik, in particular, is a well-respected academic in the 
West Bank. Thus, his appointment indicates a signal on the part of 
Hamas that its religious reforms are likely to be secondary to economic 
reforms at least in the early phases of its leadership. Fatah’s leaders, for 
the most part, have rejected Hamas’s eﬀorts toward cooperation. The 
al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have con-
tinued their terrorist attacks, although at a reduced tempo. 
Similarly, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released 
a statement in which he warns Hamas that “power is not an end in 
itself, but simply a stage on the path of implementing Sharia law” and 
called on the organization to continue the ﬁght against Israel. In a 
public interview, Hamas’s political leader Mashaal said the movement 
had “its own vision” and did not need al-Qaeda’s advice.54 A state-
ment by a radical Kuwaiti cleric, Sheikh Hamed al-Ali, distributed to 
jihadi forums suggests that Hamas should hold steadfast to Islamic 
law, not deviate to fall into the “mirage of peace” and reject previous 
agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority. Sheikh al-Ali refers to 
three traps in which he believes the West and Israel want Hamas to be 
ensnared, including substitution of Islamic law for treaties such as Oslo 
and Camp David, laying down arms and then being led to the “slaugh-
ter of humiliation,” and becoming a “toy” in the hands of the White 
House, the Kremlin, the European Parliament, and the “Enslavement 
Nations” (United Nations).55 In another posting, Abu Yehia al-Libi, an 
53 Duaik was deported in 1992, along with 415 other individuals associated with various 
Palestinian terrorist groups. He returned to the West Bank and Gaza Strip approximately one 
year later but apparently did not actively participate in Hamas activities or decisionmaking.
54 “Hamas Rejects al-Qaeda’s Support,” BBC News, March 5, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4776578.stm (as of April 23, 2006).
55 SITE Institute, “A Statement from Sheikh Hamed al-Ali Addressing the Core of the 
Problem Between Ayman al-Zawahiri, Hamas, and the Chechen Mujahideen,” March 8, 2006, 
http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications154706&Category=publications&
Subcategory=0 (as of April 23, 2006).
24    Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe
al-Qaeda operative who escaped with three others from the U.S. prison 
in Bagran, Afghanistan, in July 2005, writes of four “perversions and 
corrupt behaviors” that Hamas has manifested, including entering into 
an “inﬁdel legislative council” and not making Islamic law paramount 
to all other concerns.56
The jihadist criticism of Hamas, as Stephen Ulph notes, lays bare 
the rift between the global jihadist movement, with its supra-national 
goals, and local groups and organizations that have more limited objec-
tives and are open to tactical use of the political process. It has also 
exposed the fear that political progress, however limited, will compete 
with the jihadist program.57 For the present, it appears that Hamas sees 
its own interests as separate from those of al-Qaeda and of the wider 
global jihadist movement.
56 SITE Institute, “Hamas and the Impending Exposure by Abu Yehia al-Libi,” April 17, 
2006, http://www.siteinstitute.org.
57 Ulph (2006). 
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CHAPTER THREE
Other Islamist Groups Outside the al-Qaeda 
Network
The Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Terrorism and revolutionary violence have played a signiﬁcant role 
in the modern history of Algeria. From 1954 to 1962, the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN) fought against the French colonial pres-
ence in this country and used terrorist attacks both in Algeria and in 
France as part of this war. Although the FLN was a predominantly 
nationalist organization, it used religious rhetoric in an eﬀort to mobi-
lize support. Once it came to power in Algeria, it began to restrict 
expressions of political Islam. Approximately 30 years later, an Islamist 
revolutionary organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), would 
institute a campaign against the Algerian government now controlled 
by the FLN. 
The GIA began in response to the Algerian government’s decision 
to nullify the 1992 popular elections, which would have brought the 
Muslim party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), into power. The FIS 
had gained momentum in the period between 1988 and 1992, partly in 
response to local factors and partly as a result of a wider Islamist move-
ment across North Africa. The FIS established a social base in such 
urban centers as Algiers, Blida, Oran, Annaba, and Mostaghanem. In 
fact, it was the populations of these cities that rioted against the estab-
lished order in October 1988 and contributed to the success of the FIS 
in the 1992 elections.1
1 For more information see, Yaphe (2002), Chapter 2.
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The GIA, in contrast to the FIS, was based in the countryside 
and has been one of the most extreme Islamist terrorist groups in his-
tory, often using tactics more brutal than those employed by some of 
the most savage terrorist organizations operating today. This extreme 
violence alienated the GIA from what could have been a wider popu-
lar base in both rural and urban areas and in recent years has caused a 
signiﬁcant decline in its ability to conduct attacks both in Algeria and 
abroad. 
Ideological Foundation
The ideological foundations of the GIA are similar to those of other 
Islamists emerging in the late 1980s. Its leaders were inﬂuenced by 
Egyptian Islamist theoreticians, such as Sayyid Qutb, and they saw 
the establishment of an Islamic government in Algeria as their pri-
mary goal.2 Before the 1992 elections, Islamists might have thought 
that this revolution could be accomplished peacefully. Yet the military 
crackdown that prevented the FIS from coming into power ruled this 
possibility out.
GIA leaders believed that only an Islamic state could successfully 
take care of its citizens’ spiritual and material wealth. Moreover, to 
achieve this revolution, political activities needed to be accompanied 
by violence. Indeed, many of the group’s initial leaders and members 
had just returned from the Afghan war. These individuals had received 
a signiﬁcant amount of religious indoctrination and training in the 
methods of guerrilla warfare. They had also witnessed the power of 
jihad to bring down even a “superpower,” the Soviet Union.3 Thus, 
2 See Kepel (2002), pp. 159–173. Sayyid Qutb was one of the most signiﬁcant ﬁgures 
in the development of modern radical Islamism. While in prison, before his execution by 
President Nasser’s government, he wrote the inﬂuential book, Ma’alim ﬁ’ l-tariq (“Signposts 
for the Road”), a manifesto drawn from his vast, multivolume commentary on the Quran, 
Fi zilal al-Qur’an (“In the Shade of the Quran”). Qutb argued that the Muslim world was in 
a state of jahiliyyah, the ignorance that prevailed before Muhammad’s revelation, and that 
the governments of Muslim countries were apostate and therefore illegitimate. He advocated 
the seizure of power by a revolutionary vanguard that would then impose Islamization from 
above.
3 Kepel (2002).
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it was logical that their ideology would be rooted in beliefs similar to 
those of other returning jihadist ﬁghters, such as members of al-Gama’a 
al-Islamiyya in Egypt or the Islamic Army of Aden Abyan in Yemen. 
Until 1998, the GIA was the most powerful and active Islamic 
extremist group in Algeria. At that point, a splinter organization, the 
Salaﬁst Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), eclipsed the GIA, 
as discussed in the ﬁrst volume of this study as a result of popular 
revulsion at the GIA’s use of extreme violence against civilians. The 
GSPC eventually joined the al-Qaeda network, whereas the GIA has 
remained largely independent and has relegated itself in recent years to 
conducting small-scale attacks inside Algeria.
Strategic and Operational Objectives
Throughout the 1990s, the GIA waged what many have considered 
to be an insurgent campaign against the Algerian government, using 
rural, mountainous hideouts to conduct strikes against Algerian police 
and security forces. The group complemented its rural insurgency with 
an urban terrorist campaign that focused on assassinating key govern-
ment, intellectual, and cultural ﬁgures in Algeria, in addition, bomb 
attacks in restaurants and against other civilian targets.4 In what some 
would describe as an act of desperation, the GIA turned to conducting 
large-scale civilian massacres. In some cases, the GIA conducted massa-
cres of whole villages using mostly knives and machetes, in an attempt 
to force loyalty and support from Algerian Muslims. The massacres 
appeared as random acts of violence in which women and children 
were brutally killed. In fact, the GIA was targeting speciﬁc villages, 
families, and communities that it believed were providing support to 
rival Islamist factions.5 The GIA was trying to send a message that if 
Algerian civilians did not provide support they would suﬀer the same 
fate as the villagers who had been massacred. 
4 Kepel (2002), p. 70.
5 Kalyvas (1999), p. 244. 
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The GIA also adopted what one scholar calls an “apocalyptic” out-
look that embodied the takﬁr ideology,6 essentially the condemnation 
as apostates worthy of death of those Muslims who do not agree with 
the radicals’ interpretation of Islam.7 Eventually this tactic, in conjunc-
tion with other factors, such as a reconciliation program for Islamic 
militants instituted by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteﬂika in July 
1999 (aimed at trying to contain the insurgency by oﬀering amnesty 
in exchange for militants laying down their weapons), resulted in the 
GIA’s decline.8
The Algerian regime was not the GIA’s only target. The GIA 
began establishing cells in Europe and Africa in order to attack its 
other primary adversary, France. The group held the French respon-
sible for propping up the Algerian regime and resented the inﬂuence 
of French culture on Algerian society, which it viewed as harmful to 
Islam and the Arabic language and culture.9 As a result, the GIA waged 
a terrorist campaign inside France—primarily through these external 
networks—and relied heavily on the large Algerian expatriate popula-
tion in France to provide support. 
Some of the more noteworthy attacks inside Algeria include the 
massacre at Sidi Youssef in September 1997 in which 63 civilians were 
killed in a relatively protected area (Sidi Youssef is a neighborhood of 
Beni-Messous, an outlying suburb of Algiers which is home to a large 
military base. The security forces did not arrive until several hours 
after the attack, despite being stationed nearby).10 In January 1998, 
the GIA conducted four separate civilian massacres in which over 400 
6 According to Reuven Paz, the takﬁr ideology is “the perception of the secular Muslim 
society as heretical, with the majority of the blame placed on the rulers of the Arabic and 
Islamic states.” See Paz (2000).   
7 Takeyh (2003), p. 70.
8 Takeyh (2003), p. 72.
9 Takeyh (2003), p. 63.
10 Takeyh (2003), p. 63.
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people were killed in one night, raising the proﬁle of these massacres 
with Western governments, which vowed to provide assistance to the 
Algerian government to stop the attacks.11
The GIA also threatened attacks against foreigners inside Algeria 
in 1993, warning them to leave or suﬀer the consequences. To date, 
the GIA is believed to be responsible for over 100 deaths of foreign-
ers in Algeria, mostly Europeans.12 One of the group’s most shocking 
attacks was the killing of seven French monks in May 1996 after they 
were abducted from their monastery.13 Outside Algeria, the GIA con-
ducted a series of bombings in 1995 against the Paris metro, resulting 
in eight deaths and hundreds of wounded. The group also hijacked an 
Air France ﬂight in Marseille in 1994 and bombed a Paris market in 
1995, resulting in four deaths.14 Notably, the GIA has not conducted 
any attacks outside Algeria since 1996.
Environmental Factors
The GIA sealed its own fate through the use of tactics inside Algeria 
that ultimately alienated any potential support base, both by conduct-
ing a campaign of civilian massacres and by attacking small business 
owners and the middle class—the economic backbone of the Muslim 
community in Algeria.15 Unlike the GSPC, which splintered from the 
GIA in 1998 over its use of civilian massacres and its battleﬁeld losses, 
the GIA never established a solid relationship with al-Qaeda outside 
the few members who were veterans of the Afghan war and who knew 
or had met bin Laden in that context. Although bin Laden took a spe-
cial interest in supporting the Algerian extremists at the beginning of 
their campaign—probably because they contributed large numbers of 
11 “Hundreds Murdered in Widespread Algeria Attacks,” International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism, January 6, 1998, http://www.ict.org.il.
12 “Hundreds Murdered in Widespread Algeria Attacks. 
13 “Armed Islamic Group Attacks from 1998–Present,” International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism, http://www.ict.org.il.
14 “Armed Islamic Group,” in U.S. Department of State (2003b); “Groupe Islamique Armee” 
(2003).
15 Takeyh (2003), p. 70.
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ﬁghters to the Afghan war and were trying to establish an Islamic gov-
ernment in Algeria—he eventually turned his back on them because of 
their campaign of civilian massacres.16
The spiritual advisor for the GIA was Abu Qatada, an al-Qaeda 
leader now in British custody. Qatada issued a fatwa for the group in 
the mid-1990s authorizing attacks against women and children,17 but 
he later denied he had done so after it became clear that many in the 
larger Islamic extremist world did not approve of such methods. The 
GSPC vowed not to attack civilians and was able to gain a following 
among Islamist supporters and disgruntled GIA members who had 
been alienated by the GIA’s tactics.18
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya
The Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, an oﬀshoot of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, began in the early 1970s, not as an organized 
terrorist group, but as a student movement in Egyptian universities 
and prisons.19 Although Muslim Brotherhood members assassinated 
Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi Pasha in 1948 and attempted to kill 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954, the strategy and tactics of the 
organization evolved as it reached an informal accommodation with 
the Egyptian power structure. Al-Gama’a leaders rejected the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s gradualist approach to change and instead based their 
ideology on principles enunciated by Sayyid Qutb.20
16 Knights (2003).
17 Michael Isikoﬀ, Daniel Klaidman, and Evan Thomas, “Al Qaeda’s Summer Plans for 
Americans,” Newsweek, June 2, 2003, http://www.stevequayle.com/News.alert/03_Unrest/
030526.al-Qaeda.summer.html (as of March 10, 2006); Terence McKenna, “Inter-
view with Abu Qatada,” CBC News, June 2002, http://www.cbc.ca/national/news/
recruiters/qatada_interview.html (as of March 10, 2006). 
18 “Groupe Salaﬁste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC)” (2003).
19 “Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GAI)” (2003).
20 “Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GAI)” (2003).
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Al-Gama’a began recruiting its mid-level leaders from the ranks 
of unemployed university students angry about the lack of economic 
opportunity, while poorer individuals in the southern rural regions of 
Assiut and Minya populated the group’s rank and ﬁle.21 Although the 
group had an early leadership structure that allowed it to make quick 
decisions, al-Gama’a ranks were loosely organized, allowing for maxi-
mum operational secrecy and eﬀectiveness. After Sadat’s assassination, 
the Egyptian government launched a massive crackdown on Islamic 
extremists and their supporters and jailed a large number of those 
believed to subscribe to extremist views. As a result, terrorist violence 
in Egypt was greatly reduced during the 1980s as many of the Islamic 
extremists who managed to escape imprisonment ﬂed to Afghanistan 
to participate in the jihad against the Soviet Union. In Afghanistan, 
many of al-Gama’a’s future leaders gained expertise in guerrilla war-
fare and terrorist tactics. Those same individuals returned to Egypt in 
the late 1980s ready to apply what they had learned to their struggle 
against the government of Hosni Mubarak. 
Ideological Foundation
The ideological foundations of al-Gama’a are very much intertwined 
with the general emergence of political Islam in modern Egypt. Most 
scholars date a resurgence of political Islam in the Arab world to the 
crisis of secular nationalism following the 1967 Six Day War.22 Yet 
the ideological roots of this political philosophy can be traced back 
to the fourteenth-century philosopher Ibn Taymiyya, who postulated 
that Muslims did not owe allegiance to impious rulers. Ibn Taymiyya’s 
work is signiﬁcant because his philosophy inﬂuenced the avatars of 
such modern radical Islamists as Hasan al-Banna, the founder of 
21 “Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya,” International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, http://
www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=12 (as of March 10, 2006). 
22 See, for example, Kepel (2002). See also Abu-Rabi (1996).
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the Muslim Brotherhood;23 Sayyid Qutb; and Maulana Abu al-Al’a 
Mawdudi.24
The “blind sheikh” Omar Abd al-Rahman and his followers rep-
resent another cleavage in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. He even-
tually became the spiritual leader of al-Gama’a, providing the group 
with religious guidance and issuing fatwas when necessary. Abd al-
Rahman was the ultimate decisionmaker on issues of strategy, and he 
encouraged members to use terrorist tactics to overthrow the Egyptian 
regime, even though he spent most of his time behind prison walls. 
Abd al-Rahman was imprisoned by the Egyptian government in 1981 
for conspiring to kill President Anwar Sadat, released in 1984, and 
then jailed again in 1989 for incitement to riot. In 1990, he went to 
the United States to spread his message to Muslims in New Jersey but 
was jailed in 1995 for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing. He remains in prison today.25
Strategic and Operational Objectives
Al-Gama’a reemerged in the early 1990s with a renewed sense of pur-
pose after the return of its members from the Afghan jihad. Al-Gama’a 
leaders were energized by what they believed was a moral victory of 
Islamism in Afghanistan, and they were convinced that they could 
accomplish in Egypt what the mujahideen had achieved in Afghanistan 
by ousting the “illegitimate” governing power. As a result, al-Gama’a 
put its theories into practice in Egypt by attacking a wide variety of 
targets—Coptic Christians, banks, police, politicians, tourists, and 
23 Ibn Taymiyya’s work was not revived until the Egyptian scholar Jamal al-din al-Afghani 
(1838–1897) began to express reservations about nationalism and modernity in the late 
nineteenth century and used Ibn Taymiyya’s work to do so. Al-Afghani inﬂuenced later 
writings by Rashid Rida (1865–1935) along the same philosophical lines, which then inﬂu-
enced the following twentieth century political thinkers: Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, 
and Muhammad al-Ghazali. Maulana Abu al-Al’a Mawdudi, a contemporary of Qutb from 
India, was also inﬂuenced independently by Ibn Taymiyya’s work. Unlike his Arab contem-
poraries, he argued strongly that pan-Arabism was anti-Islamic. Mawdudi’s work inﬂuenced 
Osama bin Laden and other pan-Islamic militants.
24 Hallaq (1993); Black (2001), p. 155.
25 Katzman (2005).
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the media—with the goal of undermining Egyptian state power, secu-
lar institutions, and the economy and creating the perception that the 
Egyptian government was not able to protect its citizens.26
Two interrelated major splits developed over strategy within the 
organization. The ﬁrst split occurred following the 1997 attack against 
Western tourists at Luxor; the second concerned whether the group 
should ally itself with bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The Luxor operation 
was allegedly organized by a group of renegade al-Gama’a members 
without the authorization of the group’s leadership. The operation 
was designed to embarrass the Egyptian government by demonstrat-
ing that it was unable to protect foreigners. The al-Gama’a operatives 
who planned the attack were also hoping to get a boost in popular 
support from the success of the operation. Instead, there was wide-
spread popular outrage over the incident, causing the group’s historical 
leadership—who were imprisoned in Egypt—to call for a ceaseﬁre to 
discuss the group’s future direction and to repair existing disputes over 
strategy. Most of the group’s active operational leaders were running 
the organization from outside Egypt.
The second split occurred shortly after al-Gama’a’s call for a cease-
ﬁre when the group’s operational leader, Rifa’i Taha Musa, signed bin 
Laden’s 1998 declaration of war against “Jews and Crusaders.”27 Al-
Gama’a was weakened both operationally and ﬁnancially by the after-
eﬀects of the Luxor attack and needed a boost to continue functioning 
as a viable terrorist organization. It is unclear whether Taha Musa actu-
ally agreed with bin Laden’s views, wanted to seize power in al-Gama’a, 
or simply saw the ﬁnancial and organizational beneﬁts that al-Gama’a’s 
rival terrorist group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), reaped from 
making the decision to join al-Qaeda. Whatever the reason, Taha Musa 
courted bin Laden by making trips to Afghanistan and even appeared 
sitting next to him and EIJ leader al-Zawahiri in a videotape released 
26 “Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya,” in U.S. Department of State (2003b).
27 “Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya,” in U.S. Department of State (2003b).
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in September 2000 that threatened U.S. interests.28 Nevertheless, Taha 
Musa was unable to recruit many of his cadres to support bin Laden 
and conduct attacks against the United States. Al-Gama’a witnessed 
how the EIJ had suﬀered signiﬁcant setbacks because of its decision to 
join al-Qaeda. The group chose to go underground until it regained its 
strength. However, there are still al-Gama’a members who supported 
Taha Musa’s desire to join al-Qaeda in attacking the United States, and 
those individuals could still participate in terrorist operations against 
U.S. targets.29
The historical leadership decided to call a unilateral ceaseﬁre in 
1999 once the group’s spiritual leader, Abd al-Rahman, agreed, but 
this was done without the approval of the external leadership.30 Despite 
Abd al-Rahman’s cancellation of the ceaseﬁre in June 2000, al-Gama’a 
has not conducted a terrorist attack either inside or outside Egypt since 
August 1998, and some suggest the historical leadership has struck a 
deal with the Egyptian government to lay down its arms in exchange for 
their release from prison.31 In March 2002, the historical leaders issued 
a statement renouncing the use of violence. However, the external lead-
ers have not appeared to abandon their commitment to jihad.32
Al-Gama’a has never attacked a U.S. target but has repeatedly 
threatened to attack Americans.33 The group’s most noteworthy attacks 
include the 1995 failed assassination attempt on President Mubarak in 
Addis Ababa, a 1995 car bombing in Rijeka, Croatia, that killed one 
28 Robert Windrem and Charlene Gubash, “Al-Zawahiri Statements Often Precede 
Attacks,” NBC News, February 25, 2004. http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4358624 (as of March 
10, 2006). 
29 “Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya,” in U.S. Department of State (2003b).
30 “Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya,” in U.S. Department of State (2003b).
31 “Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya,” in U.S. Department of State (2003b).
32 “Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya,” in U.S. Department of State (2003b).
33 “Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya,” in U.S. Department of State (2003b).
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and injured 29, a 1996 attack on tourists outside the Europa Hotel in 
Cairo that killed 18 foreign tourists, and the 1997 civilian massacre at 
Luxor in which 58 foreign tourists were killed.34
Environmental Factors
In the early 1990s, al-Gama’a was able to wage a sustained terror-
ist campaign, conducting attacks in multiple sectors and striking at 
high-proﬁle targets. Because al-Gama’a appeared to many observers 
in the early to mid-1990s to pose a real threat to the regime, President 
Mubarak decided to use a consistently heavy hand against the group. 
The state of emergency that Mubarak instituted when he took oﬃce in 
1981 allowed him to deploy an array of repressive measures against al-
Gama’a to curb the threat, including detaining without representation 
individuals suspected of terrorist activity.35 The measures taken by the 
state security services also succeeded in widening the splits within the 
leadership and driving down the group’s threat potential. 
Al-Wa’ad
Al-Wa’ad (“the Promise”) is a shadowy Islamic extremist organiza-
tion based in Egypt about which little is known. According to press 
reports of the trials of al-Wa’ad members in Egypt, the group formed in 
1996. It is rather small and is made up largely of Egyptian citizens with 
dual nationality, including Russians (Chechens), Dutch, Germans, 
Canadians, and reportedly even Americans. The group was accused in 
a 2001 indictment of raising money for international jihadist causes, 
including Palestinian and Chechen groups, suggesting that al-Wa’ad 
subscribes to a pan-Islamic agenda.36 Some of the militants arrested 
were businessmen or persons with a university education, a ﬁnding 
34 “Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GAI)” (2003).
35 “Egypt Imposes Another 3-Year State of Emergency,” CBC News, February 25, 2003, 
http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/02/24/Egyptemergency030224 (as of March 10, 2006). 
36 “The Diﬃcult Future of Holy Struggle,” The Economist, January 31, 2002, http://
economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=966016 (as of March 10, 2006). 
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consistent with what we believe is the membership of other Egyptian 
extremist groups.37 Much of the ﬁnancing for the group’s activities 
allegedly came from members who owned their own companies.38 The 
Egyptian authorities, as well as various newspaper articles, have linked 
the group to al-Qaeda, but Western diplomats have reportedly ques-
tioned these links.39 Al-Wa’ad has not plotted any attacks against U.S. 
targets thus far.40 According to the trial testimony, the group was cre-
ated from a fatwa issued by two prominent Egyptian clerics, Sheikh 
Fawzi al-Saeed of the al-Tawhid mosque and Nashaat Ibrahim of the 
Kabul mosque, both in Cairo, who are believed to be the key leaders 
of the group. 
Strategic and Operational Objectives
Al-Wa’ad appears to have taken up the mantle of both the EIJ and 
al-Gama’a. Starting in November 2001, an Egyptian military court 
tried at least 94 al-Wa’ad members in 2001 and 2002 for attempting to 
overthrow President Mubarak and threatening the state’s security. The 
initiation of this trial followed a major crackdown on extremists by the 
Egyptian government after the September 11 attacks. The trial, which 
concluded in September 2002, resulted in reduced sentences of 2–15 
years for more than 40 defendants believed to have played a key role 
in terrorist planning.41 The rest of the individuals who were initially 
indicted were acquitted and released. Although the arrests may have 
eliminated or reduced the potential al-Wa’ad threat, some press reports 
indicate that at least two new terrorist groups have formed in Egypt as 
37 Khaled Dawoud, “Trying Times for Islamists,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, January 10–16 
2002, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/568/eg6.htm (as of March 10, 2006). 
38 “Egypt: Trial of Al-W’ad Group Adjourned,” Cairo MENA, FBIS AFP20020106000116, 
January 16, 2002.
39 Karl Vick, “Political Repression Spawns Extremism in Arab World,” The Washington Post,
October 30, 2001, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/1030-03.htm (as of March 
16, 2006).
40 “Egypt: Verdicts Issued Against Defendants in Tanzim al-Wa’d case,” MENA, FBIS 
GMP20020909000103, September 9, 2002.
41 “Egypt: Verdicts Issued . . . .”
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of this writing—the Jihad Group for the Victory of Muslims at Home 
and Abroad; and Jundullah, a faction of EIJ.42
Al-Wa’ad militants were reportedly organizing attacks against 
public buildings in Egypt, Muslim and Christian clergymen, art-
ists, writers, and foreigners in Egypt, as well as plotting to assassinate 
Mubarak.43 The individuals whom al-Wa’ad was targeting for assassi-
nation were all known for their secular views and opposition to Islamic 
extremism.44 According to trial testimony, two of the militants put on 
trial in Egypt after September 11 were trained as pilots in Texas. No 
speciﬁc evidence was revealed, however, that they planned to use their 
expertise in a terrorist attack. At least one operative from Dagestan was 
considered to be an explosives expert who trained other members of the 
group. Militants from al-Wa’ad also reportedly traveled overseas and 
trained with other extremists to apply the skills they learned to their 
jihad in Egypt.45
South Africa: People Against Gangsterism and Drugs 
(PAGAD)
PAGAD was formed in 1996 as a Muslim community group ﬁghting 
drugs and violence in South Africa.46 By early 1998, the group had also 
become violently antigovernment and anti-Western. It is closely associ-
ated, if not intertwined, with the South African Islamic group Qibla. 
PAGAD uses several front names, including Muslims Against Global 
42 Abduh Zaynah, “Egyptian Authorities Reportedly Apprehend New Fundamentalist 
Group,” Al-Sharq al-Aswat, FBIS GMP20030828000164, August 28, 2003.
43 Dawoud, “Trying Times . . . .”
44 Dawoud, “Trying Times . . . .”
45 Dawoud, “Trying Times . . . .”
46 According to the 2001 South African census, there are approximately 665,000 Muslims 
in South Africa, or 1.5 percent of the population (2.5 percent of the population is of South 
Asian origin, the ethnic background of most of South Africa’s Muslims), making Islam the 
third-largest religion in South Africa (after Protestant and Catholic). Thus, Muslims are a 
signiﬁcant part of South African society—a central place they have occupied historically in 
South Africa’s development (CIA, 2004). 
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Oppression and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders, when launch-
ing anti-Western protests and campaigns.47 PAGAD operates mainly 
in the Cape Town area, South Africa’s foremost tourist venue.48 While 
PAGAD’s and Qibla’s overall strength was last estimated (in 2001) 
at several hundred members, PAGAD’s G-Force (Gun Force), which 
operates in small cells, probably contains fewer than 50 members and 
is the PAGAD element believed to be responsible for carrying out acts 
of terrorism.49 PAGAD has not been active since 2002.
Ideological Foundation
PAGAD and its ally Qibla, founded and led by Achmat Cassiem since 
1979,50 advocate a greater political voice for South African Muslims.51
Though distinct, the two groups are often treated as one by the media. 
According to an extensive study by the Centre for the Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation in South Africa, PAGAD originated 
in a network of hitherto disparate and isolated anti-drug, anti-
crime groups and neighborhood watches frustrated by their 
inability to tackle problems whose roots extended far beyond 
their individual localities. 
While its ideology was “predominantly, but by no means exclusively 
Muslim” from the beginning, 
PAGAD’s development . . . cannot be seen simply as the unfold-
ing of a master plan conceived and executed by a small group of 
Islamic radicals. Rather it has to be viewed as the outcome of the 
47 U.S. Department of State (2003b); Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, TerrorismCentral, 
http://www.terrorismcentral.com (both as of March 16, 2006).
48 Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. 
49 U.S. Department of State (2003b).
50 Qibla was founded in 1979 and inspired by the Iranian Revolution. The group’s aim 
was either to defend and promote Islam in South Africa or to establish an Islamic state in 
South Africa. Cassiem was vocal in the struggle against apartheid and was imprisoned at on 
Robben Island at age 17.
51 “Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups,” in U.S. Department 
of State (2003b). 
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interplay between many internal and external forces—of action 
by PAGAD and its constituent elements and reaction by the State 
and its agencies in the speciﬁc political, social and economic con-
text of the Western Cape. 
PAGAD is perceived by the South African state and the United States 
as “an urban terror group threatening not just the State’s monopoly 
on the use of coercive force but the very foundations of constitutional 
democracy.”52
Led by a national coordinator, Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, PAGAD 
and Qibla view the secular South African government as a threat to 
Islamic values.53 According to one study, PAGAD’s ideology stems 
from “belief in essentialist notions of a historical truth encapsulated in 
Islam . . . a number of stands converge at this level without any coher-
ent distinction between them, and one can simultaneously belong to 
more than one stream”—indicating an organization that has common 
interests but not necessarily homogenous beliefs. It desires to “protect 
the new South Africa from the ‘scourge’ of democracy and liberal-
ism which is essentially a Western principle.” Its leader maintains that 
Islam is “the true meaning of the democratic principle of ‘the people 
shall govern.’”54
PAGAD states that it was originally founded to “eradicate gang-
sterism and drugs from our society, thereby restoring morality and 
social order to the communities that have lost hope of combating 
this lethal social evil.”55 Over time, however, its outlook has evolved 
to become sharply antigovernment and anti–United States, with deep 
Islamic inﬂuences. Authorities suspect that in addition to Qibla’s ini-
tial Iranian inspiration, PAGAD has ties to Islamist extremists in the 
52 Dixon and Johns (2001). 
53 Potomac Institute for Policy Studies; “Appendix C: Background Information on Other 
Terrorist Groups.” 
54 “Organisation and Structure of Pagad,” PAGAD, South Africa: UniTech—University of 
Zululand, online at http://www.duc-uz.co.za/PAGAD%5B2%5D.htm.
55 PAGAD: http://www.pagad.co.za/nethome.htm (no longer available). 
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Middle East.56 This suspicion goes hand in hand with a growing belief 
that Saudi-ﬁnanced imams were active in Cape Town’s mosques, prop-
agating and inspiring militant Islam. However, they do not appear 
to have made widespread inroads. As Morrison and Lyman stated in 
early 2004, there “is little evidence of other terrorist sympathies among 
South Africa’s Muslim population.”57 Nevertheless, a number of South 
African academic experts have made accusations that PAGAD and 
Qibla are aﬃliated with al-Qaeda. This has been diﬃcult to prove, 
although Cassiem did maintain in an October 2001 interview that 
he had recruited—via Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders—“1000 
young volunteers to ﬁght in Afghanistan.”58 While it is doubtful that 
this statement is true, it does reinforce the possibility that Qibla and 
PAGAD may look beyond their immediate interests in the Western 
Cape and South Africa to be part of the global Islamist struggle. 
Strategic and Operational Objectives
When PAGAD was ﬁrst formed in early 1996, it worked with the 
South African authorities to combat organized crime and narcotics in 
the Western Cape area. However, following a number of increasingly 
violent attacks perpetrated by PAGAD in late 1996, the South African 
government outlawed the group. There is evidence to suggest that 
PAGAD underwent a split in October 1996, similar to that between 
the “Provisional” Irish Republican Army (IRA), which wanted to 
abandon violence and return to peaceful means of struggle against 
the British, and the “Real” IRA, which wanted to continue the vio-
lence. In January 1997, three of PAGAD’s founding members, Farouk 
Jaﬀer, Nadthmie Edries, and Mohammed Ali “Phantom” Parker, left 
the main organization and registered PAGAD as a nonproﬁt commu-
56 Although increasingly anti-Western and anti-U.S., PAGAD had not been designated as 
a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. government as of 2003 (U.S. Department of 
State, 2003a). However, PAGAD was listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List in 2001 (U.S. 
Department of State, 2002b).
57 Lyman and Morrison (2004), p. 82.
58 “Islam—A South African Perspective: An Interview with Achmat Cassiem,” Carte 
Blanche MNET, October 1, 2001, produced by Sophia Phirippides, http://www.mnet.co.za/
CarteBlanche/Display/Display.asp?Id=1808.
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nity organization under South African law. The remaining members of 
PAGAD eﬀectively became Qibla’s strong-arm wing through the G-
Force. Indeed, Parker complained that PAGAD had been “taken over 
by Qibla” in the months leading up to this split.59 Currently, PAGAD’s 
Web site appears to be that of a community-empowering organization, 
with no mention of Islam. 
This split could explain why the two factions of PAGAD appear 
to have two very diﬀerent targeting practices: that of assassinating drug 
dealers and crime lords, and that of bombing symbols of globalization. 
Indeed, the oﬃcial PAGAD has condemned attacks on people uncon-
nected with drugs and gangsterism but has also stated time and again 
that the South African government’s failure to curb drug dealing and 
crime is the entire driving force behind PAGAD’s actions. 
In addition to the few hundred estimated criminal victims of 
PAGAD’s targeted violence, PAGAD’s bombing targets have included 
South African authorities, moderate Muslims, synagogues, gay night-
clubs, tourist attractions, and Western-associated restaurants. PAGAD 
is believed to have carried out the August 25, 1998, bombing of the 
Cape Town Planet Hollywood restaurant. PAGAD members are also 
thought responsible for nine additional bombings in the Cape Town 
area in 2000.60 These nine bombings resulted in some 30 injuries. Of 
the nine attacks, ﬁve were car bombings that targeted South African 
authorities, public places, and restaurants and nightclubs with Western 
associations. According to the U.S. government, these attacks included 
larger bombs triggered by more sophisticated remote detonation devices 
than had been previously witnessed in South Africa. Police arrested 
several suspects aﬃliated with PAGAD in November 2000 and con-
ﬁscated several pipe bombs. There were no further bombings or inci-
59 “Organisation and Structure of Pagad.”
60 “Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups”; Potomac Institute 
for Policy Studies.
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dents after the arrests.61 Notably, PAGAD did not take credit for these 
attacks and, instead, maintained that the bombings were actually the 
responsibility of the South African police.62
In early 2002, PAGAD was suspected of being behind a bomb 
attack at the Cape Town International Airport, which coincided with 
the trial of two of its members on a charge of illegal possession of 
explosives. This followed a similar attack, on January 12, at the court-
house where the trial was slated to begin. Although PAGAD denied 
any involvement in the incident, it was the second time the trial had 
been postponed on account of bomb attacks.63
Environmental Factors
Since 2001, PAGAD’s activities have been severely curtailed by law 
enforcement and prosecutorial actions against leading members of the 
organization. There were no urban terror incidents from September 
2000 through 2001, compared to nine bombings in the Western Cape 
in 2000 that caused serious injuries, and a total of 189 bomb attacks 
since 1996. Although South Africa undertook a number of counterter-
rorist actions during 2001–2002 in support of the war on terrorism,64
Morrison has warned that “the South African government has been too 
ill-informed, and ill equipped, to bring eﬀective controls upon radical 
Islam within its borders.”65
61 “Africa Overview,” U.S. Department of State (2001).
62 This statement was made on PAGAD’s Web site, http://www.pagad.co.za (no longer avail-
able). It should be noted that, in the past, the apartheid government frequently carried out 
“pseudo-operations” involving government-initiated attacks made to appear to be those of 
the liberation movements in a number of Southern African countries.
63 Information about these and other terrorist attacks can be found in the RAND-MIPT 
Terrorism Incident Database, http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp.
64 South Africa enacted legislation establishing a ﬁnancial intelligence unit, which targets 
money laundering. A draft antiterrorism law was approved by the cabinet and informally 
submitted to the Parliament. South Africa provided support to the United States by extradit-
ing a member of the Symbionese Liberation Army. South Africa is also a party to ﬁve of the 
12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. “Africa Overview,” in U.S. 
Department of State (2003b). 
65 Morrison (2001), p. 19.
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This points to the danger that, as the militancy of PAGAD’s and 
Qibla’s followers has evolved—particularly after September 2001, if 
Cassiem is to be believed—there will be an increasing pool of poten-
tial recruits for militant Islamic activity both inside and outside South 
Africa. If the security and policing services are unable to confront this 
problem—and U.S. authorities are deeply concerned that this is the 
case already66—then the potential that South Africa could become 
a center of Islamist terrorism and terrorist support could increase 
(although most South African analysts are skeptical about this possi-
bility, given South Africa’s historic involvement of Muslims in society). 
Moreover, while South Africa generally has a history of militant, often 
violent, protest against authority, it is unlikely that the same levels of 
anti-apartheid violence would be seen in any antiestablishment protests 
conducted by South Africa’s Muslim communities. 
This is not to say that South Africa—as the most advanced coun-
try in Africa and with a very large Muslim population—could not 
become a support-base for externalized jihadist activities. The danger 
was highlighted by the April 2004 arrests of ﬁve alleged al-Qaeda sus-
pects in South Africa. The South African police chief stated that those 
arrested were part of “an al-Qaeda-linked plot to disrupt the country’s 
third democratic elections” and that the arrests led directly to other 
arrests in Jordan, Syria, and the United Kingdom.67
Whether any of these individuals were involved with Qibla (which 
is unlikely, given that they were all foreign nationals) or whether they 
were developing an independent jihadist cell in South Africa remains 
66 Interview with senior U.S. Department of Defense Africa oﬃcial, Washington, D.C., 
July 2004.
67 The police chief stated that those arrested in the UK were found in possession of “boxes 
and boxes of South African passports,” raising serious concerns that someone in South 
Africa’s Home Aﬀairs Ministry might have supplied them. “SA Action Led to Arrest of al-
Qaeda Suspects: Selebi,” SAPA, May 27, 2004; “SA Police Foils Al-Qaeda Plot to Disrupt 
Elections,” Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily Newswire, May 27, 2004; Michael 
Wines, “South Africa Says It Deported 5 Terror Suspects Before Vote,” The New York Times,
May 28, 2004, p. 12.
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unclear. Nevertheless, leaders of the South African Muslim community 
maintain that the overwhelming majority of South African Muslims 
are 
people emotionally identifying with Al-Qaedah’s rhetoric against 
the United States of America, but in another part of their hearts, 
condemning wholesale the kind of violence that Al-Qaedah has 
undertaken around the world.68
The same sources stated that foreign jihadists coming into South Africa 
would not be able to blend into the South African Muslim community 
because 
they would be identiﬁed immediately by people within the com-
munity . . . the news would get out. It’s not very easy to hide 
in the South African Muslim community if you’re a foreigner. 
You’re going to be identiﬁed almost immediately.
Eritrean Islamic Jihad/Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement
The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM), Harakat al Jihad al 
Islami (also known as the Abu Sihel Movement), is a Sunni Islamist 
group that changed its name in 2003 to the Eritrean Islamic Reform 
Movement (EIRM) (also called the Islamic Salvation Movement).69
The group has been active in the Horn of Africa in various guises since 
the mid-1970s. It seeks the violent overthrow of Eritrea’s secular gov-
ernment and its replacement with an Islamic government.
68 “SAFRICA: Analyst, Muslim ‘Authority’ Discuss Deportation of Al-Qaeda Suspects,” 
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The group is led by its Secretary-General, Sheikh Mohamed 
Amer, and his deputy, Amir Abul Bara Hassan Salman.70 It has been 
named by U.S. oﬃcials as being “one of al-Qaeda’s main allies in the 
Horn of Africa.”71 However, the true nature of EIRM’s external rela-
tionships is far more complicated, and far less obvious, than this. The 
EIRM appears to be an amalgam of a number of diﬀerent organiza-
tions, interests and factions, combining moderate and radical Islam. Its 
methods combine da’wa (propagating Islam) and jihad.72
Eritrea, the EIRM’s main target, has complained that Sudan is 
backing the group to advance Khartoum’s wider Islamic agenda across 
the Horn.73 Eritrea, in turn, is believed to support the Sudanese oppo-
sition group National Democratic Alliance, which has the stated objec-
tive of overturning the current National Islamic Front government in 
Khartoum.74 It is also alleged that, in the summer of 2001, Ethiopia 
sponsored a conference of Eritrean exile terrorist groups, which 
included the EIJM, in the Ethiopian city of Gonder. Thus it appears 
that regional governments use terrorist groups in the Horn for their 
own geopolitical ends.
Following the conference in Gonder, a new group was formed 
in March 2003 called the Eritrean National Alliance (ENA), or the 
Alliance of the Eritrean National Forces, a coalition of thirteen Eritrean 
opposition groups led by Heruy Tedla Biru and dedicated to the over-
throw of Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki’s government. The ENA is 
70 Interview with the Deputy Amir of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement—Abul Bara’ 
Hassan Salman: “The Governing Regime Is a Terrorist Regime Which Acts with Enmity 
Against the Eritrean People,” Nida’ul Islam, Issue 22, February–March 1998, http://www.
fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/eritrea.htm (as of April 23, 2006). 
71 Victoria Ward, “Warning to Travellers After British Geologist Killed in Eritrea,” PA 
News/The Scotsman, April 18, 2003, http://www.dehai.org/archives/dehai_news_archive/
apr-may03/0284.html (as of March 16, 2006).
72 Iyob (2004). 
73 Support for this theory comes from a news conference held by EIRM’s Secretary-General 
Amer in Khartoum in mid-1998. Interview with the Deputy Amir of the Eritrean Islamic 
Jihad Movement; United Nations Development Programme (1998). 
74 http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=9d00794b6fab0f9b6ee0588c13a017
&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=8df17f6fc5cf681f0edc01e7a0c76be0.
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believed to include the EIRM; Eritrean Islamic Salvation, also called 
the Arafa Movement; the Eritrean Democratic Resistance Movement 
(Gash-Setit); the Eritrean Liberation Front–Revolution Council; and 
other groups and factions.75
Some questions remain as to whether the EIRM is fully integrated 
into the ENA or continues to operate alongside it. The ENA, unlike 
the EIRM, does not espouse an Islamic ideology but rather a secular 
one comprising elements of Afro-Marxism, Maoism, and Ba’athism. 
Many EIRM supporters do not appear to subscribe to the group’s mili-
tant Islam but rather support it because of resentment over the ruling 
Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and PFDJ’s curtail-
ment of Islamic political activity. (The Eritrean government also cur-
tails Christian evangelism out of concern that it might disturb the 
balance between Islam and Christianity in the country and threaten 
national unity.)76 A January 2004 U.S. Institute of Peace report noted 
that “the EIJM’s continuity as an organization is fed by the PFDJ 
regime’s unwillingness to contemplate real versus virtual political par-
ticipation of Eritrea’s multicultural citizens.”77
The ENA has stated that it would not attack the Eritrean military 
but rather “strategic targets such as television and radio centres,” as it 
wanted to “win over” the military. Heruy also indicated that it would 
not attempt to assassinate President Afewerki because “the problems 
[assassinations] produced later are too big to handle.” Ethiopia, Sudan, 
and Yemen, according to Heruy, had promised “material support” to 
75 See http://www.theodora.com/wfb2003/eritrea/eritrea_government.html; IRIN, “Horn 
of Africa: Armed Factions and the Ethiopia-Eritrea Conﬂict,” May 14, 1999,  http://www.
fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/19990514.htm (both as of March 17, 2006).
76 See Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Eritrea, at http://www.cswusa.com/Countries/
Eritrea.htm (as of June 8. 2006).
77 Iyob (2004). 
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the ENA. Heruy stated that “We wish to get rid of the dictatorship in 
our country and the natural thing to do is to ally ourselves with our 
immediate neighbours.”78
Ideological Foundation
The EIRM has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization 
by the U.S. Department of State.79 Indeed, while the EIRM has been 
accused of being an al-Qaeda aﬃliate in Eritrea, there is little evidence 
of any links between the group and al-Qaeda. The leadership of the 
EIRM and ENA has indicated that it sees its struggle against Afewerki’s 
government within the wider context of al-Qaeda’s professed push for 
a new Islamic caliphate, but it is clear that the EIRM’s operational 
view remains focused on the situation in Eritrea, with some concern 
over Sudan and Ethiopia as well. Indeed, an April 2003 communiqué 
from the then-EIJM blamed the Eritrean government for using the 
September 11 attacks to attempt to link the Eritrean jihadists to al-
Qaeda and of fabricating evidence that the Eritrean “mujahideen” were 
targeting civilians. The EIJM communiqué stated, 
We do not target civilians and innocent people of Eritrea or the 
foreign[ers] visiting or residing in Eritrea. We, in our ﬁghting are 
targeting the Afewerqi regime and its military machinery and 
that Jihad in Eritrea is not terrorism against innocents, but has 
been launched for a sublime end and a legitimate goal, that is lift-
ing tyranny and grievance suﬀered by the Eritrean people in gen-
eral, and by Muslims in particular, from that dictatorial ruling 
regime and resisting the (state terrorism) carried out by Afewerqi 
Chauvenic [sic] regime.80
78 “New Rebel Force in Eritrea: An Alliance of 13 Eritrean Opposition Groups Says It Is 
Setting Up a Military Wing to Topple President Isaias Afewerki,” BBC News, May 2, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/2995873.stm (as of March 17, 2005). 
79 The EIRM/EIJM is not even mentioned in the State Department’s Patterns of Global 
Terrorism 2002; see U.S. Department of State (2003a). 
80 Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement General Secretariat, April 17, 2003,  http://www.
meskerem.net/eritrean_islamic_jihad_movement.htm (as of June 2004).
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Strategic and Operational Objectives
As noted, the EIRM maintains that its actions are directed only against 
the Eritrean government and not against civilians. It is clear that such 
statements need to be treated with some skepticism, especially because 
there is a lack of clarity regarding the EIRM-ENA relationship when it 
comes to attacks against the Eritrean military. The EIRM has claimed 
various “military successes” against the Eritrean armed forces. For 
example, in August 2003, the EIRM’s “military secretariat” released 
a communiqué stating that its “mujahideen” had successfully carried 
out ﬁve attacks during July and August 2003, and claimed 44 Eritrean 
military personnel killed, with the loss of only three “mujahideen.”81
Nevertheless, the Eritrean government has blamed the movement 
for civilian deaths, including the murder of British geologist Timothy 
Nutt in April 2003.82 The government believes that such attacks are 
aimed at deterring foreign investment in Eritrea, but the EIJM has 
denied any involvement, stating that its policy was “only to attack 
government targets in Eritrea.”83 Another attack in August 2003, in 
which two local employees of the U.S.-based aid group Mercy Corps 
International were killed in the northern Red Sea region of the country, 
was similarly blamed by the government on the EIJM.84 In November 
2003, two UN aid trucks in Tesseney near the Sudanese border were 
destroyed by remote-control devices placed under each truck. There 
were no casualties.85
In March 2004, the Eritrean government blamed Sudan and 
Ethiopia for backing “terrorists”—notably the EIJM—who allegedly 
81 Awate Team, “EIRM’s ‘Military Communiqué’ & Our Commentary,” August 18, 2003, 
http://www.awate.com/artman/publish/article_2025.shtml (as of March 17, 2006). 
82 Ward, ”Warning to Travellers.” 
83 “New Rebel Force in Eritrea.” 
84 “US Told Suspected al-Qaeda Aﬃliate Killed Aid Workers in Eritrea,” AFP, October 6, 
2003, 12:40PM PDT, http://quickstart.clari.net/qs_se/webnews/wed/cx/qus-eritrea-unrest.
r2lw_do6.html (as of June 2004).
85 Jonah Fisher, “UN Assesses Security in Eritrea,” BBC News, November 24, 2003, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/3234378.stm (as of March 17, 2006). 
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bombed a hotel, also in Tesseney,86 killing three people. It was not 
clear whether the dead at Tesseney were civilians or military. While 
both Ethiopia and Sudan denied the accusation and accused Eritrea of 
blaming them for its internal problems, Eritrean Foreign Minister, Ali 
Said Abdella, also claimed the group “had been trained and armed by 
al Qaeda head Osama bin Laden during the 1990s.”87
Environmental Factors
The focus of the EIRM (and the ENA) remains ﬁrmly ﬁxed on the 
Eritrean government, but there is a possibility that other regional fac-
tors could push it toward militancy outside Eritrea’s borders. Although 
it is unlikely that the EIRM would suddenly refocus its violence 
against wider Western targets outside Eritrea, the EIRM could become 
involved with other like-minded Islamic organizations throughout 
the Horn of Africa to promote common interests and perhaps seek to 
establish an Islamic federation in the Horn. This is a possibility as long 
as the interests, actions, and legacies of most of these groups, their sup-
porters, and targets, remain interwoven in an almost indistinguishable 
pattern of relationships.
A multitude of groups and factions, each with its external sup-
porters, abounds across the Horn. For a description of these groups, see 
the box on the next page.
86 Tesseney is believed to be central to the EIJM’s operations because it is the Eritrean base 
for refugee repatriations from the Sudan and so has a signiﬁcant UN presence.
87 “Eritrea Says Sudan and Ethiopia Behind Hotel Blast,” Reuters, March 10, 2004, http://
eri24.com/news4651.htm (as of April 23, 2006).
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Other Groups Across the Horn of Africa
Djibouti: The Afar Front pour la Restauration de l’Unité et la Démocratie 
(FRUD) and the separate FRUD–”Dini/combatant faction.”
Eritrea: The little-known Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO) and  
   Afar Liberation Front [Party].
Ethiopia: The ethnic Somali Ogadeni clan occupies much of southeastern 
Ethiopia, and its preeminent political party, the Ogadeni National Liberation Front 
(ONLF), has resisted attempts by the Addis Ababa government to have it join the 
Ethiopian Somali Democratic League, which is a multi-clan umbrella party afﬁli-
ated with the ruling Ethiopia People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). 
The ONLF is also believed to be linked to the United Front for the Liberation of 
Western Somalia (UFLWS) in Somalia. Finally, there are the Oromo Liberation 
Front, the United Oromo People’s Liberation Front, the Oromo Peoples’ Liberation 
Organisation, and the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organisation, the latter a 
member of the EPRDF coalition.
Somalia: The many factions and groups include the United Somali Congress–
Patriotic Movement and the Rahanweyn Resistance Army, both allegedly sup-
ported by Ethiopia; the Somali National Front, a Marehan group split between 
pro- and anti-Ethiopia factions; Mohamed Hussein’s ruling Somali National 
Alliance, supported by Eritrea; and the previously noted al-Itihaad al-Islamiyya 
(covered in the ﬁrst volume, Part 1, the Global Jihadist Movement ) and its afﬁli-
ated UFLWS, which is believed to receive support from Ethiopia.
Finally, there is also the question of the Afar region which, following the 
de facto independence of Eritrea in 1991, found itself straddling three states: 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Afar rebels ﬁghting in Ethiopia are known as 
the Ugogomo, or revolutionary party, and are believed to be supported by the 
ruling EPRDF, which includes the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Front (ARDUF) in 





The nonaﬃliated part of the Iraqi insurgency, that is, the component 
that is outside the al-Qaeda and al-Zarqawi networks, is diverse and 
widespread. It is composed of groups of both nationalist and religious 
provenance.1 The insurgency is almost exclusively Sunni. Both the 
Shi’ite and Kurdish communities have continued to rally around their 
new national leaders and, until the February 2006 bombing of the 
al-Askari mosque in Samarra—one of the holiest Shi’ite shrines2—
refused to engage in sectarian revenge. 
We do not place the Shi’ite militiamen associated with Muqtada 
al-Sadr in the insurgent category because even though al-Sadr’s militia-
men, organized in the so-called Mahdi’s Army, share the Sunni hos-
tility toward the United States and have engaged in violent activi-
ties, these activities generally do not rise to the level of Sunni terror-
ism. Moreover, al-Sadr must operate within the broader framework 
of Shi’ite politics in Iraq. In this context, al-Sadr’s movement has to 
take account of the political and religious authority of the Iraqi Shi’ite 
hierarchy headed by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani—which limits the al-Sadr 
movement’s freedom of action and ability to mount a sustained insur-
1 This chapter reﬂects information provided by CJTF-7 personnel in Baghdad; Kathleen 
Ridolfo, “A Survey of Armed Groups in Iraq,” RFE/RL Iraq Report, June 4, 2004; “Iraqi 
Insurgency Groups,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_insurgency.htm (as of 
March 17, 2006); and surveys of open press sources. 
2 The shrine, built in 944, is the site of the tombs of the Tenth and Eleventh Imams, Ali 
al-Hadi and his son, Hassan al-Askari. Samarra is also the place where, according to Shi’a 
tradition, the Twelfth or “Hidden” Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, went into occultation.
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gency with popular support. Al-Sadr’s movement participated in the 
January 2006 general elections as part of the United Iraqi Alliance, the 
Shi’ite coalition, and emerged as a power broker in the formation of a 
new Iraqi government.
The insurgency under discussion is certainly one of the most com-
plex and challenging ever faced by the United States. It presents no 
single coherent enemy against which American forces can mass their 
superior strength. The insurgency’s various components ﬁght for their 
own reasons, having little in common other than a desire to remove 
the U.S. and coalition presence from the country. In general, they seek 
to create a crisis between the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people in 
the hopes that outside support for the government will wane, forcing 
the withdrawal of foreign forces.3 The insurgency is far larger than the 
5,000 guerrillas previously thought to be at its core. One indication is 
the sheer number of suspected insurgents—some 22,000—who have 
cycled through U.S.-run prisons. Most have been released. Indeed, 
some U.S. commanders in Iraq have expressed concern that the Abu 
Ghraib prison has become a “jihad university”—a breeding ground for 
extremist leaders and a school for terrorists.4
At least 28 diﬀerent insurgent groups have formed in 2003 
through 2005, some but not all based in the Sunni triangle north and 
west of Baghdad. Some of these groups are increasingly embracing tac-
tics imported by foreign ﬁghters, such as the car bombings of civilian 
targets.5 It goes without saying that the universe of insurgent groups in 
Iraq is very dynamic and ﬂuid. Groups appear, change, merge, divide, 
and disappear. They operate under diﬀerent names and sometimes 
3 “Defeating the Insurgency in Iraq,” U.S. Institute for Peace Workshop, May 16, 2005.
4 Jim Krane, “U.S. Oﬃcials: Iraqi Insurgency Bigger,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 9, 2004; 
Thom Shanker, “U.S. Fears Abu Ghraib Is ‘Jihad University,’” International Herald Tribune,
February 15, 2006.
5 Edward Cody, “Sunni Resistance to U.S. Hardens,” The Washington Post, July 7, 2004, 
p. 1.
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under no name at all.6 Therefore, our intention is not to provide a 
comprehensive portrayal of the Iraqi insurgency but to identify its key 
components, trajectory, and likely prospects. 
Ideological Foundation
As noted in the preceding discussion, the myriad groups engaging in 
armed activity in Iraq have little in common other than a desire to 
remove the U.S. and coalition presence from the country. The Sunni 
groups—the backbone of the insurgency—want the new Iraqi govern-
ment to fail, but beyond that, they exhibit wide diﬀerences. By con-
trast, Shi’ite militants—including al-Sadr’s movement—back the idea 
of a new government that is representative of the majority Shi’ite popu-
lation, even if they compete over control of that government. (The al-
Sadr movement and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq are ﬁerce competitors for dominance in the Shi’ite-majority 
southern provinces.)
For the moment, nationalism is the glue that holds the Sunni-
based insurgency together. Sheikh Abdul-Satar Abdul-Jabbar of the 
Council of Islamic Scholars, Iraq’s preeminent Sunni organization, has 
said that the main, Sunni-based insurgency is likely to rage as long as 
Iraqis’ sense of nationalism is bruised by the presence of U.S. military 
forces on their soil.7
In the wake of the turnover of authority from the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) to the Iraqi government, and especially 
after the ﬁrst round of elections in January 2005, tensions appeared 
to be rising between the homegrown Iraqi resistance and the foreign 
Islamist ﬁghters. There has been evidence of sniping between groups 
on Arabic television and Web sites and in interviews with Iraqi and 
American oﬃcials, as well as from members of the insurgency and people 
with close ties to it. All speak of rising friction between nationalist
6 Ahmed Hashim, “Iraqi Insurgency Is No Monolith,” The Daily Star (Lebanon), July 28, 
2003, http://www.lebanonwire.com/0307/03072815DS.asp (as of March 17, 2006).
7 Cody, “Sunni Resistance to U.S. Hardens.” 
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ﬁghters and foreign-led Islamists over goals and tactics, with some 
Iraqi insurgents indicating revulsion over the car bombs and suicide 
attacks in cities that have caused hundreds of civilian deaths.8 The split 
took a dramatic turn in July 2004, when masked men calling them-
selves the Salvation Movement released a videotape containing threats 
to kill al-Zarqawi.9 The next day, a statement posted on an Islamist 
Web site, claiming to be signed by al-Zarqawi, lashed out against the 
Council of Islamic Scholars. The statement accused the group of weak-
ness for oﬀering a ransom to prevent the beheading of Nicholas Berg, 
the American killed in May 2004.10 More recently, in the run-up to 
the ratiﬁcation of the new Iraqi constitution in the fall of 2005, jihad-
ists have publicly executed Sunni clerics who advocated participation 
in the October 2005 referendum on the constitution. Since then, there 
have been reports of armed clashes and executions of foreign jihad-
ists by Iraqi Sunnis. (As this book was going to to print, the news was 
received that al-Zarqawi and several of his associates had been killed in 
a U.S. air strike on their hideout on June 7, 2006.)
Strategic and Operational Objectives
The strategic and operational objectives of these groups vary widely. 
The most senior oﬃcial from Hussein’s regime still at large is the 
former vice-chairman of Saddam’s Revolutionary Command Council, 
Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, who specialized in internal security. He may 
8 Ian Fisher and Edward Wong, “Iraq’s Rebellion Shows Signs of Internal Rifts,” The New 
York Times, July 11, 2004, p. 1.
9 In the video, three men with rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons, ﬂanked by an 
Iraqi ﬂag, delivered the threats. The man speaking had a clear Iraqi accent. “We have started 
preparing . . . to capture [al-Zarqawi] and his allies or kill them and present them as a gift to 
our people. This is the last ultimatum to those who give him shelter. This is the last warning. 
If you don’t stop, we will do to you what the coalition forces have failed to do.” By issuing its 
threat on a tape released to the satellite channel al-Arabiya, the group has copied the tactics 
of al-Zarqawi himself, who has repeatedly used that network and the al-Jazeera channel to 
publicize its terrorist attacks (AP, July 7, 2004). 
10 Ian Fisher and Edward Wong, “Iraq’s Rebellion Shows Signs of Internal Rifts,” The New 
York Times, July 11, 2004, p. 1.
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be directing some of the attacks.11 Former regime loyalists believe that 
they have no option but to continue ﬁghting and are also convinced 
that the United States and its coalition partners will tire long before 
they do.12 These groups are trying to apply the experiences of other 
guerrilla and terrorist organizations to their operations. Their objective, 
as noted earlier, is to return the old order, or vestiges of it, to power. 
Nationalists do not necessarily support the return of the Ba’ath 
party (some actively oppose it), but they resent what they consider to 
be the U.S. occupation of Iraq and are angered by the coalition’s fail-
ure to restore law and order, as well as security, and by U.S. operational 
methods that are seen as deliberately humiliating the Iraqis and their 
honor. These individuals or groups are relying heavily on kinship and 
tribal ties to provide them with shelter and succor as they plan and 
execute their operations. 
Iraqi Islamists have emerged after decades of suppression by the 
Ba’thist regime. At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, many 
were amateurs. Others have proven to have considerable military expe-
rience. All of them have learned quickly, and they have the experi-
ences of other Islamist organizations to help them. Their objective is 
the establishment of an Islamic state. As discussed in Part 1, foreign 
Islamist ﬁghters have inﬁltrated into Iraq to ﬁght the United States, 
its allies, and the Iraqi government and have provided the bulk of the 
suicide bombers who have caused the largest number of casualties in 
the conﬂict.
Insurgent elements are employing an increased range of weapons 
in their attacks. Iraqi militants employed Katyusha rockets for prob-
ably the ﬁrst time in an October 28, 2003, attack in Kirkuk. Other rel-
atively advanced weapons reportedly used by, or newly available to, the 
insurgents include 160-millimeter mortars; shoulder-ﬁred surface-to-
air missiles; an improvised, though not crude, multiple rocket launcher 
(used to attack the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad); and improvised explo-
sive devices (IEDs) and antitank mines (both used to damage heav-
11 Cody, “Sunni Resistance to U.S. Hardens.” 
12 Sergio Ramazzotti, “Iraqi Rebel Vows to Kill ‘Lying’ Americans, Distances Resistance 
from al-Qa’ida,” La Repubblica, January 24, 2004, pp. 33–38.
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ily armored coalition vehicles). Of course, the insurgents continue to 
attack with their original means—including rocket-propelled grenades 
(RPGs) and smaller IEDs—while adding new weapons, allowing them 
to engage more diﬃcult coalition targets from longer ranges. 
Environmental Factors
The early dissolution of the CPA in June 2004 clearly threw oﬀ the 
insurgents and their plans, forcing them to redirect their target selec-
tion from primarily U.S. and coalition to Iraqi targets and creating a 
split in their ranks.13 The split between native Iraqi insurgents and for-
eign ﬁghters played into former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s 
strategy of seeking to divide the insurgency by appealing to Iraqi ﬁght-
ers to reject the presence of foreigners. Allawi and other oﬃcials of the 
former interim government met with former Ba’ath Party members and 
Sunni tribal leaders to convince them that their interests and those of 
foreign ﬁghters were not the same.14
The high turnout in the January 30, 2005, elections and the pros-
pect of a sovereign Iraqi government dominated by Shi’ite and Kurdish 
parties appears to have caused some sectors within the Sunni insur-
gency to doubt their strategy. The February 28, 2005, issue of Time
magazine revealed direct contacts in Baghdad between senior insur-
gents, including former members of the Saddam regime, and U.S. oﬃ-
cials. The goal of the insurgents participating in the talks, according to 
the article, was to establish a political identity that would enable them 
to represent disenfranchised Sunnis and to negotiate an end to the U.S. 
military oﬀensive in the Sunni triangle.15
The expectation of U.S. oﬃcials and some sectors of the Iraqi 
government is that Sunnis will eventually channel their discontent into 
political action rather than continue to take up arms. A move in this 
13 Edward Wong, “Undeterred, Insurgents Keep Up Deadly Attacks Across Iraq,” The New 
York Times, July 2, 2004.
14 Fisher and Wong, “Iraq’s Rebellion Shows Signs of Internal Rifts.” 
15 “Talking with the Enemy,” Time, February 28, 2005.
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direction could further widen the rift between local insurgents and 
foreign ﬁghters. But the reality is that the Sunni Arabs are a minority 
in the country and will probably be a small or nonexistent presence in 
the highest echelons of the new Iraqi government, even though they 
had governed the area that is now Iraq since the days of the Ottoman 
Empire. Shi’ite politicians have been remarkably conciliatory after 
their success in the January 2005 elections, despite continued violence 
against Shi’ites. Nevertheless, Shi’ite parties could block constitutional 
amendments desired by the Sunnis, thus alienating Sunnis even fur-
ther (the possibility of such amendments was left open at the time of 
the approval of the Iraqi constitution as an incentive for Sunnis to 
participate). Moreover, there is strong sentiment within Shi’ite politi-
cal sectors to resume the policy of “de-Ba’athiﬁcation” that had been 
deemphasized by the Allawi government. That, of course, would render 
an agreement to end the insurgency harder to achieve.
Security is a major environmental factor shaping Iraqi political 
dynamics. The interim Iraqi government displayed a single-minded 
focus on issues of security. At his ﬁrst cabinet meeting, interim Prime 
Minister Allawi kept the discussion centered on ways to combat the 
tenacious insurgency. His ﬁrst public appearance after his appointment 
was at a military recruiting center. His ﬁrst out-of-town trip was to an 
Iraqi army base. And his ﬁrst oﬃcial order was a new national security 
decree allowing him to exercise broad powers of martial law in rebel 
strongholds.16 The oﬀensives to retake Fallujah and to pacify the area 
known as the “triangle of death” southwest of Baghdad were major ini-
tiatives to reduce insurgent sanctuaries. The successor government of 
Ibrahim al-Ja’afari has continued this emphasis, and it can be expected 
that the government elected after the adoption of a permanent Iraqi 
constitution will support a continued U.S. military presence until an 
adequate level of security is restored. 
16 Danica Kirka, “Iraq Vows ‘Sharp Sword’ vs. Attackers,” The Boston Globe, July 13, 
2004.
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Future Trajectory of the Insurgency
At this writing, the Iraqi insurgency is in a transitional stage. It is evolv-
ing in response to wider political events in Iraq, which center, of course, 
on the rise of the Shi’ites to a dominant position in the state. Sunni-
Shi’ite dynamics, therefore, will likely become more signiﬁcant. Even 
as the original political goals of the insurgency become less attainable, 
changes that might occur in the future could include the rise of more 
competent insurgent units and the emergence of more skilled leaders. 
The eﬀect could be more sophisticated and more skillfully conducted 
attacks against government and civilian targets; increasing attacks on 
armored vehicles; systematic eﬀorts to restrict air and road mobility; 
and the destruction of oil infrastructure.
For the short to medium term, the insurgency may persist as long 
as coalition forces remain visible in Iraq. Iraqi forces have provided 
the American military with intelligence for air strikes on rebel safe 
havens.17 How often the Iraqi government asks for American airpower 
to achieve tactical goals may aﬀect the pace and scope of the insur-
gency. U.S. and British commanders have been careful to emphasize 
their partnership with the new Iraqi security forces, but they acknowl-
edge that Iraqi units still lack the training, equipment, and motivation 
to take on the insurgency.18 That can be expected to change, of course, 
as Iraq resumes full sovereignty and builds up its armed forces. 
In the end, terror alone cannot guarantee success for the insur-
gents. Despite the uncertainty about the future of Iraq, there can be no 
doubt that the January 2005 election, the approval of the Iraqi consti-
tution, and the January 2006 election for a permanent Iraqi govern-
ment drove a nail in the coﬃn of Sunni political supremacy in Iraq. 
The insurgency can continue to wreak havoc, but doing so will become 
an exercise in political futility. In these circumstances, three general 
scenarios are possible:
17 Edward Wong, “New Law in Iraq Gives Premier Martial Powers to Fight Uprising,” The 
New York Times, July 7, 2004, p. 1.
18 Richard Lloyd Parry, “Coalition Could Act Alone over Rebels,” The London Times, July 
1, 2004.
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In the most benign case, signiﬁcant elements of the Sunni com-
munity realize that a return to the status quo ante is no longer viable. 
They accept a minority role within a democratic Iraq. The Sunnis might 
ﬁnd a common interest with the Kurdish parties in balancing Shi’ite 
predominance. A rough balance of power could develop, allowing for 
what might be called “democracy with Iraqi characteristics.”19 Over 
the medium to long term, the insurgency, increasingly isolated from its 
Sunni base, would eventually subside.
In the second scenario, the representatives of the Sunni commu-
nity are too alienated or terrorized to enter into a political arrangement 
with the Shi’ites and the Kurds. The insurgency could continue, per-
haps at high levels of violence, but would be unable to transcend its 
narrow social base or to prevent the nascent government from gradu-
ally consolidating its control over the country.
In the third and least favorable scenario, if the new government is 
unable to contain the insurgents and terrorists or to win broad support 
among the diverse ethnic and religious communities in Iraq, it will be 
no match for local warlords and will have to contend with the growth 
of terrorist infrastructures. A failure of central authority could lead to 
a formal or de facto partition of the country.20
The wild card in Iraq’s political evolution is external interference. 
Elements of the former Saddam regime are believed to be directing the 
insurgency from Syria. Tens of thousands of Iranian pilgrims, smug-
glers, drug runners (hashish and heroin), and illegal immigrants have 
entered southern Iraq, which contains Shi’ite pilgrimage sites in Najaf 
and Karbala. The inﬂux also includes Iranian intelligence operatives 
and agents attempting to promote Iranian inﬂuence. Iranian activ-
ity is not just limited to the southern part of Iraq. Two Iranians were 
caught in Baghdad in the summer of 2004 attempting to detonate a 
19 See Rabasa, Benard, Chalk, et al. (2004), p. 53. Diﬀerent Iraqi scenarios are discussed in 
more detail on pp. 53–54.
20 Robin Wright, “In Iraq, Daunting Tasks Await,” The Washington Post, July 7, 2004, p. 
14.
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car bomb.21 In June 2004, eight British Marines were seized by the 
Iranian military while navigating the river border with Iran. And at 
least twice in July 2004 machine guns were ﬁred at night from the 
Iranian side of the border toward Iraqi workers prospecting for oil on 
their own side.22
These Iranian actions may be part of a long-term strategy by Tehran 
to create an Iranian sphere of inﬂuence in southern Iraq. Matters are 
complicated by the existence of Shi’ite political parties in Iraq with 
varying degrees of loyalty to Iran. The key question is whether they will 
identify themselves as Shi’ites ﬁrst, united with their Iranian brethren, 
or as Iraqis, threatened by Iranian encroachment. In addition, key peri-
ods of religiosity—the annual Karbala pilgrimage and the hajj—can 
help bring radical Islamists into and out of Iraq and the Arabian pen-
insula. The ﬁnal answer may not be clear for years.
21 Richard Lloyd Parry and Richard Beeston, “Iranian Bombers Held in Baghdad,” The 
Times (London), July 6, 2004.





Categories of Non-Islamist Groups and Insurgencies 
Non-Islamist terrorist and insurgent groups fall into two basic 
categories: 
Marxist insurgencies, most of them Maoist, that follow a strategy of 
“people’s war” as deﬁned in the writings of Mao Zedong and the 
Vietnamese revolutionaries. There are, of course, variations, and 
each of these insurgencies has its own speciﬁc characteristics, but 
they generally follow the same model. 
Separatist groups. Although some claim to be Marxist or Islamic, 
the separatists’ primary goal is to establish independent eth-
nically deﬁned entities. This category includes such groups as 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known 
as the Tamil Tigers; Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA); and 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), among others. 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and 
National Liberation Army 
Ideological Background
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) are Marxist armed groups that have 
operated in Colombia since the 1960s. The FARC originated as the mil-
•
•
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itary arm of the Moscow-line Colombian Communist Party and has 
an orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology, although its military approach 
is derived from Maoist and Vietnamese “people’s war” doctrine. The 
ELN, on the other hand, was inspired by the Cuban Revolution and 
was infused with a strong dose of Marxist-oriented Catholic “liberation 
theology.” Both advocate armed revolutionary struggle to overthrow 
the Colombian government and replace it with a socialist system. A 
third actor in the Colombian conﬂict, the United Self-Defense Forces 
of Colombia (AUC), the so-called paramilitaries, opposes the Marxist 
groups. AUC is in the process of demobilizing pursuant to an agree-
ment with the government of President Álvaro Uribe.1
Strategic and Operational Objectives
The FARC has not deviated from its original strategy of “protracted 
people’s war” that it reaﬃrmed at its landmark Seventh Conference 
in 1982. The strategy, based on Maoist, Vietnamese, and Farabundo 
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) precepts, involves gradually 
extending the organization’s presence and control in the countryside 
and eventually isolating the government forces in the major cities. This 
strategy of territorial control is linked to the FARC’s involvement in 
the drug trade that generates much of the revenue that funds the orga-
nization’s operations (the other main sources of funds are extortion, 
kidnappings, and cattle rustling).2
FARC methods and tactics include bombings, assassinations, kid-
nappings (which have political as well as ﬁnancial utility), and hijack-
ings. The FARC also carries out guerrilla and main force military 
action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets, 
including the electrical infrastructure. It has increasingly conducted 
support operations outside Colombia. It has logistical facilities on the 
1 For a survey of the ideology of the FARC and ELN, see Rabasa and Chalk (2001). 
Colombia’s Fundacion Seguridad & Democracia has published a valuable series of reports 
on the demobilization of several AUC units in 2005 and on numerous other aspects of the 
political-military situation in Colombia, found at the foundation’s Web site, http://www.
seguridadydemocracia.org (as of March 17, 2006).
2 Some have argued that the FARC has in fact simply become a criminal cartel, but this 
perception underestimates the group’s political agenda. See Rabasa and Chalk (2001).
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Panamanian side of the inhospitable Darien border region, as well as 
camps in Venezuela and Ecuador. Still, FARC targets have been almost 
exclusively domestic. However, in March 1999, a FARC unit executed 
three U.S. Indian rights activists on Venezuelan territory after it kid-
napped them in Colombia. Foreign citizens, as well as Colombians, 
often are targets of FARC kidnapping for ransom.3
Both the FARC and the ELN have entered into periodic nego-
tiations with successive Colombian governments. President Andrés 
Pastrana’s government (1998–2002) attempted to come to terms with 
the FARC. The negotiation process involved giving the FARC con-
trol of a 42,000-square-kilometer territory in central Colombia known 
as the despeje, a demilitarized area. The negotiations broke down in 
February 2002, and the government abrogated the agreement that gave 
the FARC free rein in the despeje. The Uribe government, which came 
to oﬃce in July 2002, has pursued a more aggressive counterinsurgency 
strategy that has sought to reduce the FARC’s inﬂuence in its opera-
tional areas. Ongoing operations have succeeded in dismantling a sig-
niﬁcant part of the FARC infrastructure in its base areas in the depart-
ments of Meta, Caquetá, and Guaviare, in southeastern Colombia.4
The FARC has attempted to counter with diversionary attacks in areas 
of limited government presence. Colombian analysts debate whether 
the Uribe government’s campaign has successfully eroded the FARC’s 
hold over its base areas or whether the group has implemented a tacti-
cal move to lower its proﬁle in order to build up its strength and regain 
the strategic initiative at a later date.5
In recent years, the ELN has declined in importance and become 
more amenable to a negotiated political settlement. Although the group 
retains a strong presence in the oil-producing department of Arauca, 
3 See Chapter Seven.
4 Rabasa conversation with senior Colombian army oﬃcer, Washington, D.C., August 
2005. See also the data on combat operations in Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia 
(Bogotá), “Coyuntura de Seguridad, Enero–Marzo 2005,” http://www.seguridadydemocra-
cia.org/ docs/pdf/boletin/boletin8completo.pdf (as of March 17, 2006).
5 The latter is the opinion of Colombian insurgency expert Alfredo Rangel Suarez, “Un 
campanazo de alerta: las lecciones de Putumayo,” El Tiempo (Colombia), August 12, 2005. 
64    Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe
in eastern Colombia, it has suﬀered from inroads by the FARC and 
the paramilitaries into its former strongholds on the Atlantic coast and 
Magdalena valley.6
Environmental Factors
The FARC sees itself as part of the anticapitalist and antiglobal-
ist movement. For example, the group is a member of the Sao Paulo 
Forum discussed in Chapter Six, and it has stated that it will now 
target U.S. forces and economic interests in Colombia. The more active 
role of the United States in providing military assistance and training 
to Colombian government forces, including the training of special-
ized units for the protection of a critical oil pipeline in northeastern 
Colombia, could produce a shift in FARC strategy toward directly tar-
geting U.S. personnel and assets.
Numerous incidents point to the presence of Middle Eastern actors 
in Colombia and FARC-controlled territory. An Egyptian terrorist 
belonging to al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, who was wanted in connection 
with the 1997 massacre of Western tourists at Luxor, entered Colombia 
illegally in 1998 to hold talks with the FARC. He was arrested and 
turned over to the United States via Paraguay.7 In October 1998, FARC 
and Iranian oﬃcials signed an agreement allowing the construction of 
an Iranian meatpacking plant and slaughterhouse in the “demilitarized 
zone” in southern Colombia that was then controlled by the FARC.8 In 
2004, there were reports of FARC personnel forming suicide squads to 
6 See Espejo and Garzon (2005).
7 “La Frontera de ‘Los Caballitos,” http://historicos.elespectador.com/periodismo_inv/2001/
noviembre/nota1.htm (as of March 17, 2006).
8 “U.S. Pressured Bogota to Stop Iranian-Funded Meat Plant,” ABC News, January 6, 
2000.
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attack government as well as American facilities and personnel. These 
reports could be false or misguided, however, because the FARC has 
yet to conduct a deﬁnitive suicide operation.9
Maoist Insurgencies
Ideological Foundation
Maoist groups throughout the world—prominently in Peru, Nepal, 
India, Bhutan, and the Philippines—are committed to seizing power 
using the concept of “people’s war” and instituting Maoist forms asso-
ciated with The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China.10
In India, a growing number of states—most prominently Bihar 
and Andrah Pradesh—have experienced a steadily escalating level of 
Maoist insurgent violence. So concerned has New Delhi become that 
in September 2005, it convened a strategy coordination session of the 
chief ministers from Maoist-aﬀected states. Indian Maoism, previously 
the senior partner in the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties 
and Organizations of South Asia, now ﬁnds itself overshadowed by 
its Nepalese counterpart. Indeed, using a combination of terror, guer-
rilla warfare, and main force action, the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist), or CPN(M), has come to dominate much of the country-
side in a struggle that now has cost more than 12,000 lives. Viewed 
by the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) umbrella 
organization as the premier Maoist force active in the world today, 
the CPN(M) has increasingly made common cause with like-minded 
Indian groups. Joint pronouncements cite Indian and American impe-
rialism as the leading enemies of mankind. In Bhutan, the activities 
9 “Militiaman Reportedly Training Guerrillas to Carry Out Suicide Attacks Captured,” 
El Espectador, March 18, 2004; Frank Monteverde, “Interview with FARC spokesman Raul 
Reyes,” New Colombia News Agency, November 29, 2003. In January 2003, FARC mem-
bers appeared to conduct a suicide operation as they self-detonated a vehicle that pulled 
alongside a military convoy. Yet given the lack of any further suicide-like attacks, the death 
of the perpetrators might have been unintended.
10 The deﬁnition is from Thomas A. Marks’s review of this report, August 2005. For a 
authoritative study of Maoist insurgencies, see Marks (1996).
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of Ngolops (armed Nepalese dissidents) pose a serious threat to the 
country’s security. Ngolops, referred to by Bhutanese authorities as 
“antinationals,” are people of Nepalese origin who claim that they are 
Bhutanese citizens forcibly evicted by the Royal government of Bhutan 
into refugee camps.11 In the state of Assam, India, Ngolops formed the 
United Liberation Front of Asom and the National Democratic Front 
of Bodoland as their political arms. In the Philippines, the Maoist 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) remains active, with its New 
People’s Army thought to ﬁeld some 13,000 combatants. Reports of the 
CPP collaborating with Islamic groups such as the MILF have yet to be 
conﬁrmed.12 Peru’s Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, or SL) once held 
the leading role in RIM now ascribed to the CPN(M). Characterized 
by the extreme brutality of its attacks, Shining Path steadily grew after 
its founding in the early 1960s. The group suﬀered a near-fatal blow 
with the capture of its leader Abigail Guzmán in 1992, but the kidnap-
ping of 71 oil workers in June 2003 and the ambush of a military patrol 
in July 2003 demonstrate that remnants remain active.13
Strategic and Operational Objectives
Maoist groups emphasize violence in rural areas to mobilize a “counter-
state” capable of challenging urban-based government power. Although 
each group has its peculiarities, all generally follow the strategy and 
tactics developed in the writings of Chinese and Vietnamese revolu-
tionaries. Maoist strategy involves ﬁrst gaining control of the country-
side through a variety of tactics, of which terror against “class enemies” 
is an essential component, and eventually isolating and defeating the 
government forces in the urban centers. The operationalization of this 
approach takes a predictable form. As the armed political movement 
projects itself into local areas, resistance is neutralized by terror. Appeals 
for help from victims or their relatives are answered by the armed local 
representatives of the state, the police. The police are ambushed, forced 
11 “Bhutan Assessment, 2003,” http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bhutan/index.
html (as of March 17, 2006).
12 Cronin (2004).
13 McDermott (2004a).
 Non-Islamist Groups    67
to seek refuge in their stations, and then systematically eliminated. The 
result in aﬀected areas is a population dominated by the insurgents. 
Seeking to reverse the tide, the government commits the main force 
units of its military. As these forces disburse to reclaim lost population, 
they are themselves attacked by insurgent main force units formed 
from “regularized” guerrilla formations. “Mobile warfare,” in Maoist 
terminology, ensues, with force-on-force action designed to produce 
equilibrium. This is to be followed by “war of position,” as government 
forces are routed and captured “positions” held. In the end, the counter-
state, the alternative society formed under the Maoists, is to become 
the state.
Environmental Factors
Maoist groups connect not only through organized meetings but also 
by reading accounts of one another’s exploits and duplicating models 
for organizing, training, and equipping. Although “anti-imperialist,” 
these groups by and large direct their attacks against domestic enemies 
and have not attacked the United States directly. 
Although not a direct threat to the United States, Maoists use 
terrorism as an integral component of their strategy of people’s war 
and are inherently hostile to the international order. They may thus 
ﬁnd common interests with al-Qaeda and its associates. They have, 
as opportunity has presented itself, participated in narcotics traﬃck-
ing. Nepal serves as a hub for hashish traﬃcking in Asia.14 SL deals 
in drugs, and coca farmers are being organized into support bases for 
SL.15 The Philippines’ New People’s Army derives much of its revenue 
from marijuana traﬃcked to urban areas and the production of hashish 
oil exported to Europe through crime syndicates in Manila.16 Clearly, 
Maoist groups thrive in countries where there is corruption, lawlessness, 
transnational crime, and the discontent produced by broken political 
systems. Key factors that could move the Maoists to become a larger 
14 McDermott (2004a).
15 McDermott (2004a).
16 Rabasa, discussion with Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Manila, 
August 2005. 
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threat include U.S. support for governments under attack by Maoists, 
spillover eﬀects from insurgency, and recruitment and indoctrination 
of native peoples against urban elites and governments.17
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Background and Ideological Foundation
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a terrorist insurgency 
that has waged a bitter war for the creation of a separate Tamil Eelam 
state in Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern provinces for the past four and 
one-half decades. The group emerged in the wake of renewed intercom-
munal antipathy and violence between the country’s majority Sinhalese 
and minority Tamil populations during the 1970s.18 The LTTE devel-
oped as an extremist outgrowth of the Tamil United Liberation Front, a 
social-political movement that was prepared to advance Tamil demands 
through the accepted channels of the Sri Lankan state. Rejecting this 
stance, a hard core of militants formed a variety of underground guerrilla 
organizations dedicated to armed struggle against the Colombo gov-
ernment during the mid-1970s. Initially, 42 militant groups were cre-
ated, although ﬁve quickly achieved dominance. These were: the Tamil 
Eelam Liberation Organisation; the People’s Liberation Organisation 
of Tamil Eelam; the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front; the Eelam 
Revolutionary Organisation of Students; and the Tamil New Tigers 
(TNT).19 Of these, it was the TNT that was to assume the early mantle 
of the Tamil struggle.
Led by Chetti Thanabalasingham, the TNT embarked on a par-
ticularly intensive campaign of assassination and violence in 1974 that 
17 Davis and Bedi (2004).
18 For further details on the roots and genesis of the ethnic conﬂict in Sri Lanka, see 
Gunaratna (1993a, 1993b, 1998); Little (1994); Rupesinghe, ed. (1998); Rotberg, ed. (1999); 
Bullion (1995); Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1994); Venkatachalam (1987); Manogaran (1987); 
Misra (1995); De Silva (1986, 1995); and Suryanarayan (1991).
19 Gunaratna (1993b), p. 27.
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was variously designed to silence pro-government Tamils,20 eliminate 
informants, and disrupt police investigations into terrorist incidents 
and related criminal activities perpetrated under the group’s auspices. 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, the TNT’s second in command, assumed 
leadership of the organization in 1976 when Thanabalasingham was 
arrested. He renamed the group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
and set about to reconﬁgure it in a manner consonant with his own 
ambitious intentions and ideological designs. Aﬃrming the legitimacy 
of the Tamil struggle for independence on the basis of the Thimpu 
Principles21 and specifying that it was only through the LTTE that 
these objectives could be achieved, Prabhakaran fashioned a uniquely 
elite, ruthlessly eﬃcient, and highly professional ﬁghting force22 that 
emphasized selective recruitment (a policy that continues to this day) 
and an institutional ethos of unswerving dedication to the Eelam 
cause. 
Over the course of the intervening 28 years, the LTTE has gained 
a reputation as one of the most sophisticated and deadly terrorist insur-
gencies in the world. At the time of writing, the Tigers had successfully 
driven the Sri Lankan government to the negotiating table and eﬀec-
20 Signiﬁcantly, attention was drawn precisely to this LTTE policy in a 1998 analysis of 
the group by the U.S. State Department. Included within a synopsis of the Tigers’ “political 
objectives” was “eliminate moderate Tamils and other Tamil militant groups that compete 
with the LTTE for inﬂuence within the Sri Lankan Tamil community.” See U.S. Department 
of State (1998).
21 The Thimpu Principles aﬃrm the following ﬁve nonnegotiable demands: (1) recognition 
of Tamils as a nation; (2) recognition of the existence of an identiﬁed homeland for the Tamil 
people; (3) recognition of the right of the Tamil people to self-determination; (4) recogni-
tion of the right of the Tamil people to a separate citizenship; and (5) recognition of the 
fundamental right of all Tamils to look on the north and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka as 
their country. See Kumar Ponnambala, “The Only Possible Solution to the Tamil National 
Problem,” TamilCanadian.com (as of March 21, 2006). 
22 “We ﬁght while others merely talk” was how the LTTE both deﬁned and distinguished 
themselves from other Tamil militant organizations. Cited in Wijesekera (1993), p. 310.
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tively forced it to accept terms for a ceaseﬁre that have since allowed 
the group to set up a mini Eelam state covering roughly 15 percent of 
the country’s entire geographic territory.23
Current estimates of the LTTE’s overall on-ground strength in 
Sri Lanka vary between a low of 12,000 to a high in excess of 20,000.24
The true ﬁgure likely lies somewhere between these two approxima-
tions, although a recent split in Tiger ranks resulting from the defection 
of the group’s special commander for the Eastern Batticaloa-Amparai 
District, Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan (alias Colonel Karuna), has 
complicated the picture somewhat, reducing the number of cadres 
available to Prabhakaran by an estimated 5,500.25 Although Karuna’s 
departure represents a potentially serious blow to the LTTE, it prob-
ably will not signiﬁcantly dent the group’s overall human resource and 
operational capabilities, for three reasons. First, most Tamil forces are 
concentrated in the Prabhakaran-loyal districts of northern Sri Lanka. 
Second, virtually all the specialist units at the center of past militant 
23 The ceaseﬁre was brokered by Norway on February 22, 2002, and has since led to sev-
eral rounds of talks between the LTTE and Colombo over the last two years. At the time 
of writing, the Tigers had put forth their own blueprint for home rule, which calls for the 
establishment of a so-called Interim Self Governing Authority covering eight Tamil-majority 
districts in the northeast and a subsequent plebiscite (ﬁve years later) on self-determination. 
Prabhakaran has given explicit warning that if this proposal is not taken seriously, the LTTE 
will once again take up arms against the central government. Many in Colombo believe that 
the Tiger leader has no interest in peace and is merely using the current period of relative 
stability to rearm, recruit additional cadres, and consolidate control over the north. Chalk 
interviews with Sri Lankan intelligence and military oﬃcials, Colombo, May 2004.
24 RAND ﬁeldwork and interviews, Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) and Internal 
Intelligence Bureau (IIB), Colombo, May 2004. According to one source, the LTTE’s 
strength breaks down as follows: military strength, 11,000–15,000 (depending on the num-
bers of Karuna supporters that have yet to be integrated back into the group); intelligence 
cadres, 2,500; Black Tigers, 350; total strength including political and logistical support 
cadres, 21,000.
25 RAND ﬁeldwork and interviews, SLAF and Western diplomatic oﬃcial, Colombo, May 
2004. See also B. Rahman, “Split in LTTE: The Clash of the Tamil Warlords,” South Asia 
Policy Institute Topical Paper No. 942, March 2004; “Rebel Commander Willing to Meet 
LTTE Top Leadership,” Associated Press, March 11, 2004; IISS, “Sri Lanka’s Peace Process in 
Jeopardy”; Chris Kamalendran, “Inside the Karuna Fortress,” The Sunday Times (Sri Lanka), 
March 14, 2004; Bandula Jayasekera, “Prabhakaran Smuggled in 11 Arms Shiploads During 
Truce—Karuna,” The Island (Sri Lanka), April 9, 2004. 
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activities—including the Black Tigers, the Leopards Division, and 
the intelligence wing—remain ﬁercely loyal to the LTTE and, just 
as important, view Prabhakaran’s continued leadership as absolutely 
essential to the success of the Eelam struggle. Third, the immedi-
ate threat from Karuna was silenced after his forces were decisively 
defeated in a sustained Tiger oﬀensive at the Verugal River (just south 
of Trincomalee in eastern Sri Lanka) on April 9, 2004; of those who 
survived the onslaught, the bulk have since returned to their local vil-
lages and show no sign of taking up arms again.26
Operations and Tactics
As noted, the LTTE remains one of the most adept terrorist insur-
gencies in the world. The group has eﬀectively fought the Sri Lankan 
armed forces (SLAF) to a standstill and currently exercises eﬀective 
control over signiﬁcant stretches of northeast Sri Lanka. The Tigers 
have also repeatedly demonstrated an ability to operate along the entire 
guerrilla conﬂict spectrum from selective assassinations and targeted 
terrorist strikes to mobile hit-and-run attacks as well as full-scale, mul-
tiple battalion-sized assaults.27 Much of this success is due to a highly 
dynamic learning process that has taken advantage of the inherent 
weaknesses in Colombo’s military and security establishment.
In many ways, the SLAF has yet to emerge as a professional force 
that truly understands the nature and type of war it has been ﬁghting. 
The majority of commanders have never seen any action, with many 
promoted purely on the basis of seniority or as a result of political con-
nections, personal loyalties, and friendships. Compounding the situ-
ation is the wholly inadequate training and support that is given to 
26 Interviews, SLAF, Colombo, May 2004. Although Karuna’s defection is unlikely to 
prove a major challenge to Prabhakaran, the incident does demonstrate the potential costs 
to a group of centralizing under the authority of a single leader that demands and expects 
complete subordination. Karuna was an extremely experienced guerrilla ﬁghter and highly 
revered ﬁgure among the Tamils of eastern Sri Lanka. His loss will undoubtedly complicate 
the LTTE’s challenge of establishing and consolidating control over this part of Sri Lanka 
(which is, itself, an integral component of the Eelam state that the Tigers ultimately seek to 
create). 
27 RAND ﬁeldwork and interview with SLAF, Colombo, May 2004. 
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regular soldiers. Some recruits have been dispatched to the front line 
after only four weeks of basic combat training, and troops regularly 
cite shortages in such basic equipment as modern assault riﬂes, ammu-
nition, and ﬁeld radio sets.28
On a strategic level, the SLAF tends to rely on outdated doctrines 
that place a premium on taking and holding static lines of defense 
through maximum force as opposed to more nuanced (and relevant) 
counterinsurgency operations that combine civil campaigns to win 
hearts and minds with directed disruptive missions behind enemy 
lines. Indeed the one positive initiative to create a permanent special 
forces body able to undertake unconventional missions of this type—
the Long Range Patrol Group (LRPG)29—was reversed in 2003 after 
Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe dismantled the group following 
unsubstantiated claims that the squad was involved in a plot against his 
ruling coalition.30
The weaknesses and associated failings of the SLAF have pro-
vided the LTTE with a useful benchmark of what not to do in terms of 
combat readiness and eﬀectiveness. Indeed the makeup of the group’s 
military structure is exactly contrary to that of the Sri Lankan army. 
Tiger commanders are promoted purely on merit and all retain exten-
sive battleﬁeld experience. Regular cadres undergo intensive training 
that is speciﬁcally geared to the Sri Lankan context (see below). And 
LTTE tactics emphasize small teams, deep penetration, and pseudo-
style operations, generally taking on a more conventional footing (of 
which the LTTE is perfectly capable of mounting) only when theater 
conditions are most conducive to this style of ﬁghting.31
28 RAND ﬁeldwork and interviews, senior Western diplomat and SLAF, Colombo, May 
2004. 
29 The LRPG, a U.S.-trained unit, was established in 1996.
30 Iqbal Athas, “Safe House Raid: Heads Roll as Army Chief Cracks the Whip,” The Sunday 
Times (Sri Lanka), January 25, 2004. Some observers have gone even further, claiming that 
the decision to dismantle the LRPG was deliberately orchestrated to keep the LTTE at the 
negotiating table and ensure that Prabhakaran continued to view the Norwegian-led peace 
process as beneﬁcial. Comments made during the World Alliance for Peace in Sri Lanka 
(WAPS) conference on “Road Maps to Peace in Sri Lanka,” Oslo, August 20, 2004.
31 RAND ﬁeldwork, Colombo, May 2004.
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Tactically, the LTTE has conspicuously exploited the outmoded 
doctrines of the SLAF to repeatedly confound Sri Lankan military 
oﬀensives. Indeed, one of the main reasons the army has failed to 
secure much of the north and east is due to its overwhelming reliance 
on set-piece, trench warfare. The Tigers quickly recognized that the 
best way to defeat this type of warﬁghting stance was ﬁrst to monitor 
the combat readiness and deployment size of known defense lines using 
long-range reconnaissance and sabotage teams and then, based on this 
intelligence, to hit them with overwhelming artillery ﬁre and battalion-
sized attack forces. Between 1995 and 2002, roughly 60 percent of all 
Sri Lankan ﬁeld casualties resulted from this adaptive combination of 
low- and high-level assault modalities.32 On an “unconventional” level, 
the LTTE has developed highly eﬀective (and feared) suicide wings 
to carry out selective assassinations, urban bombings, and sea-borne 
attacks. Located in both the Black Tigers and Sea Tigers, these cadres 
have been responsible for well over 200 strikes since 1987, the vast bulk 
of which have been successful in achieving their primary aim. Table 
5.1 details some of the most well known of these instances. Indeed 
until recently, the LTTE was unique among militant substate entities 
around the globe in speciﬁcally institutionalizing martyrdom as a sig-
nature mode of attack and establishing this form of violence as not 
only “normal” and positive but also the sine qua non of operational 
eﬀectiveness.33
32 RAND ﬁeldwork and interviews, SLAF and senior Western diplomats, Colombo, May 
2004. The LTTE is currently thought to be in the possession of a battery of new-age missiles 
with an accurate ﬁring range of 40 miles.
33 By comparison, at the height of the Lebanese Shi’ite campaign against American dip-
lomatic and military targets in Beirut during the 1980s, suicide bombings accounted for 
fewer than 20 percent of all Hezbollah/Islamic Jihad terrorist operations. See Merari and 
Braunstein (1984), p. 10.
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Table 5.1 
Prominent LTTE Suicide Attacks, 1987–2002
Date Target Purpose Remarks
1987 Tamil University 




Attack modeled on the 1983
Hezbollah truck bombing in Beirut; 75
people died in the assault.a





Ghandi was assassinated for his 
decision to curtail Indian support for 
the LTTE and lead a peacekeeping 
force to stabilize the situation 
in Jaffna. This is the only act of 
concerted terrorism that the LTTE has 
carried out beyond the Sri Lankan 
theater. Eleven others were killed in 
the attack.b






The blast killed over 20, wounded 50, 
and destroyed vehicles as far away as 







Premadasa was killed by a deep 
penetration mole who had been 
on the presidential staff for several 
years. He was targeted for his 
endorsement of the 1987 Indo–Sri 
Lankan Peace Accord. The attack 










Dissanyake was targeted for his 
key role in arranging the details 
of the 1987 Indo–Sri Lankan Peace 
Accord; an additional 50 people 
were killed in the attack (which bore 
strong resemblances to the Ghandi 
assassination).e






Both ships were completely destroyed 
in the twin assaults, which left 11
sailors dead (the two ships were 
berthed with skeleton crews at 
the time of the strikes). It has been 
speculated that al-Qaeda’s attack on 
the USS Cole was modeled on this 
operation.f
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Table 5.1—continued
Date Target Purpose Remarks





Four oil storage tanks were destroyed, 
triggering one of the largest ﬁres ever 
seen in Colombo. Twenty-one persons 
were killed in the operation.g
1996 Central Bank Destroy strategic 
economic target
This is the most destructive act of 
terrorism to have ever taken place in 
Sri Lanka, killing 91 and injuring in 
excess of 1,400.h




The WTC was hit just one week after 
it opened. The attack, which killed 15
and injured over 100, was thought to 
be in retaliation for the U.S. decision 
to designate the LTTE as a terrorist 
organization (the bombing is one of 
the few conducted by the Tigers that 








Kumaratunga was targeted for her 
hard-line stance against the LTTE
and (then) refusal to negotiate with 
the group. Although the president 
survived the attack, which was carried 
out by a male Black Tiger dressed 
as a woman), she suffered damage 
to her face and lost her right eye. 
Fourteen other people were killed, 







and hub of critical 
transportation 
infrastructure
Twenty-six civil and military aircraft 
were destroyed in the attack; it is 
estimated that losses to Sri Lankan 
Airways exceeded $350 million.k
a Amal Jayasinghe, “Tiger Bombers Primed for a Repeat,” The Australian, February 8,
1996; Amy Waldman, “Suicide Bombing Masters: Sri Lankan Rebels,” The New York 
Times, January 14, 2003.
b “Tigers Suspect in Gandhi Assassination,” The Daily News (Sri Lanka), May 25, 1991;
“Tiger Terror,” The Times (Londonƒ), August 10, 1995.
c Daryll de Silva, “Car Bomb Wrecks JOC Headquarters,” The Daily News, June 22,
1991.
d Amal Jayasinghe and Anosh Ahamath, “President Assassinated,” The Sunday 
Observer (Sri Lanka), May 2, 1993; “Tiger Terror.” 
76    Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe
Table 5.1—continued
e “Gamini Killed in Bomb Blast,” The Daily News, October 24, 1994; “Tiger Terror,” 
The Times (London), August 10, 1995.
f Author interview, Western diplomatic ofﬁcial, Colombo, May 2004; Panduka 
Senanaysake and Nicholas Candappa, “LTTE Blasts Two Navy Gunboats,” The Daily 
News, April 20, 1995; Panduka Senanayake, “LTTE Claims Responsibility over Blasts in 
Trinco,” The Observer (Sri Lanka), April 19, 1995.
g Sarath Malalasekera, “Tiger Hitmen Go for Oil Facility,” The Daily News, October 
21, 1995.
h Vijitha Yapa, “Tamil Lorry Bomb Rips Apart Central Bank in Colombo,” The 
Independent (UK), February 1, 1996; Amal Jayasinghe, “Tiger Bombers Primed for a 
Repeat,” The Australian, February 8, 1996.
i Niresh Eliatamby, “Tigers Take Carnage to Heart of Colombo,” The Courier-Mail 
(Australia), October 16, 1997; John Stackhouse, “Terrorists Rip Sri Lankan Peace,” The 
Globe and Mail (Canada), October 16, 1997; John Burns, “Tamil Bombing Tied to U.S. 
Terror Listing,” The International Herald Tribune, October 17, 1997.
j “Wounded Sri Lankan President Calls on Tamils to Join Fight Against Terrorism,” 
CNN.com, December 20, 1999, http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/99/1227/
srilanka.iv.wickramasinghe.html; Dilshika Jayamaha, “Bombing Wounds Sri Lankan 
President,” The Washington Post, December 19, 1999.
k Rohan Gunaratna, “Intelligence Failures Exposed by Tamil Tiger Airport Attack,” 
Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2001, p. 16; “The Tigers Pounce,” The 
Economist, July 28, 2001; “Tamil Rebels Raid Sri Lankan Airport,” The Washington 
Post, July 25, 2001.
Boosting its tactical and operational base is part of the LTTE’s 
active and innovative R&D agenda. The group has demonstrated 
remarkable skill in this regard, particularly in the realms of suicide 
devices, standoﬀ resources, and marine attack munitions. The Tigers 
have developed numerous technologies to avail martyr operations, 
ranging from bomb vests complete with primary, secondary, and even 
tertiary detonation switches—including one version that explodes 
when the wearer raises his or her arms in surrender—to specially 
equipped suicide boats, bicycles, and motorbikes. These delivery media 
are repeatedly tested and reconﬁgured in secure Tiger camps and are 
only actively deployed after they have demonstrated a high degree of 
eﬀectiveness (generally upward of 90 percent).34
LTTE has been even more adroit with surface and underwater 
combat innovation. The group is known to have fabricated at least two 
types of submersible, timer-activated explosive: a cylindrical bomb 
34 RAND ﬁeldwork and interviews, Western diplomatic oﬃcial and Internal Intelligence 
Directorate (IID), Colombo, May 2004. 
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(roughly 60–90 centimeters in height) that can be suspended from a 
ship’s propeller or rudder shaft and an improvised RDX slab that can 
be attached to a vessel’s hull with a black glycerol mixture. The Sea 
Tigers have also manufactured a variety of attack, logistics, person-
nel, and multipurpose craft as well as stealth suicide boats especially 
equipped with angled metallic superstructures to reduce their radar 
cross-section.35 However, perhaps the most creative R&D eﬀort has 
been the attempt to construct two-man mini-submarines for releas-
ing divers inside Sri Lankan harbors. Revelations that the LTTE were 
making concerted moves in this direction ﬁrst broke in 2000 when a 
partially completed prototype was discovered at a Tamil-owned ship-
yard in Phuket. According to informed sources, the ﬁve-meter vessel, 
while rudimentary, was capable of remaining submersed for up to six 
hours (at speeds up to ﬁve knots) and could very well have served as a 
prototype for more advanced versions to attack operational naval sur-
face ships.36
Environmental Factors 
Although the LTTE does not presently threaten the United States, it 
does provide a benchmark for the sophistication that a substate insur-
gency can achieve given the right combination of circumstances. 
Moreover, there is always the danger that the group could contract 
out its expertise to other groups that are of more immediate relevance 
to the ongoing global war on terror, including jihadists in South and 
Southeast Asia, or could itself come to view Washington as an obstacle 
to the attainment of Tamil objectives in Sri Lanka. According to one 
source in Colombo’s Internal Intelligence Directorate (IID), the LTTE 
has already made contact with al-Qaeda through Pathmanathan 
Kumaran, the Tigers’ weapons procurement chief, who allegedly trav-
eled to Kabul between 2000 and 2001 to try to arrange the procure-
35 Campbell and Gunaratna (2003).
36 Interview, IIB, Colombo, May 2004. See also “Lanka Suspects Submarine in Thailand to 
be LTTE’s,” Associated Press, July 16, 2000; Davis (2000), p. 28. It is not currently known 
whether the LTTE has been able to successfully introduce submarines into its overall battle 
armory. 
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ment of surface-to-air missiles (munitions that the group had already 
demonstrated a proven capacity to employ, using them to bring down 
two Sri Lankan transport planes and a helicopter gunship during the 
1990s). It is not known whether these munitions were ever supplied to 
the Tigers or, indeed, if this initial contact was followed with subsequent 
meetings. The same IID source also explicitly referred to the residual 
threat of attacks being directed against U.S. warships visiting the port 
of Trincomalee should Prabhakaran begin to view Washington’s stance 
in the current peace process as unalterably opposed to the notion of an 
independent or at least fully autonomous Tamil homeland.37 For these 
reasons, the United States needs to be aware of how the LTTE has 
evolved and how learning has aﬀected its organizational capabilities 
and the corresponding threat levels that those capabilities represent.
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Ideological Foundation
Founded in 1959, ETA is a Marxist group that uses terrorism in 
hopes of forming an independent Basque state in parts of northern 
Spain and southwest France.38 ETA stands for Euskadi ta Askatasuna, 
which means “Basque Fatherland and Liberty.” In the past, ETA has 
received assistance from the Cuban and Libyan regimes, and some of 
its members have found political asylum in Mexico and Venezuela. It 
has had links with other militant left-wing movements in Europe and 
elsewhere, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA).39
Although ETA’s aim is to establish an independent Basque state based 
on Marxist principles, there have been ideological splits in the organi-
zation as to whether there should be class war or national war, as well 
37 RAND ﬁeldwork and interview, IID, Colombo, May 2004.
38 Some analysts today downplay the salience of the ideology in motivating the group. 
Thomas A. Marks’s review of this manuscript, July 2005.
39 See, for instance, Mariano Rajoy, “Está absolutamente probado que ETA se entrenó en 
algunos países con terroristas islámicos,” El Mundo, Madrid, October 21, 2001, p. 26.
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as splits within the ETA over the level of violence the group should use 
to achieve its goals.40
Strategic and Operational Objectives
ETA’s goal is the establishment of an independent Basque state through 
the use of violence. Like the PIRA, which is linked to a political move-
ment (Sinn Fein), ETA has a political arm, Herri Batasuna, which is 
in fact a coalition of various nationalist factions. ETA’s goal is compli-
cated by the fact that only about half of the population of the Basque 
country is of Basque origin. In the 2001 regional elections, Batasuna 
received only about 10 percent of the vote. Batasuna was declared ille-
gal in 2003 and is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States 
and the European Union. 
ETA conducts assassinations of national and regional oﬃcials and 
attacks on government buildings in Spain. In 1973, ETA operatives 
killed Generalissimo Francisco Franco’s apparent successor, Admiral 
Luis Carrero Blanco, by planting an underground bomb that exploded 
as he was being driven to mass at a Madrid church. In 1995, an ETA 
car bomb almost killed José María Aznar, then leader of the conserva-
tive Popular Party, who later became Spain’s prime minister. The same 
year, investigators disrupted a plot to assassinate King Juan Carlos. 
And in 1999, Spanish investigators foiled a truck bombing of Madrid’s 
Picasso Tower, a skyscraper designed by the architect of the World 
Trade Center.41
ETA ﬁnances its operations through kidnapping, extortion, rob-
bery, arms traﬃcking, and “taxes,” as well as with money leaking from 
its political counterpart Batasuna.42 ETA operatives have reportedly 
trained in Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Mexico, Cuba, 
and several South American states harbor ETA operatives.43
40 Drake (1998), p. 56; Perez-Agote (1999).
41 Steven Adolf, “Taliban van Baskenland Onder Druk Door Antiterreur,” NRC 
Handelsblad, October 1, 2001, p. 5.
42 Cronin (2004).
43 Miro (2003).
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Environmental Factors
A dispute within the ETA over the future course of the movement 
resulted in an extremely small faction willing to work with Osama 
bin Laden’s terrorist network. Journalistic sources claim that up to 
80 members of ETA were in Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
and two of them were arrested on February 29, 2004, transporting 
explosives to Madrid.44 Moreover, al-Qaeda has had a lengthy presence 
in Spain. In November 2001, Spanish authorities arrested eight men 
suspected of being al-Qaeda operatives involved in the September 11 
attacks, and one of these men reportedly had past links with Batasuna.45
Although there has been no evidence that ETA has considered target-
ing Americans, connections with the al-Zarqawi terror network and 
European al-Qaeda networks could induce members of this organiza-
tion to join in attacks on U.S. interests in Europe.
Some Conclusions Regarding Groups Outside the 
al-Qaeda Universe
We began this volume by discussing three categories of alternative 
groups and alternative threats in the ongoing struggle against terror-
ism: (1) Islamist groups that articulate a politico-religious agenda for 
their own country and are not directly linked to the al-Qaeda net-
work; (2) Islamist terrorist groups whose agendas are primarily ethno-
nationalist and that present a reasonable challenge to U.S. allies; 
and (3) highly capable, non-Islamist, terrorist groups. Table 5.2 sep-
arates the groups we examined into these three categories. Notably, 
of the Islamist groups outlined, only two—al Wa’ad and the Iraqi 
insurgents—developed after 1998, when Osama bin Laden issued his 
fatwa calling for a global jihad against “Jews and Crusaders.”
44 Magdi Allam, “Patto di sangue Eta-integralisti—In Iraq anche le brigate basche,” Corriere 
della Sera, March 15, 2003; Richard Giragosian, “The al-Qaeda Franchise,” Asia Times, 
March 17, 2004.
45 Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 0000035/2001 E, Juzgado Central de Instuccion No. 005, 
Madrid, Spain, September 17, 2003, pp. 366 and 577.
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Table 5.2

























The other groups were already well established and active and had 
articulated their agenda prior to al-Qaeda’s emergence in the interna-
tional arena. The majority of the Islamist groups we have discussed 
interpret their jihad much more narrowly than groups aﬃliated or 
associated with al-Qaeda. Hezbollah’s interests center on Lebanon and 
its immediate vicinity; Hamas is focused on the Palestinian problem; 
and the GIA seeks to overthrow the Algerian government. Even for 
the groups to which aﬃliation or association with al-Qaeda might be 
operationally attractive, external and internal factors have held such 
tendencies in check. Hezbollah appears to be inﬂuenced by its ties to 
Syria and Iran, as well as by its involvement in Lebanese politics. Al-
Gama’a al-Islamiyya appears to be concerned about the views of its 
support communities in Egypt. 
Nevertheless, these groups should not be dismissed as unthreat-
ening just because they have not joined the global jihadist movement. 
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These organizations—which we refer to as regional threats—endanger 
U.S. regional security interests and U.S. friends and allies, and some, 
such as Hezbollah, could emerge as global threats. 
Potential Dangerous Shifts Ahead
Some analysts have argued that after the September 11 attacks and the 
onset of the global war on terror, Islamist terrorist groups have begun 
to move toward al-Qaeda. The logic behind this argument is that the 
success of these attacks caused a shift in the worldview of many like- 
minded groups, turning them away from their local agendas to a more 
global, anti-America outlook. This view has some merit. It is clear from 
our previous discussion that many of the nonaﬃliated Islamist groups 
have at least considered some involvement with al-Qaeda or expan-
sion toward a more pan-Islamic agenda. Importantly, the interaction 
among these groups so far appears to have been motivated by both 
ideology and pragmatism. 
In this context, even some of the non-Islamist groups could decide 
to cooperate with al-Qaeda or other Islamist groups for their own rea-
sons. For example, many of the militant groups now maintain repre-
sentatives in the criminal and black market world. This interconnectiv-
ity allows terrorists to acquire weapons as necessary, perhaps even to 
expand their capabilities. We discuss the nexus between transnational 
criminal organizations and militant groups in Chapter Seven. At this 
point, it is important to stress that some terrorist groups could shift 
their worldview, thus adopting an agenda similar to that of al-Qaeda. 
Alternatively, others could simply capitalize on a perceived trend toward 
anti-U.S. attacks, shifting the focus of their own attacks toward U.S. 
targets—either to increase their potential through alliances with more 
capable al-Qaeda aﬃliated groups or simply to gain greater recognition. 
A recent RAND study analyzed factors that caused terror-
ist groups to adjust their intentions (e.g., their ideology or world-
view) and capabilities. The study isolated three key factors that 
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cause terrorist groups to shift from their chosen paths: (1) counter-
attacks by security forces; (2) external support from states or other 
militant organizations; and (3) gain or loss of popular support.46
Signiﬁcantly, the global war on terrorism has aﬀected a number 
of the terrorist organizations discussed in this study in all three areas. 
We mentioned earlier that a potentially dangerous shift can be seen 
in the emerging Hamas-Hezbollah nexus, as illustrated by the March 
14, 2004, attack in the Israeli port of Ashdod.47 Given the qualita-
tive leap in Hamas’s eﬀorts, it might not be a surprise that Hezbollah 
ﬁnanced and, indeed, allegedly planned this attack. Yet this degree 
of aid and coordination is greater than anything prior in the Hamas-
Hezbollah relationship. From an Israeli viewpoint, some security oﬃ-
cials have stated that this attack motivated the Israeli government to 
assassinate Sheikh Yasin.48 Indeed, the Israeli security apparatus has 
methodically assassinated both existing and emerging Hamas leaders 
and many experts believe it may take years for Hamas to rebuild, if it 
ever can recover.49
But the Ashdod attack also holds other, and more global, impli-
cations for the war on terrorism. First, it demonstrates that Sunni and 
Shi’ite militants will work together, given a mutual enemy. In this case, 
the enemy is Israel, but this does not preclude cooperation between 
Sunni and Shi’ite militants against the United States. Second, up to 
this point, Hamas was facing signiﬁcant counterterrorism pressure 
from the Israeli government. In addition, tightening security and the 
fence around Palestinian territories all served to make it more diﬃcult 
for Hamas to carry out its operations in Israel. Thus it could have been 
more willing to take strategic guidance from Hezbollah—not just aid 
46 For more information, see Cragin and Daly (2004).
47 Cragin and Daly (2004); Cragin interviews, Israeli counterterrorism experts, April 
2004.
48 Cragin interviews, Israeli counterterrorism experts, April 2004.
49 The IDF also reportedly was responsible for an attack against a Hezbollah leader, Ghaleb 
Awali, in Beirut on July 19, 2004. It is likely that this attack was also linked to the Ashdod 
bombing, perhaps as a warning for Hezbollah not to get too involved in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conﬂict.
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but actual suggestions for types of attacks and targets. Parallel coun-
terterrorism eﬀorts by the United States and its allies in the war on ter-
rorism could provoke other nonaﬃliated terrorists to accept guidance 
from al-Qaeda in the future, as Hamas apparently did from Hezbollah. 
Finally, in the case of Hezbollah, a potential explanation for the shift 
in its aid toward Hamas is that Hezbollah may be struggling to sus-
tain attention and support since Israel pulled out of southern Lebanon. 
Greater involvement in the Palestinian resistance could help Hezbollah 
increase its momentum and support. It is thus possible that Muslim 
anger at the U.S. presence in Iraq could similarly provoke shifts in the 
agendas of Hezbollah or other groups vis-à-vis the United States, as 




During the past ten years, political movements based on ideologies 
opposed to the spread of global capitalism, the destruction of the natu-
ral environment, and the growth of such transnational bodies as the 
European Union (EU) have taken root in Western Europe and North 
America, where the presence of international media has given these 
oppositionists a vast forum. At its core, this nascent ideological move-
ment opposes corporate power and the assumed socioeconomic dislo-
cations that may follow in the wake of the spread of globalized capital-
ism across the world. 
It is in this context that several commentators have described the 
antiglobalization movement as a de facto “New, New Left,” drawing 
comparisons to the international radical upheaval that swept France 
and other countries in 1968. Although antiglobalization radicals have 
been associated with marches and demonstrations, the real importance 
of the movement in terms of terrorism and national and international 
security considerations lies in its eﬀect on organizations that have 
shown, in varying degrees, an explicit penchant for violence.
This chapter provides an overview and assessment of anarchist 
groups, the “New, New Left,” and right-wing extremists in Europe 
and North America; antiglobalization populist movements and radical 
indigenous people’s movements in Latin America; and ecoterrorists and 
other niche extremists on the even farther fringe of the movement. It 
should be noted that this analysis is not intended to be comprehensive. 
The ﬂuid and overlapping nature of the groups, along with their often 
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secretive and frequently opaque nature, makes it diﬃcult to arrive at 
authoritative judgments. These evaluations should be viewed as a ﬁrst 
step in a more long-term process to assess potential terrorist threats.
Anarchism, the “New, New Left,” and the Extreme Right 
in Western Europe and North America
Anarchists
During the 1880s and 1890s, prime ministers, presidents, and mon-
archs were frequent targets of anarchist bombs and guns. A series of 
spectacular terrorist attacks in Europe and North America, including 
those that took the lives of Czar Alexander II of Russia in 1881, French 
President Marie-François Sadi Carnot in 1894, and U.S. President 
William McKinley in 1901, led to widespread fears of a worldwide 
anarchist conspiracy and a transatlantic campaign to eradicate the 
movement.1 From the time of the 1917 Russian Revolution until 
the collapse of European communism in 1989, Marxism-Leninism 
eclipsed anarchism as the premier left-wing anticapitalist ideology.2 In 
the postsocialist world, activists opposed to global capitalism, milita-
rism, nuclear power, and other perceived ills have rediscovered anar-
chism and embraced it as a framework for explaining and changing the 
political, economic, and social order.
Nowhere has anarchism enjoyed a greater resurgence than in 
Germany, Spain, and Italy, the ideology’s traditional Western European 
homes. Chronically high levels of unemployment, disillusionment 
with mainstream politics, and a deep reservoir of opposition to glo-
balization have made Western European audiences receptive to anar-
chism. Recently, violence has been associated with anarchist militants. 
Beginning shortly before Christmas in 2003, Romano Prodi, president 
of the European Commission; European Central Bank chairman Jean-
1 For more on this campaign, see Jensen (2001). For more on anarchism in Europe during 
this period, see Miller (2001), pp. 41–58. 
2 Except possibly in Spain during the Spanish Civil War, when anarcho-syndicalists were 
the dominant force in the Catalunya region until suppressed by the communists in 1938.
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Claude Trichet; and EUROPOL, the continent’s police coordinating 
body, received packages containing small amounts of explosives. No 
one was hurt by these bombs. They were “little more than a symbolic 
gesture,” according to the Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃce in Bologna.3 An 
organization known as the Informal Anarchist Federation (Federazione 
Anarchica Informale), numbering an estimated 350 members, took 
credit for the parcel bomb sent to Prodi.4 A communiqué delivered to 
the oﬃces of a Roman newspaper explained the purposes of the attack, 
namely, to strike out at the “control and repression structures . . . of the 
new European order,” and, ultimately, “the destruction of the state.”5
At the tactical level, anarchist goals include the release of imprisoned 
comrades and, more broadly, the abolition of jails and prisons.6
The anarchist “galaxy,” according to Italian oﬃcials, includes 
“insurrectional-anarchists.” Numbering no more than 100, this subset 
of activists is highly elusive and dangerous, according to Italian author-
ities.7 “They do not claim responsibility for their attacks [and] they act 
suddenly,” according to one magistrate.8 Since 1996, their targets have 
included railway building sites, the oﬃces of the center-left Democrats 
of the Left party, and international corporations, such as McDonalds 
and Blockbusters.
3 Luigi Spezia, “Prodi: Spate of Searches,” La Repubblica (Rome), December 29, 2003, 
FBIS. “Gunpowder may not have been used, just chlorate-based weedkiller, which ‘does 
little more damage than Christmas sparklers, because this was no lethal device,’ one detec-
tive said.” 
4 “Letter Bombs Addressed to EU Oﬃcials Panic Europe,” National Public Radio, Weekend 
Edition Sunday, January 25, 2004.
5 Luigi Spezia, “Bologna, Explosives Claim: ‘Prodi Was Our Target,’” La Repubblica 
(Rome), December 24, 2003, FBIS. 
6 Emanuela Fontana, “A Subversive Thread from Rovereto Leads to Riva del Garda,” Il 
Giornale (Milan), December 9, 2003, FBIS. 
7 Fabrizio Roncone, “The Map: Although They Are Few and Disorganized, They Now Feel 
Like Protagonists,” Corriere della Sera (Milan), November 12, 2003, FBIS.
8 Roncone, “The Map . . . .”
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Italian anarchists have forged links with anarchists in other 
European countries, such as Spain, Greece, Germany, and France.9
The Internet has been a boon to anarchist groups by allowing dis-
persed individuals to share information, plan operations, recruit new 
members, and, allegedly, to share bomb-making recipes.10 Germany 
has proven to be a particularly fertile ground for anarchist recruitment. 
Within the so-called “autonomist scene,” there are as many as 5,000 
activists and supporters, according to Germany’s internal intelligence 
agency, the Oﬃce for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz, or BfV).11 In the autonomists’ view, acts of counter-
violence are a necessary response to the “structural” violence embodied 
in the German state and society. Recent violent actions by the auton-
omists include arson, attacks on neo-Nazis, militant demonstrations 
against nuclear power, and the disruption of road and rail transport. 
During street protests, autonomists typically don combat gear, wear 
masks, and form into “black blocs” to smash windows, assault police, 
and carry out other violent acts. In the view of the German authorities, 
such actions cross the line from protest into terrorism. Indeed, accord-
ing to the BfV, these groups “have posed a threat to internal security 
in Germany.”12
In Italy, some observers have claimed that the upsurge in terror-
ist violence heralds a return to the “days of lead” (giorni di piombo)
of the 1970s, in which Italian society was paralyzed by frequent ter-
9 Claudia Fusani, “Counteroﬀensive at Viminale: ‘We Know All the Names,’” La Repubblica
(Rome), December 30, 2003, FBIS.
10 Sophie Arie, “Berlusconi Says Basta! to Violence,” Guardian (London), November 6, 
2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,1079040,00.html (as 
of March 21, 2006).
11 BfV, Annual Report of the Oﬃce for the Protection of the Constitution 2002, Cologne: 
BfV, n.d., p. 108.
12 BfV, Annual Report, p. 97. The BfV also alleges that other groups on the extreme left are 
willing to use violence to achieve their goals. Most notable are activists with links to rem-
nants of the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, or RAF), the Marxist-Leninist terrorist 
movement that dissolved in 1998. BfV, Annual Report, fn. 115, p. 239.
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rorist bombings, assassinations, and violent street protests.13 Similarly, 
the Council of the European Union has concluded that the possibility 
exists for the “resurrection” of extreme left-wing and anarchist terror-
ism across the continent.14 Recent events would seem in some ways 
to bear out this judgment. In Italy, in addition to the violent anar-
chists, other terrorists have emerged, including those claiming to be 
successors to the Red Brigades, which splintered in 1984. Extremist 
groups such as the Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (Nuclei 
di Iniziativa Proletaria Rivoluzionaria), which claimed responsibility 
for a bomb attack in 2002 near the Interior Ministry in Rome, have 
no more than a dozen members,15 although some observers claim such 
groups are attracting increasing support.16
That said, the claim that Italy is returning to the “days of lead” 
seems overstated. Anarchist groups are small, and while they have car-
ried out acts of terrorism, they cannot be compared to the violence of 
the late 1970s. At ﬁrst glance, the left-wing extremist threat in Germany 
might appear to be larger, since the number of violent activists is greater. 
However, most of the terrorist incidents described by the German 
authorities are really little more than gloriﬁed vandalism. Window 
breaking, minor arson, and rock throwing, rather than assassination, 
are the order of the day. Moreover, what is considered “anarchist” vio-
lence by European authorities may not always be the responsibility
13 See, for example, “Return to the ‘Days of Lead,’” Weekend Australian (Sydney), March 23, 
2002, p. 15. 
14 Council of the European Union, “Situation in the Terrorist Activity in the European 
Union: Situations and Trends,” document no. 5759/02, January 31, 2002, p. 9.
15 U.S. Department of State (2003b), p. 142. 
16 See, for example, “Nuclei di Iniziativa Proletaria Rivoluzionaria (NIPR),” Jane’s World 
Insurgency and Terrorism 16, October 2002. 
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of anarchist groups. In both Italy and Germany, there is a long tradi-
tion of labeling incidents of political violence as “anarchist” when in 
fact other groups on the right have been responsible.17
An assessment of the terrorist potential of the anarchist groups 
presents a mixed picture. Factors that could contribute to terror-
ism include highly eﬃcient communications and transportation net-
works, elite alienation, impatience with conventional political organiz-
ing, and membership with a strong commitment to the cause and a 
willingness to take risks. Countervailing factors include the apparent 
willingness of the state to take actions against suspected terrorists, the 
lack of concrete grievances, and the existence of traditional and non-
violent outlets for expressing political grievances.
The “New, New Left”
During the past decade, once-staid meetings of international ﬁnan-
cial and political institutions—the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, the Group of Eight (G-8)—have been transformed into 
arenas of street protest, civil disobedience, and occasionally violence. 
To some outsiders, the antiglobalization movement (or, as many activ-
ists prefer to call it, the global justice movement) appears to be an 
inchoate collection of a wide variety of causes ranging from interna-
tional debt, to global capitalism, to freedom for Mumia Abu-Jamal, 
the former Black Panther on death row in Pennsylvania for the murder 
of a police oﬃcer. Sometimes described as the “New, New Left,”18 the 
movement, while still highly diverse, has begun to fashion a coherent 
worldview.
17 Statewatch, “EU Deﬁnition of Terrorism: Anarchists Targeted as Being ‘Terrorists’ 
Alongside Al Qaeda,” Analysis No. 10, February 2002, p. 3, http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2002/feb/terrdef.pdf (as of March 22, 2006); and Paul Berman, “The Passion of 
Joschka Fischer,” The New Republic, September 3, 2001, p. 36. 
There is an extensive history in Italy of anarchists or “left-wingers” appearing as suspects 
in the early stages of investigations, being arrested and later being shown to be innocent. 
In 2000 and 2001 two trials concerning explosions during the so-called ‘years of lead’ 
originally blamed on anarchists resulted in convictions for right-wingers acting with 
state collusion.” (Statewatch, “EU Deﬁnition of Terrorism,” p. 3.) 
18 Bob von Sternberg, “Call It Anarchism or New New Left, It Has a Big Voice,” Star 
Tribune (Minneapolis), May 21, 2000, p. 25A.
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At the movement’s core, as mentioned earlier, is opposition to 
global capitalism. Globalization, according to the Act Now to Stop 
War and End Racism (ANSWER) Coalition, “is in fact a form of class 
war by the rich and powerful against the poor. It is a form of corporate 
violence against working people and their labor unions.”19 The global 
justice movement, in the words of a leading theorist, “is the only major 
channel through which we can engage the most critical issues,” such as 
climate change, poverty, and environmental degradation—issues that 
are allegedly ignored in mainstream political discourse.20
Opposing “globalization,” or international ﬁnancial institutions, 
is no longer at the movement’s cutting edge. Like the anarchists, global 
justice movement activists are turning their energy to opposing what 
they consider illegitimate concentrations of public and private power. 
According to one movement polemicist, a “genuine, global revolution 
is underway,” sparked by the belief that
Political freedom without economic freedom is meaningless. This 
shared understanding is one of the rallying points for this new 
international gathering force of dissidents, conjured into existence 
by a capitalism more powerful and unchecked than anything we 
have seen for a century. . . . Freedom—sovereignty—is about the 
right to decide your economic, as well as your political destiny.21
The potential for these movements to pose a violent threat to the 
political, economic, and social order beyond isolated excesses—that is, 
the potential to cross the line from protest to terrorism—is unclear. It 
is not at all certain, for example, that today’s movements will follow 
the trajectory of the left-wing, largely student-based movements of 
the 1960s and 1970s, from which violent extremists emerged in West 
Germany, Italy, France, and the United States.22
19 ANSWER fact sheet, October 2, 2003, http://www.internationalANSWER.org.
20 George Monbiot, “Stronger Than Ever: Far from Fizzling Out, the Global Justice 
Movement Is Growing in Numbers and Maturity,” Guardian (London), February 28, 2003, 
p. 19.
21 Paul Kingsnorth, “The Global Backlash,” New Statesman, April 28, 2003.
22 Berman (1996), p. 96.
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The Extreme Right
On the other end of the political spectrum, extreme right-wing activ-
ists also profess an opposition to global capitalism, international ﬁnan-
cial bodies, Third World debt, and other manifestations of globaliza-
tion. The British National Party, for example, claims that the “bosses 
of the banks” have used “bribery or economic pressure to encour-
age the corrupt rulers of unfortunate Third World states to take out 
huge loans their people can never repay.”23 In the discourse of some 
right-wing extremists in Germany, globalization is an American-led 
conspiracy, conducted by, and for the beneﬁt of, Jewish capitalists.24
Other right-wing extremists oppose globalization on the grounds that 
it undermines national sovereignty. In the words of one writer, “Pro-
White Nationalists are natural enemies of Globalization for racial, eco-
nomic and sovereignty reasons.”25 The National Alliance, one of North 
America’s largest neo-Nazi groups, has set up an “Anti-Globalism 
Action Network,” and claims that “White Nationalists are . . . anti-
capitalist and anti-establishment and pro-environment . . . [they] are 
the true revolutionaries.”26
Much of this railing against the evils of globalization is probably 
opportunistic—done in the hopes that it will attract recruits rather than 
as a result of new interpretations of events. However, the use of anti-
globalization rhetoric may also reﬂect deeper trends within the extreme 
right, speciﬁcally, a growing ideological convergence with some parts of 
the far left. This is not an entirely new phenomenon, of course. During 
the previous century, political extremists ostensibly at odds with each 
23 British National Party, “Cults, Jets and Greed—The Frantic Rush to ‘One World,’” http://
www.bnp.org.uk/articles/rush_globalism.htm (as of March 22, 2006).
24 BfV, The Signiﬁcance of Anti-Semitism in Current German Right-Wing Extremism, p. 9, 
http://www.extremismus.com/vs/antisemitism-e.pdf (as of March 22, 2006). 
25 Walter Nowotny, “Pro-White Nationalism Versus Globalization,” Pro-White Forum,
July 17, 2002, http://www.churchoftrueisrael.com/nsforum/ns7-17.html (as of March 22, 
2006). 
26 Quoted in Anti-Defamation League, “Deceptive Web Site Attempts to Lure Anti-
Globalization Activists to Neo-Nazi Movement,” http://www.adl.org/NR/exeres/D512AD57-
27F3-44B0-AA18-14D136259DCF,0B1623CA-D5A4-465D-A369-DF6E8679CD9E,
frameless.htm (as of March 22, 2006). 
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other in fact shared a common outlook. In Weimar Germany during 
the 1920s, some members of the extreme right described the Soviet 
Union in approving terms as an anticapitalist, antiliberal beacon for 
the world.27 During the 1960s, the American Nazi Party, violently 
opposed to racial integration, found common cause with the Nation 
of Islam, whose leader, Elijah Muhammad, praised white opponents 
of “race mixing.”28 In recent years, opposition to Israel and Zionism 
has also emerged as a common theme for the extreme right and the 
New, New Left. The leader of France’s leading Jewish organization 
has decried the emergence of a “brown-green-red” alliance that attacks 
Jews and Israel in racist, anticapitalist, and anticolonialist terms.29
An Extreme Right–Islamist Alliance?
The possibility of a tactical alliance between white supremacists and 
Islamist extremists cannot be discounted. The National Alliance has 
staged pro-Palestinian demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in 
Washington, and Louis Beam, a prominent anti-Semitic agitator, has 
publicly praised the “liberation movements” of Syria, Libya, Iran, and 
Palestine.30 Echoing a favorite Islamist trope, the National Alliance 
denounces “American and allied forces which have repeatedly made war 
on Moslem states in response to the demands of the Jewish lobby.”31
The global war on terrorism, according to the National Alliance, is 
“just a new name for the same game of killing when the Jewish lobby 
says ‘kill.’”32
27 Furet (1999), p. 203. 
28 Clegg (1997), pp. 152–153. 
29 “Le CRIF dénonce une alliance antisémite ‘brun vert rouge,’” Accueil TF1, January 27, 
2003, http://www.col.fr/judeotheque/archive.web/CRIF%20Cukierman%20fustige%20l%
E2%80%99alliance%20brun,%20vert,%20rouge.htm (as of June 2005); and Strauss (2003), 
pp. 61–65. 
30 Anti-Defamation League, “Louis Beam,” http://www.adl.org/learn/Ext_US/beam.asp?
xpicked=2&item=beam (as of March 22, 2006). 
31 National Alliance, “Make Your Neighborhood a Terror-Free Zone,” http://www.natall.
com/leaﬂets (as of March 22, 2006). 
32 “Real Homeland Security,” Free Speech, Vol. VIII, No. X, October 2002, p. 8. 
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Al-Qaeda, according to some press accounts, has shown some 
interest in reaching out to non-Islamic militant groups, with anti-
Semitism, anti-Americanism, and anti-Westernism serving as a common 
ground.33 An alliance between the global justice movement and either 
neo-Nazis or Islamic radicals is harder to imagine. Certainly the 
movement’s libertarian elements (and the movement’s anarchist fringe) 
would be unlikely to support linkages with politically and theologically 
totalitarian groups. Although neo-Nazis, Islamists, and the New, New 
Left share an anti-Zionist stance (and a deep well of anti-Semitism), 
opposition to Israel remains a relatively minor component of the global 
justice movement’s agenda, and so is unlikely to serve as the foundation 
for any real partnership.
Neo-Marxist and Radical Populist Movements in Latin 
America
Antiglobalist movements are not part of the universe of terrorism, and 
some claim to be democratic—although they generally reject deﬁni-
tions of Western liberal democracy. Nevertheless, they threaten U.S. 
security interests because they threaten the stability of key countries 
and take countries where they seize power into destructive detours into 
irrational economic and political policies. 
The antiglobalization movement in Latin America is unique in 
that many of the regional leftist movements and parties are linked in 
an international structure known as the São Paulo Forum. The São 
Paulo Forum was established under the auspices of Fidel Castro in 1990 
in the Brazilian city of São Paulo. The forum brings together about 
120 Latin American leftist political parties and organizations, includ-
ing the two major Colombian guerrilla organizations—the FARC 
and the ELN—as well as the Cuban Communist Party, Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chávez’s V Republic political movement, Nicaragua’s 
Sandinistas, the FMLN of El Salvador, the National Revolutionary 
33 Paolo Pontoniere, “Al Qaeda Reaching Out to Non-Islamic Militant Groups,” Paciﬁc 
News Service, November 16, 2001. 
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Union of Guatemala, former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s 
Lavallas Movement, Mexico’s Zapatista National Liberation Army, and 
the United Left Movement of Peru. 
The goal of the forum’s organizers was to develop a post-Soviet 
strategy for the Latin American revolution. The fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the subsequent Soviet collapse were traumatic events for 
the extreme left in Latin America. Nevertheless, the more optimistic 
radicals argued that the end of communism in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe did not signify the end of the socialist camp. According 
to a document of the VI Conference of the São Paulo Forum, “China, 
Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, and Cuba remain on their feet, and are 
working to develop their own political strategies to advance the social-
ist alternative.”34
The forum’s political program centers on a strong critique of “neo-
liberalism,” which it describes as an economic model that allows the 
elites to accumulate even greater wealth at the expense of the poor. 
Globalization, according to the forum, is “pillage on a planetary scale.” 
The forum believes that the contradictions between the wealthy few 
and the exploited many cannot in the long term be sustained and that 
the neoliberal economic model will collapse sooner rather than later.
At the strategic and tactical levels, the forum concluded that the 
antiglobalization forces needed to develop “new forms of struggle.” It 
was necessary to move beyond the social sectors that had supported the 
left in the past, and capture “popular organizations that have emerged 
in response to the injustices of the modern capitalist model.” Among 
the new forms of struggle that were recommended was taking advan-
tage of the democratic opening in a number of Latin American coun-
tries, particularly in those where “democratic and popular fronts” were 
viable alternatives to unpopular neoliberal governments. Although the 
method of struggle was to be the democratic process, the forum’s goal 
remains revolution. This was clearly stated in the Base Document of the 
IX Encounter of the forum, held in Managua, Nicaragua, in February 
34 Cited in Alejando Peña Esclusa, “A los diez años de su fundación: radiografía del Foro 
de São Paulo,” forums.terra.com/foros/actualidad/ actualidad_C5/actualidad_venezolana_
F100/foro_P532013 (as of November 2001). 
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2000: “Our goal is revolution. That is, a profound transformation of 
society, which should be accomplished by reaﬃrming and recreating 
democracy, an essential aspect of any alternative political project.”35
In recent years, political forces backed by the São Paulo Forum 
have gained some notable successes. By the mid-1990s the strategy 
has brought to elected oﬃce throughout Latin America 291 deputies 
or legislative chamber members, 51 senators, 10 governors, and sev-
eral hundred mayors aﬃliated with the São Paulo Forum.36 The most 
spectacular success of the antiglobalization Latin American left was 
the election of Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela in December 
1998, but Chávez’s election was not an isolated case. Other antiglobal-
ist populists have been elected, or have come close to being elected, 
in a number of South American countries. Lucio Gutiérrez, a former 
military oﬃcer who led a coup against the government of President 
Jamil Mahuad in 2000, won the presidential election in Ecuador in 
November 2002 (although Gutiérrez has since sought to govern as a 
centrist). Evo Morales, the longtime leader of the Bolivian coca farm-
ers, came in second out of eleven candidates in the June 2002 Bolivian 
presidential election, and his Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) 
gained the second-largest number of seats in the Bolivian parliament. 
Morales was elected president of Bolivia in December 2005.
The goal of the Cuban government and its allies in the São Paulo 
Forum of reversing the so-called neoliberal reforms in Latin America 
currently focuses on derailing the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA), which would remove trade barriers among all Western hemi-
sphere countries except Cuba. In January 2004, the Cuban govern-
ment hosted the third “Hemispheric Meeting Against the FTAA,” 
attended by 1,200 antiglobalization activists from 32 countries. In 
their ﬁnal declaration and action plan, the anti-FTAA forces took 
credit for the ousting of Bolivian president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 
35 “IX Encuentro del Foro de São Paulo: Capitalismo contemporaneo y debate sobre la alter-
nativa,” http://www.geocities.com/nuestrotiempo/25foro.htm.
36 Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (ICCAS), University of Miami, Cuba 
Transition Project, “Cuban Foreign Policy in Latin America,” No. 51, January 22, 2004, 
p. 2.
Antiglobalization Movements    97
in 2003 and agreed to a coordinated strategy to defeat any and all 
trade liberalization agreements with the United States, including a 
modiﬁed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well 
as bilateral accords. The ﬁrst battle is to be waged against the U.S.–
Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which is pending 
ratiﬁcation by the legislatures of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua.37 Havana and its anti-FTAA allies are well 
poised to obstruct or reverse movement toward the FTAA, the most 
important U.S. policy objective in the hemisphere. Venezuela, Brazil, 
and Argentina walked out of the World Trade Organization talks in 
Cancun, Mexico, in 2003, and are delaying negotiations on the ﬁnal 
draft of the FTAA treaty.
Radical Indigenous Peoples’ Movements in the Andean Region
Radical indigenous peoples’ movements throughout the Andean region 
have been a major transmission belt for Cuban and Venezuelan inﬂu-
ence and general antiglobalization activity. These movements include 
leftist and populist groups, such as those led by Evo Morales and 
Felipe Quispe in Bolivia, the Pachakuti in Ecuador, and Uruguayan, 
Argentine, and Mapuche Indian groups in Chile (see below). The 
emergence of these movements is related to broader social and political 
trends in the Andean region, most notably the collapse of traditional 
governing arrangements that permitted small Spanish-origin elites to 
monopolize political power and exclude the indigenous majorities, and 
the reaction against the eﬀects of neoliberal economic policies. 
In Bolivia, economic reforms—privatizing state enterprises, 
reducing subsidies, and encouraging foreign investment—were imple-
mented in the 1980s and 1990s but stalled toward the end of the 1990s 
as a result of a downturn in the price of Bolivia’s mining output. A coca 
eradication program spearheaded by the United States led to the near-
elimination of coca cultivation in the Bolivian lowlands but deprived 
37 ICCAS, “Cuban Foreign Policy in Latin America, Part II, Cuba Transition Project,” No. 
52, February 3, 2004.
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tens of thousands of peasants in the lowlands of an income.38 The result 
was the growth of the MAS, started by the coca farmers’ leader Evo 
Morales, and the radical indigenous people’s movement led by Felipe 
Quispe. Morales, who came in second in the June 2002 presidential 
election, despite (or because of) open opposition by the U.S. ambassa-
dor, has proposed a “participatory democracy” model for Bolivia based 
on elements of the Cuban model and Chávez’s “Bolivarian Revolution.” 
In April 2003, Morales and leaders of indigenous peoples in Ecuador 
and Honduras met with Chávez in Caracas and agreed to create an 
alliance extending beyond indigenous peoples to other “dispossessed” 
groups in Latin America.39 Felipe Quispe, the founder and leader of 
the Pachakuti Indian Movement (MIP), was imprisoned from 1992 to 
1997 for his role in the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army, a Bolivian terror-
ist organization. In the 2002 election, MIP came in third in the capital 
city of La Paz. The MIP’s long-term goal is to abolish Bolivia and other 
Andean states and restore the Tahuantinsuyo, the pre-Colombian 
indigenous state. In the short term, the movement seeks to replace its 
authority for the state’s authority in the areas it controls—that is, to 
create a parallel state structure based on communitarian values.40
Antiglobalization forces in Bolivia scored a spectacular victory 
when they overthrew the U.S.-backed government of President Sánchez 
de Lozada in October 2003. The conﬂict began soon after Sánchez de 
Lozada announced his decision to export natural gas to the United 
States and Mexico. An estimated 74 people were killed in a month of 
protests against the government’s free-market economic policies before 
President Sánchez de Lozada resigned and left the country.41 Sánchez 
38 Marc Lifsher, “The Andean Arc of Instability,” The Wall Street Journal, February 24, 
2003.
39 “Bolivia, indigenismo y vasos comunicantes,” Destaque Internacional—Informes de 
Coyuntura, Año V, No. 113, Buenos Aires, October 23, 2003.
40 “Felipe Quispe: de ‘terrorista’ a líder parlamentario,” http://www.redvoltaire.net/arti-
cle454.html; and “El Mallku Speaks: Indigenous Autonomy & Coca,” January 15, 2002, 
http://www.narconews.com/felipe1eng.html (both as of March 22, 2006). 
41 Jose de Cordoba, “Indians Agitate for Political Goals,” The Wall Street Journal, January 8, 
2004.
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de Lozada’s successor, Vice President Carlos Mesa, resigned in June 
2005, after weeks of escalating street demonstrations and violent con-
frontations, conceding that he was no longer able to govern. Mesa’s 
resignation opened the way for Morales’s election in 2005. A powerful 
anti-U.S. and antiglobalization indigenous movement has also emerged 
in Ecuador. In January 2000 thousands of indigenous protesters and 
young army oﬃcers overthrew the government of president Jamil 
Mahuad and announced the creation of a new government, including a 
“Parliament of the People” and a three-man governing junta. However, 
the coup was defused when the country’s military chief took a seat in 
the junta but then dissolved it and turned over power to Vice President 
Gustavo Noboa. In the November 2002 election, former colonel Lucio 
Gutiérrez, a leader of the 2000 revolt, defeated the incumbent Noboa. 
Although he appeared very much in the Chávez mold—a former coup-
maker who campaigned as a populist—Gutiérrez has moderated his 
stance since taking oﬃce and has sought to cooperate with the United 
States and international ﬁnancial institutions.42 The antiglobalization 
movement, however, remains capable of threatening or even bringing 
down his government.
In Peru there have been signs of the revival of the Shining Path. 
Although its leaders, including its chairman Abigail Guzmán, are 
in prison, the group never completely disappeared. There have been 
reports of kidnappings and killings in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the 
organization’s traditional stronghold, since 2001.43 With the increase 
in coca cultivation in the area as a consequence of U.S. eradication 
eﬀorts in Colombia, Shining Path remnants may be able to access the 
resources that they need to fund a renewed insurgency.
42 “Ecuador’s Gutierrez Boosts His Image in U.S. Tour,” The Wall Street Journal, February 
21, 2003.





The Convergence of Terrorism, Insurgency, and 
Crime
During the Cold War, many of the insurgent and terrorist organiza-
tions that proliferated throughout what was then known as the Third 
World were largely dependent on great power support. Even when these 
groups developed within a speciﬁc local context, they were quickly 
assimilated into one global camp or the other. The Soviets and the 
Cubans backed a number of so-called liberation movements in Africa 
and Central America, as well as Middle East terrorist organizations; 
while the United States supported groups such as the National Union 
for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola, the Afghan 
mujahidin, and the anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua. 
The end of the Cold War brought an eﬀective end to external sup-
port for these groups. The Soviet Union disappeared and the United 
States simply lost interest in the fate of many of its former clients. 
For many of these groups, making the adaptation to a new environ-
ment was a matter of survival. Their post–Cold War survival strategies 
hinged on their ability to generate new sources of revenue to support 
their operations. Some groups were unable to make the transition and 
disbanded or made peace with the governments that they were seeking 
to overthrow, as in the case of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan rebels. 
Other groups, however, tapped into locally available sources of 
revenue and grew in strength. The most successful in making the tran-
sition were those that operated in countries that produced high-value 
commodities, legal or otherwise—for instance, diamonds in West 
Africa; minerals in Central Africa; cocaine and heroin in Colombia; 
and opium and heroin in Southwest Asia and the “Golden Triangle.” 
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Still other groups were able to fund themselves successfully by means 
of smuggling and arms traﬃcking, kidnapping and extortion, piracy, 
compact disc counterfeiting, and a variety of other criminal activity. 
These activities provided easy targets of opportunity for terrorist 
or rebel movements. The groups had the ﬁrepower to deal themselves 
into the trade. They could trade the commodities themselves, as in 
the case of the Liberia-backed Revolutionary United Front of Sierra 
Leone and “conﬂict diamonds”; or protect and “tax” them, which is the 
FARC’s preferred approach to the cocaine industry;1 or set themselves 
up as middlemen in human and arms traﬃcking.
The activities of these groups tend to weaken and corrupt politi-
cal and social institutions, particularly when they involve traﬃcking 
in a lucrative and social destructive commodity such as cocaine. To 
the extent that these groups are successful, they also displace state 
and government institutions, usually weak to begin with, in the areas 
where they establish a foothold. Unchecked, the groups will expand 
their resource base, increase their recruiting pool, and generate greater 
capacity at the expense of the state. Therefore, there is a high correla-
tion between the development of these groups and failed or failing 
states.
To illustrate the operation and evolution of these linkages, we 
will analyze several case studies. These include the Tamil Tigers in 
Sri Lanka; the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines; the FARC and 
ELN in Colombia; the activities of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in West Africa; and Hezbollah and 
other Middle Eastern extremist groups in North America and the tri-
border region of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. 
1 The FARC is involved in the drug trade at all stages of production and transportation; 
however, most commentators concur that the bulk of the FARC’s income from drugs is 
derived from taxing production as opposed to proﬁts earned through traﬃcking.
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The Tamil Tigers’ Widespread International Criminal 
Network
One factor that has considerably beneﬁted the LTTE insurgency over 
the past three decades is the group’s sophisticated international support 
network. While much of this infrastructure is a result of legitimate 
fundraising activity among the Tamil diaspora and political lobbying 
designed to discredit the Sinhalese Colombo government, a signiﬁcant 
component has been criminal in nature, involving human smuggling, 
drug traﬃcking, and gunrunning.
Human Smuggling
The trade in human beings is thought to constitute an important part 
of LTTE ﬁnancial procurement, providing a consistent and long-term 
source of operational income (as well as a convenient way to establish 
arms procurement agents around the world—see below). According to 
intelligence oﬃcials in Canada, Australia, and the UK, the group is 
playing a pivotal role in smuggling illegal migrants and refugees out of 
Sri Lanka and India to the West, charging anywhere between $18,000 
and $32,000 per transaction.2 The overall scope of this trade is diﬃ-
cult to determine. However, in June 2000, the Sri Lankan Criminal 
Investigation Department (CID) uncovered one major LTTE smug-
gling ring involving an estimated 600–700 people who had been traf-
ﬁcked to the EU on forged Schengen state visas.3 Even after taking 
overhead costs into account, the net proﬁts from such an operation 
would have been substantial, running into the millions of dollars.
The Tigers allegedly make considerable use of Thailand for human 
traﬃcking—both as an identiﬁcation forgery hub and as a staging point 
for onward journeys. The group is thought to have established a small 
2 Chalk interviews with defense and intelligence oﬃcials, London, Ottawa, Bangkok, and 
Canberra, November–December 2000.
3 With a Schengen visa, a person may travel freely, with no internal border controls and few 
stops and checks, in the 15 European countries that are party to the Schengen agreement. 
See “CID Bust Another Multi Billion Rupee Human Smuggling LTTE Operation,” Daily 
News (Sri Lanka), May 17, 2000; and “Human Smuggling Racket Busted,” Daily Mirror (Sri 
Lanka), June 26, 2000.
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but highly eﬀective cadre of intermediaries in Bangkok and Chiang 
Mai. They are used to facilitate the actual movement of migrants across 
national borders. Such a modus operandi is also seen as a viable way 
of distancing senior LTTE members from possible prosecution in the 
event that a smuggling ring is broken up or otherwise penetrated by 
law enforcement authorities.4
Canada constitutes the main destination of choice for the bulk of 
the LTTE’s human cargo because of its large Tamil diaspora (which 
facilitates rapid local integration into the adopted society) and Canada’s 
liberal immigration laws.5 Once in the country, the migrants quickly 
go underground and generally take on low-paying menial jobs that 
have been prearranged by the LTTE. This eﬀectively ensures that the 
new arrivals remain semipermanently indentured to the group. In the 
current context, this essentially means acting as local Tiger henchmen 
or debt collectors.6
Drug Trafﬁcking
Apart from human smuggling, there have been additional claims about 
the group’s involvement in drug-running operations from South Asia’s 
Golden Crescent. According to the Toronto-based Mackenzie Institute, 
some of the most proﬁtable LTTE activities have been in the form 
of heroin traﬃcking, particularly since the 1980s when Afghan and 
Pakistani producers started to use smuggling routes through southern 
4 Personal correspondence between Chalk and Sri Lankan High Commission oﬃcials, 
Bangkok, December 2000. See also Davis (2003c), p. 32.
5 Police and intelligence oﬃcials believe that the LTTE-Canadian smuggling route oper-
ates according to a basic procedure. Clients ﬁrst travel to Bangkok, often on stolen passports 
that have been doctored for the purpose, where they await the provision of forged iden-
tity documents such as passports, driver licenses, and residency cards. Onward journeys to 
Canada are then arranged. Personal correspondence between Chalk and Sri Lankan intel-
ligence oﬃcials, Bangkok, December 2000. See also Joshi (2000); and “Underground to 
Canada,” The National Post (Canada), March 25, 2000.
6 Personal correspondence between Chalk and Canadian and Sri Lankan intelligence oﬃ-
cials, Ottawa and Bangkok, November–December 2000. 
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India and Sri Lanka more frequently.7 Oﬃcials in Colombo agree; one 
senior oﬃcial asserted that collections from the Tamil diaspora pale 
compared to the group’s narco-based revenue.8
Deﬁnitive proof linking the LTTE to an oﬃcial policy of drug 
traﬃcking has yet to materialize. In Canada, for instance, both the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS) have failed to implicate the group con-
clusively in heroin smuggling operations in Montreal, Toronto, and 
Vancouver, despite conducting intensive and protracted investigations 
into the trade over the past two years.9
Sri Lankan government sources insist that this merely reﬂects the 
tightly organized and compartmentalized nature of LTTE traﬃcking 
networks in general, which, as with human smuggling, has eﬀectively 
insulated the group and its senior membership from prosecution.10
Western organized crime specialists tend to adopt a similar line, fur-
ther pointing out that, at least on a circumstantial level, deﬁnite indi-
cators do exist suggesting a connection between the LTTE and the 
heroin trade:
7 “Funding Terror: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Their Criminal Activities in 
Canada and Western Europe,” Mackenzie Brieﬁng Notes, The Mackenzie Institute, Toronto, 
1995. See also “Narco-Terrorism Alliance in India, Sri Lanka,” The Hindu (India), May 17, 
1998. 
8 Personal correspondence between Chalk and Sri Lankan intelligence and law enforce-
ment oﬃcials, Colombo, March 1999. It should be noted information derived from Sri 
Lankan oﬃcials concerning this matter must necessarily be viewed with a degree of caution 
and circumspection. 
9 Personal correspondence between Chalk and oﬃcials with the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS), Ottawa, November 2000. 
10 Personal correspondence between Chalk and Sri Lankan High Commission oﬃcials in 
Ottawa, Bangkok, and Canberra, November–December 2000.
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There have been numerous arrests of Tamils on drug-related 
charges over the last ﬁfteen years, many of whom have had at 
least some links with militant organizations.11
The LTTE supreme leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, is known to 
have met the legal costs of many of these Tamils and has occa-
sionally authorized “sustenance payments” to their family mem-
bers while they served their prison terms.12
Several organized gangs operating in the greater Toronto met-
ropolitan area and engaged in the importation and distribution 
of number 3 heroin (“brown sugar”) retain important symbolic 
links with the LTTE, including the VVT gang;13 the Jane Finch, 
Kipling, Sooran, Seelapul, and Mississauga gangs; and the Gilder 
Tigers.14
Gunrunning
Finally, the LTTE is known to run a highly proﬁcient gunrunning 
operation. The group’s weapons and munitions network, which spans 
the globe, is headed by Tharmalingham Shanmugham, alias Kumaran 
Pathmanathan and colloquially known simply as “KP.” Second to 
Prabhakaran and with a half-million-dollar bounty on his head, he is 
currently the second-most-wanted man in Sri Lanka. Most members 
of his weapon procurement team—the “KP Department”—have no 
criminal record and have not been involved in active guerrilla or ter-
rorist operations. The reliance on noncombatants is a deliberate tactic 
that is designed to minimize the possibility that those involved with 
11 See, for instance, Athas (1999); Anthony Davis, “Tiger International,” Asiaweek.com,
http://www.pathﬁnder.com/asiaweek/96/0726/cs1.html (as of March 22, 2006); “To Catch 
a Tiger,” The Island (Sri Lanka), May 25, 1998; “Funding Terror: The Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam and Their Criminal Activities in Canada and the Western World,” pp. 5–6. 
12 Correspondence between Chalk and South Asian terrorism specialist, June 1997.
13 A west Toronto Tamil gang named for Valvettithurai, a northern Sri Lankan town.
14 RCMP Directorate for Criminal Intelligence, “The Use of Organized Criminal Activity 
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gunrunning operations will be known to either Sri Lankan or overseas 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.15
Facilitating the movement of arms is a highly active merchant 
shipping network known as the Sea Pigeons. Apart from the PIRA 
and the PLO, the LTTE is the only insurgent-terrorist group that is 
known to have at its disposal a viable maritime capability for logisti-
cal purposes. Today, the ﬂeet numbers at least 11 deep-sea freighters, 
the majority of which reportedly sail under Honduran, Panamanian, 
or Liberian ﬂags of convenience.16 The LTTE has eﬀectively exploited 
the notoriously lax registration requirements of shipping bureaus in 
these countries, allowing the group to confound international tracking 
and monitoring attempts by repeatedly changing the names, mani-
fest details, and duty statements of the vessels used, which has also 
been an integral part of the so-called “phantom ship” phenomenon 
(see below).17
LTTE munitions procurement draws on a variety of sources. 
Much of the group’s overseas arms purchases come from the boom-
ing post–Cold War arms bazaars that have emerged in Southeast and 
Southwest Asia—especially Cambodia, Burma, Pakistan, and, until the 
U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan. The Tigers have 
also moved to establish major weapons trading centers in Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, North Korea, Ukraine, Croatia, and South Africa.18
Thailand has emerged as the main logistical interface between 
these various international source countries, both with regard to weap-
ons bound for the Sri Lankan theater and for subcontracted deals 
involving other insurgent and criminal actors. The LTTE Thai net-
15 Byman, Chalk, Hoﬀman, et al. (2001),  p. 119.
16 LTTE vessels sail under a number of additional ﬂags. Three ships, the Sun Bird, the 
Amazon, and the Golden Bird, for instance, are respectively known to have been registered in 
Cyprus, New Zealand, and Malta.
17 Chalk interview, Canberra, September 1998. See also Mike Winchester, “Ship of Fools: 
Tamil Tigers’ Heist of the Century,” Soldier of Fortune, Vol. 23, No. 8, August 1998, p. 39; 
“Tiger Arms Ship in High Sea Drama,” The Sunday Times (Sri Lanka), May 9, 1998; and 
“Armed to the Teeth,” India Today, January 11, 1996.
18 Byman, Chalk, Hoﬀman, et al. (2001), p. 119.
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work involves the recruitment of locally based Tamils who are used 
to open and staﬀ front companies based in Trang and Phuket on the 
Andaman Sea coast as well as in Bangkok, notably around Naret Road 
and the General Post Oﬃce.19
Rationale for Convergence with Organized Crime 
The LTTE’s involvement in organized crime essentially relates to chang-
ing geopolitical decisions and calculations undertaken by the Indian 
government in the 1980s. During the early stages of the Tamil insur-
gency in Sri Lanka, the LTTE had beneﬁted greatly from the backing 
and support of New Delhi, which was acutely aware of the risk of ignor-
ing the sympathetic ethnic proclivities of its own Tamil population in 
Tamil Nadu. Moreover, the Indian government was actively prepared 
to support the Tamil separatist war as a way of indirectly pressuring 
Colombo to remain within its sphere of inﬂuence. Between 1983 and 
1987, India’s Research and Analysis Wing, the agency charged with 
advancing India’s clandestine foreign policy goals, provided sanctuary 
and arms to the LTTE as well as insurgent training in paramilitary 
camps located in the south of the country.
Although the Indian government was instrumental in support-
ing the Tamil insurgency during the early 1980s, by 1987 New Delhi 
was beginning to fear that the creation of an independent Tamil state 
in Sri Lanka could spark secessionist demands in its own Tamil Nadu. 
Moreover, the presence of armed Tamil militants in the country had 
begun to cause a growing problem in the south, compounding already 
serious strains brought about by the number of Tamil refugees ﬂeeing 
from Sri Lanka’s Jaﬀna peninsula.20 As a result, the Indian government 
terminated its support for the LTTE and actively began looking for a 
19 See Davis (2003c), p. 30. 
20 Gunaratna (1998), p. 117. By 1987, the total number of Tamil refugees in Sri Lanka had 
risen to an estimated 13,000.
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federalist solution to Sri Lanka’s growing ethnic crisis, something that 
Colombo was equally keen to achieve given the increasingly violent 
and costly nature of the insurgency.21
New Delhi’s subsequent eﬀorts to disrupt the Tigers’ munitions 
supply chain represented a signiﬁcant blow to the group, requiring the 
development of a more secure and independent line of weapons fund-
ing and acquisition. Accordingly, the LTTE moved to develop its own 
logistical network—one that would be self-sustaining, speciﬁc to the 
needs of the group, and, most importantly, insulated from the chang-
ing strategic imperatives of a sole state backer. To a certain extent, the 
LTTE could rely on remittances and contributions from sympathetic 
members of its extensive diaspora in such countries as the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and Norway.22 However, 
this represented only a ﬁnite, eﬀectively capped source of assistance 
that was contingent on the mobilization of communities that may 
have little opportunity or willingness to support an insurgency being 
fought on the other side of the world. The move to organized criminal-
ity reﬂected the need for larger, more consistent injections of support, 
as well as the requirement for battle-related materiel that could only be 
supplied through the shadowy world of underground arms trading.
The LTTE has strenuously sought to play down any suggestion 
that it is involved in organized crime for any reason other than self-
preservation. A considerable component of the group’s overseas public-
ity and propaganda eﬀort entails portraying the Tigers as a bona ﬁde 
organization engaged in a fully justiﬁed and legitimate war of national 
liberation. More to the point, the LTTE political leadership seeks to 
21 In July 1987, Colombo and New Delhi signed the Indo–Sri Lankan Peace Accord, which 
provided for a complete cessation of hostilities and the surrender of all weapons by the Tamil 
militants; the amalgamation (subject to a referendum) of the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
into one, Tamil-dominated administrative unit with its own elected provincial council; co-
equal status for Tamil and English as oﬃcial languages; the prevention of the use of Indian 
territory by Tamil militants for military or propaganda purposes; and the repatriation of 
Tamil refugees. New Delhi also agreed to send a peacekeeping force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka, 
sparking a bloody secondary guerrilla war with the LTTE that eventually led to a humiliat-
ing Indian withdrawal in March 1990. For further details of this period see Singh (2001).
22 Overall, the LTTE has a relatively sizable diaspora in 54 countries from Bangladesh to 
Botswana.
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impress on the international community that, should the organiza-
tion succeed in winning control of a separate state, it would exercise 
its duties in a responsible manner consistent with democratic norms 
of civilized behavior.23 Obviously any overt attachment to organized 
criminality—particularly drug traﬃcking, which the United States 
has portrayed as one of the most threatening transnational dangers 
currently confronting the global community—would run counter to 
this objective.
A related consideration has to do with the Tamil diaspora. As 
noted above, contributions from expatriates do not constitute a self-
sustaining source of income for the LTTE. They nevertheless remain 
an important source of supplementary income. Donations from the 
UK, Australia, and Canada, for instance, are collectively estimated to 
net up to $1.5 million a month for the group’s cause, most of which is 
derived from a standard baseline “tax” that is imposed as a minimum 
moral obligation on families living in the respective host state.24 To 
a large extent, the LTTE’s ability to procure this funding has been 
indicative of its general invisibility to law enforcement by shunning 
unnecessarily explicit criminal behavior.25
These public relations considerations have acted as a self-regulating 
brake on the LTTE’s overall convergence with organized crime. The 
group has conspicuously sought to cover its tracks at every juncture (as 
noted above, very few cadres have ever been charged on drug-related 
oﬀenses) and has generally engaged only in those endeavors that are 
directly related to its war eﬀort and that oﬀer a reasonably secure line of 
funding and support. Consequently, the LTTE has not morphed into 
the type of criminal-terrorist entity seen in other parts of the world. 
Crime remains an adjunct to its wider political goals rather than its 
central purpose.
23 See, for instance, Chalk (2000).
24 See, for instance, Davis, “Tiger International,” p. 35; “Tamil Expatriates Finance LTTE 
Terror,” Daily News (Sri Lanka), June 8, 1998; “A Tamil Tiger Primer on International Arms 
Bazaar,” The International Herald Tribune, March 10, 1998; and “The LTTE Rides High in 
Norway,” Lanka Outlook, Summer 1998, pp. 24–25.
25 Chalk interview, Ottawa, October 17, 2002.
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The Abu Sayyaf Group: An Islamic Terrorist-Criminal 
Group 
Mindanao has been the locus of a prolonged and bitter Moro Islamic 
separatist conﬂict since the mid-1970s. Historically, the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) represented the main vehicle for this strug-
gle. However, the group made peace with Manila in 1996,26 and since 
then two entities have been at the forefront of militant activities in the 
southern Philippines: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and 
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Of the two, it is the latter that has estab-
lished the most concerted ties to organized criminal activity.
Abu Sayyaf is a self-styled Islamic insurgent movement that ﬁrst 
emerged in 1989 with the assistance of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, 
Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law and personal representative in the 
Philippines.27 Its original founder was Abdurajak Janjalani, an ultra-
fundamentalist veteran of the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan 
who fought under the command of the mujahidin commander Abdul 
Rasul Sayyaf and was inﬂuenced by bin Laden. Under Janjalani’s 
tutelage, the ASG developed a highly radical ideological agenda that 
aimed for the creation of an independent and exclusive Islamic state in 
Mindanao. In pursuit of this objective, the group has advocated the 
deliberate targeting of all non-Muslims in the southern Philippines and 
26 The MNLF signed a peace agreement with Manila in 1996, known as the Davao 
Consensus, which created a limited Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and provided 
for peace and development eﬀorts in the south. For an overview of the accord see Chalk 
(1997).
27 At its inception, the ASG was known as al-Harakat al-Islamiyya (Islamic Movement); in 
1992, the group renamed itself the Mujahidin Commando Freedom Fighters before settling 
on Abu Sayyaf in 1993.
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has repeatedly deﬁned its intentions as intimately tied to an integrated 
eﬀort aimed at asserting the global dominance of Islam through mili-
tant armed struggle.28
Although the ASG was originally founded as a committed and 
closely coordinated jihadist movement, it has progressively degener-
ated into a network of loosely based territorial commands concerned 
more with money than political or religious goals. The main factor 
accounting for this structural and ideological fragmentation was the 
death of Janjalani, who was killed during a Philippine police ambush 
in December 1998.29 Not only did his elimination trigger an acute 
leadership crisis within the group (which has never been resolved), 
more importantly it removed the chief driving force behind the ASG’s 
former Islamic zeal.30 The combined eﬀect of these two factors was the 
gradual infusion of outside criminal tendencies and imperatives, the 
principal thrust of which has been piracy and kidnapping.
Piracy
The ASG has carried out numerous pirate attacks oﬀ Mindanao and 
nearby islands, particularly between Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, and 
the Zamboanga Peninsula. The group essentially has free run of these 
waters, because of both the absence of joint Philippine-Malaysian 
maritime patrols (essentially reﬂecting interstate tensions arising from 
ongoing territorial disputes and issues of maritime sovereignty) and 
the diﬃculty of instituting a comprehensive monitoring regime of the 
Philippines’ extensive archipelagic coastline.
28 Turner (1995), p. 15; Concepcion Clamor, “Terrorism in the Philippines,” paper pre-
sented before the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Paciﬁc’s Working Group 
on Transnational Crime, Manila, May 1998, p. 5; “Validation of the Existence of the 
ASG,” internal document prepared for the Philippine National Intelligence Coordinating 
Agency, February 14, 1997; “Separatist Rebellion in the Southern Philippines,” IISS Strategic 
Comments, Vol. 6, No. 4, May 2000, p. 2.
29 See, for instance, Jose Torres, “The Abu Sayyaf Ten Years After,” ABS-CBN News, n.d., 
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/images/news/microsites/abusayyaf/abu10.htm (as of March 
22, 2006). 
30 Comments made during the INR Workshop on Radical Islam in Southeast Asia, 
Washington, D.C., October 31, 2003.
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ASG cadres, usually operating in teams of between two and ten, 
mainly target ﬁshing trawlers, merchant vessels, and small-scale cargo 
containers, launching assaults from fast motorized outriggers, or bancas,
that are able to outrun any vessels that the ill-equipped Philippine navy 
can put to sea.31 Typically, a ship will be threatened with an RPG or 
peppered with heavy machine gun ﬁre and a payoﬀ demanded. If this 
is not forthcoming, the vessel will be boarded, its cargo ransacked, the 
captain’s safe stolen (often this will contain a large amount of cash to 
pay port fees and loading charges), and the crew killed.32
In addition to commercial carriers, the ASG has also periodi-
cally attacked passenger ferries that operate crossings in the Sulu and 
Celebes Seas. The monetary scale of these assaults is of a lower mag-
nitude than that oﬀered by cargo containers and ﬁshing trawlers, and 
most ships are able to carry only a small number of paying customers, 
most of whom will not be particularly wealthy. But the ships them-
selves tend to oﬀer a highly attractive target of opportunity given their 
lack of maneuverability, the frequency and regularity of inter-island 
sailings, and the near total absence of onboard security.33
Between 1996 and the end of September 2003, 811 actual and 
attempted acts of piracy were recorded in Southeast Asia, 11 percent of 
which took place in Philippine waters.34 Although many of these inci-
dents involved ships berthed at Manila port, a considerable proportion 
occurred in the vicinity of southern islands and inlets under the direct 
control of, or close to, Abu Sayyaf strongholds. It is this consistent 
31 Davis (2003b), p. 14.
32 See, for instance, Virtual Information Center, “Primer: Piracy in Asia,” October 31, 
2003, pp. 19–20, http://www.vic-info.org/RegionsTop.nsf/45cb6498825bd61d0a256c
6800737df2/90b323f6d67ef5de0a256b9500807103?OpenDocument (as of March 22, 
2006). 
33 Peter Chalk, “Threats to the Maritime Environment: Piracy and Terrorism,” presentation 
given before the RAND Stakeholder Consultation Meeting, Ispar, Italy, October 28–30, 
2002.
34 See International Maritime Bureau (2003), p. 5. Generally speaking, only Indonesia has 
surpassed the Philippines in terms of the regional incidence of piracy.
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correlation of attacks and geography that accounts for the ASG’s cur-
rent designation as one of the leading terrorist-piracy organizations in 
Southeast Asia.35
There are no reliable statistics as to how much money the ASG 
has actually made by engaging in maritime crime. However, most com-
mentators believe it to be substantial, providing a largely self-generating
source of income that is reﬂected in the group’s ongoing pursuit of sea-
borne proﬁteering.36
Despite this active track record, there has as yet been no indi-
cation of direct ASG involvement in the most lucrative aspect of the 
piracy phenomenon, the outright hijacking of a targeted vessel for the 
purposes of repeat illegal trading. Known as phantom ships, these car-
riers are falsely documented under ﬂags of convenience, generally from 
Honduras, Panama, and Liberia (all of which are notorious for their 
extremely lax registration requirements), and used to transport and 
then reroute the cargoes of unsuspecting commodity agents or brokers. 
However, there have been allegations that Abu Sayyaf members have 
worked in conjunction with phantom ship criminal syndicates, help-
ing to hide hijacked vessels in secluded harbors under ASG control 
and to facilitate the discharge of diverted payloads to corrupt local 
oﬃcials and members of the armed forces.37 Given the enormous prof-
its that can be garnered from phantom ship frauds—the International 
Maritime Bureau estimates groups engaged in the practice can earn 
upward of US $50 million a year38—the possibility that this type of 
indirect involvement has indeed occurred cannot be discounted.
35 See, for instance, Coast Guard Intelligence Assessment (2000), p. I-7.
36 This perspective on the ASG was expressed to Chalk in various meetings and interviews 
in the Philippines, London (International Maritime Bureau), and Singapore between 2000 
and 2003.
37 Virtual Information Center, “Primer: Piracy in Asia,” pp. 20–21.
38 Personal correspondence between Chalk and Eric Ellen, IMB, London, January 1997. See 
also “Dead Men Tell No Tales,” The Economist, December 18, 1999.
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Kidnapping
Although the ASG has long engaged in kidnapping and extortion, under 
Janjalani’s leadership such tactics were used exclusively as a means for 
raising funds for operational and logistical purposes. Since 1998, how-
ever, abductions have increasingly been aimed at generating money for 
its own sake. The practice has been encouraged by the general willing-
ness of the victims’ families to pay ransoms, as well as their reticence 
to involve the authorities or seek judicial redress, even in the event that 
the hostage takers are subsequently apprehended.39 In one publicized 
case, two Hong Kong hostages were released for a “board and lodging 
fee” of 2 million Philippine pesos (P) (roughly $36,000) 106 days after 
their original capture.40 At the time this was typical of most ransom 
demands, which according to the Philippine National Police generally 
ran between a minimum of P500,000 (roughly $9,000) and a maxi-
mum of P2 million.41
The scale of these incidents reached new heights in March 2000 
when the ASG carried out a mass kidnapping of more than 50 ele-
mentary school children and teachers, including Catholic priest Rhoel 
Gallardo (who was later killed), from the village of Tumahubong on 
the island of Basilan.42 The operation constituted the largest single 
abduction carried out by the group and has since been seen by several 
commentators as marking the turning point of Abu Sayyaf into a full-
ﬂedged kidnap-for-ransom business.43
39 Chalk (2002), p. 202; Independent Insight Inc., “Kidnap-for-Ransom in the Philippines,” 
Manila, November 12, 2001, p. 3.
40 “Guerrillas Make a Killing Out of Abductions,” South China Morning Post, December 28, 
1998; “HK Hostages Released After 106-Day Ordeal,” South China Morning Post, December 
24, 1998.
41 Chalk interview, Manila, June 1998. See also “Zambo Blast Cover Up for Weak ASG,” 
Manila Times, January 5, 1999.
42 See, for instance, “Abu Sayyaf Primer,” Virtual Information Center, November 5, 2002, 
p. 12, http://www.vic-info.org/regionlist2002.htm; “Gunmen Take Foreigners Hostage in 
Malaysia,” The Washington Post, March 25, 2000; “Philippine Military Begins Assault on 
Muslim Rebels,” CNN Interactive Worldwide News, April 22, 2000. 
43 See, for instance, Lopez (2000); and Gunaratna (2001).
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It was the following month, however, that the ASG gained inter-
national notoriety for engaging in criminally motivated abductions. 
On April 23, a faction led by Ghalib Andang (otherwise known as 
Commander Robot) carried out a lightening raid on a diving resort in 
Sipadan, Malaysia (Easter Island), capturing 21 hostages, including ten 
Malaysians, three Germans, two French nationals, two South Africans, 
two Finns, one Lebanese, and a Filipino. Initial ransom demands were 
cast in terms of provision of supplies and political stipulations (rever-
sion to barter trading, curbs on foreign ﬁshing, foreign mediation in the 
Mindanao dispute, release of prominent Islamist terrorists imprisoned 
in the United States) but quickly evolved into demands for money—
$1 million for each of the Western tourists. Five months later, a Libyan-
brokered deal was reached for the release of six of the captives, which 
the head of the Philippine armed forces, General Angelo Reyes, later 
conﬁrmed netted the group over $16 million.44
The Sipadan operation proved to be a major boon as well as a 
prominent tactical watershed. The injection of money allowed the ASG 
to recruit impoverished local villagers who were reportedly oﬀered 
“salaries” of P40,000 to P100,000 each; buy the loyalty of compet-
ing factions (intelligence sources claim that several million pesos were 
distributed for this purpose); and acquire the necessary weapons and 
logistical resources to sustain the group’s activities over the short to 
medium term.45 More to the point, it proved that “crime paid” both 
monetarily and in terms of institutional bargaining power, and ensured 
that kidnapping would remain the ASG’s favored means of ﬁnancial 
procurement.
44 See, for instance, U.S. Department of State (2003b), pp. 101–102; Oxfam Small Arms 
Report, draft text supplied to author, 2001, p. 3; “Fears of the Hostage Takers,” The Economist,
August 26, 2000; “Libya Denies Ransom Oﬀer for Hostages,” The Sacramento Bee, August 
13, 2000; and “Philippine Forces Continue All-Out Attack on Rebels,” The Washington Post, 
September 17, 2000. According to Reyes, US $1 million was paid for the nine Western hos-
tages and US $350,000 for each of the rest.
45 Torres, “The Abu Sayyaf Ten Years After”; “A Clash of Civilisations,” ASEAN Focus 
Group—Asian Analysis, Australian National University, May 2000, http://www.asean
focus.com (as of March 23, 2006). 
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Reﬂecting this, in the 13 months following the Sipadan opera-
tion, no less than 102 people were abducted in various incidents across 
the southern Philippines. The tally included French and German jour-
nalists, Malaysian resort workers, U.S. tourists, and Christian mis-
sionaries (one of whom was subsequently beheaded)—reportedly gen-
erating additional ransom payments of between $15 million and $20 
million.46
Overall, the ASG is thought to account for roughly 20 percent 
of all kidnappings that take place in the Philippines. However, if one 
adds abductions perpetrated by ex-members of the police and security 
forces, many of whom are alleged to retain close criminal ties to Abu 
Sayyaf (and MILF), the total would rise to near 60 percent.47 It was in 
this context that the Minority Parliamentary House leader, Feliciano 
Belmonte, famously referred to Ghalib Andang as the “Bill Gates of 
the [Philippine] kidnapping industry.”48 (Andang was captured in 
November 2003 after a gun battle in southern Jolo Island as he was 
planning another abduction.)
Gunrunning
The third major form of criminal activity to which the ASG has been 
connected is gunrunning. The southern Philippines has been awash 
with weapons since the mid-1980s, emerging as one of the main sources 
46 “Abu Sayyaf Group,” pp. 12–19; Independent Insight Inc., “Kidnap-for-Ransom in 
the Philippines,” p. 2; “Rebels Kidnap America; Philippines to Reconsider Ransoms,” The 
Washington Post, August 31, 2000; “A Hostage Crisis Confronts Estrada,” The Economist, 
May 6, 2000; and “Military Finds 2 Beheaded by Philippine Rebels,” The Washington Post, 
May 7, 2000. At the time of writing, the ASG held no hostages; those who were seized 
between 2001 and 2002 either had been killed (generally by beheading) or had escaped from 
their captors during military pursuit operations.
47 Independent Insight Inc., “Kidnap-for-Ransom in the Philippines,” p. 4. Thirty-ﬁve per-
cent of abductions in the Philippines are carried out by drug groups (15 percent) and inter-
national syndicates (20 percent); 4 percent are perpetrated by ad hoc criminal groups (that 
are organized due to a speciﬁc opportunity) or street gangs; only 1 percent carry demands of 
a purely political nature.
48 Lopez (2000).
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for light arms in Southeast Asia.49 Several factors account for the prolif-
eration of munitions in the region, including (1) shortfalls in the disar-
mament, demobilization, and reintegration programs that followed the 
conclusion of the MNLF insurgency in 1996; (2) illicit transfers from 
corrupt members of the army and militiamen of the Civilian Armed 
Forces Geographic Units;50 (3) diversion of arms from the U.S. Excess 
Defense Articles program in the Philippines;51 and (4) local produc-
tion both from the MILF and from skilled gunsmiths in Mindanao 
and northern Luzon. Prices on the black market reportedly range from 
US $660 for an M-16 assault riﬂe to US $37 for .38- and .45-caliber 
handguns.52
The ASG has eﬀectively tapped the burgeoning stock of weap-
onry in Mindanao, both to augment its own supplies and to build up 
inventory that can be sold to other interested parties. The group has 
developed a particularly useful “business” in the latter regard, acting as 
an intermediary for the regional traﬃcking of Philippine-source weap-
onry. An established maritime tradition, combined with the lack of 
active coastal surveillance around Mindanao, as noted in the discus-
sion of piracy, has ensured that Abu Sayyaf smugglers can move arms 
caches quickly with relatively little risk of interdiction. Members of 
the organization are also known to have built strong links with well-
49 Philippine security oﬃcials conservatively estimate that between 75,000 and 100,000 
weapons are loose throughout the southern Philippines, most of which are long arms as 
opposed to handguns.
50 Between 1972 and 1986, a total of 8,000 army weapons, mainly Garand M-1 riﬂes, 
M-14s, and M-16s, went unaccounted for.
51 Between 1992 and 1998—as part of its EDA program—the United States gave the 
Philippines 3,638 M-14s, an unspeciﬁed number of M-16s, 16,488 Colt M1911 pistols, and 
116 A-1 automatic riﬂes. Many of these “oﬄoaded” weapons subsequently found their way 
on to the black market as a result of leakage from the police and security forces. Oxfam Small 
Arms Report, pp. 5–6.
52 Davis (2003a), pp. 32–37.
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connected criminal and terrorist elements based in Malaysia, provid-
ing the group with the necessary points of contact through which to 
arrange and conclude regionwide, as opposed to purely local, deals.53
Most of the arms that are purchased for resale are traﬃcked over 
water, passing from bases in Zamboanga and Jolo, across the Sulu 
Sea to prearranged buyers and subcontractors in the Malaysian prov-
inces of Sabah, Sarawak, and Kelantan. From here consignments are 
moved to key regional hubs in Cambodia (Sihanoukville), Thailand 
(Phuket, Ranong, Rayong), Bangladesh (Cox’s Bazaar, Chittagong), 
and Singapore.54 These same routes work in reverse, providing an eﬀec-
tive two-way corridor that can be used for both the import and export 
of munitions.
The general level of ASG munitions trading activity has risen dra-
matically over the last four years as a result of the proliﬁc ransom pay-
ments the group has received from its various kidnapping pursuits. 
According to local commentators, the unprecedented injection of cash 
triggered a major arms-buying spree across Mindanao, driving up 
prices for everything from mortars and “baby” M-16 assault weapons 
ﬁtted with grenade launchers (M-203) to recoilless riﬂes, M-60, and 
even .50-caliber heavy machine guns.55
Flush with cash, the ASG has been able to pay top dollar for these 
armaments.56 The cost is passed onto paying customers in the form 
of 50 percent markups, allowing the group to build up a modern and 
broad-ranging weapons inventory.57 Demand for this base stock has 
been consistently strong, both because Philippine-source munitions 
53 Comments made during the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Workshop on 
“Radical Islam in Southeast Asia,” Washington, D.C., October 31, 2003. 
54 Davis (2003a), pp. 30–32.
55 Torres, “The Abu Sayyaf Ten Years After”; Lopez (2000); Oxfam Small Arms Report, 
p. 7.
56 For example in 2001, the ASG was reportedly prepared to pay P48,00 for one M-16 riﬂe 
(the standard weapon of the security forces), nearly double the oﬃcial listed price by the 
government (P25,000). The group was also oﬀering P280,000 for an Ultimax light machine 
gun, which normally retails for around P93,000. Oxfam Small Arms Report, p. 7.
57 Davis (2003a), p. 35.
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are cheap in comparison to those coming from extraregional sources 
such as North Korea, China, and Pakistan (price inﬂation notwith-
standing) and far more sophisticated than traditional supplies from 
Cambodia (most of which derive from surplus stocks left over after the 
Third Indochina War).
Rationale for Convergence with Organized Crime
As noted above, ASG involvement with organized crime primarily 
reﬂects the group’s general organizational and ideological fragmenta-
tion since the death of Janjalani in 1998. Over the past ﬁve years, the 
group has steadily degenerated into a loosely based network of territo-
rial “lost commands” concerned more with money than fundamental-
ist Islamist imperatives. Although the rhetoric of jihadism still infuses 
the group, it has been used largely to legitimate and cover up what is 
essentially a criminally based agenda.58
Exacerbating the ASG’s general evolution into criminality have 
been two additional factors. First, the very success of the group’s illicit 
endeavors, particularly kidnapping, not only demonstrated the ﬁnan-
cial worth of crime but also provided the necessary capital to oﬀset 
unavoidable overhead operating costs (such as those associated with 
building up a viable weapons inventory).
Second, and no less important, ASG Islamist ranks have been 
steadily diluted by the importation of recruits who view the group 
less as a vehicle to achieve speciﬁc Islamic objectives than as a means 
of enrichment. Local bandits, laid-oﬀ agricultural and construction 
workers, and farmers suﬀering from poor crops simply gravitate into 
58 It should be noted that Khaddafy Janjalini—a leading ASG member and brother of the 
group’s original founder—has been pushing to reintegrate the organization and return it to 
the pursuit of an explicit Islamist agenda. It is too soon, however, to tell if this attempt to 
regenerate the ASG as a “bona ﬁde” jihadist force will be successful.
The Convergence of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Crime    121
and out of the group as their own individual exigencies change.59
Philippine intelligence sources estimate that the ASG’s membership 
grew rapidly after the kidnappings in 2000 and 2002 as members of 
the local Moro community ﬂocked to the group, lured by the promise 
of action and the huge ransom payments that had been coerced out of 
foreign government hands.60 As one senior Philippine military com-
mander remarked, the root causes of ASG can increasingly be summed 
up in two words: “thrills and joblessness.”61
The group has used its wealth to purchase weapons, communica-
tion sets, and transportation vehicles. This has allowed it to repeatedly 
absorb, recover, and at times respond to government attacks that have 
been orchestrated under the auspices of Balikitan-02-I and Balikitan-
03-II. Initiated in 2002 and renewed in 2003, these combined military 
exercises have involved Army, Marine, and Scout Ranger special force 
units and were designed to train the Philippine military to root out Abu 
Sayyaf cells in the southern Philippines. Philippine oﬀensives (code 
named “Endgame”) have been successful in Basilan and Zamboanga.62
Nevertheless, the ASG’s involvement in such terrorist attacks as the 
2005 Valentine Day bombings in Manila reﬂect an organization that 
is not only very much alive, but is also capable of operating beyond the 
traditional Mindanao theater.63
59 Comments made during the INR Workshop on “Radical Islam in Southeast Asia,” 
Washington, D.C., October 31, 2003. Poverty is chronic in Mindanao, which remains the 
least developed of the Philippine provinces. According to the World Bank, a staggering 
92 percent of the population lives below the oﬃcial poverty line; in Jolo, the ASG’s main 
center of strength, unemployment runs between 50 and 70 percent of the male population. 
See Davis (2003b), p. 18.
60 Torres, “The Abu Sayyaf Ten Years After.”
61 Cited in Davis (2003b), p. 18.
62 Davis (2003b), p. 17. At the time of writing, at least 300 ASG armed militants were thought 
to remain on Jolo, with between 100 and 160 scattered across Basilan and Zamboanga.
63 Chalk interview, Philippine police, military, and intelligence oﬃcials, Manila, March 
2005. See also Carlos Conde, “The Philippines: Bombs in Three Cities Kill 6,” The New York 
Times, February 15, 2005; “Over 60 Hurt in Makati Explosion; GMA Inspects Site,” ABS-
CBN, February 16, 2005. 
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On a more general level, the reorientation from religious-
separatist to material ambitions has eﬀectively eliminated the option 
of a political accommodation. Indeed, if anything, one can expect to 
see the ASG deliberately fostering a climate of general instability in 
Mindanao to ensure the survival of what has proven to be an espe-
cially conducive environment for wider arms traﬃcking, kidnapping, 
and piracy. Over the longer term, there is also the risk that a criminal-
ized ASG will emerge as a resource for foreign-based terror networks, 
notably al-Qaeda and its Southeast Asian aﬃliate, Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI).64 Such concerns should not be viewed as idle speculation. With 
the MILF keen to play down its own alleged support of transnational 
Islamic extremism in the context of ongoing peace negotiations with 
the Philippine government,65 the ASG may well prove by default to 
be the favored conduit through which external radicals seek to extend 
the range and scope of their operations in Southeast Asia. Indeed, as 
recently as 2003, Philippine intelligence was claiming that JI and al-
Qaeda terrorists had been working in conjunction with Abu Sayyaf 
members in the procurement, preparation, and distribution of explo-
sive devices, including, cellular-detonated car bombs.66
Colombia: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency
Over the past decade, Colombia has confronted a metastasizing left-
wing insurgency that has been sustained and further complicated by 
funds derived from an entrenched criminal economy. Three main play-
ers have been integral to this chronic situation: the FARC, the ELN, 
64 In 2003, Abu Sayyaf ’s chief explosives expert, Abdul Mukim Edris, escaped from prison 
with Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, JI’s principal operative in the southern Philippines and one of 
the network’s most senior bomb-makers in Southeast Asia (al-Ghozi was killed by Philippine 
police three months later).
65 At the time of writing, the MILF had announced its intention to pursue comprehensive 
peace talks with the Manila government aimed at consolidating a ﬁnal settlement to the 
conﬂict by 2004.
66 See, for instance, Davis (2003b), p. 18.
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and illegal paramilitary self-defense forces, loosely organized under the 
umbrella of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
The FARC was established in 1964 as the military wing of the 
Moscow-line Colombian Communist Party under the leadership of 
Manuel Marulanda Vélez (alias Tiroﬁjo or “Sureshot”). The group’s 
long-term aim is the seizure of national power through a people’s war, 
although its current public short-term agenda calls for land redistribu-
tion, disbanding of the military and the security forces, a crackdown 
on the AUC, and empowering the historically disenfranchised lower 
working and peasant classes.67 The FARC has an estimated ﬁghting 
force of 15,000 to 18,000 combatants who are organized into seven 
regional “bloques” (or blocs) and some 71 fronts (67 rural and four 
urban) that are deployed in a coordinated pattern across the country. 
The group also has some 10,000 milicia members who help with logis-
tics and intelligence gathering.68 A lengthy process of peace negotiations 
between the Colombian government and the FARC—which involved 
the surrender to the FARC of an extensive demilitarized zone in south-
central Colombia—collapsed at the beginning of 2002 after the FARC 
carried out a series of high-proﬁle kidnappings and assassinations.
The Havana-line ELN was founded in 1964 by intellectuals from 
the University of Santander and is presently led by Nicolas Rodriguez 
(alias Gabino). Like the FARC, the group stresses economic and social 
reform and the general restructuring of the state security apparatus. 
However, it has also long contested oil drilling and production in north-
ern Colombia and tends to emphasize an overall ideological agenda that 
mixes Cuban revolutionary theorizing with “liberation theology.” The 
ELN is much smaller than the FARC, numbering 3,500–5,000 ﬁghters
67 For further details see FARC’s Web site, http://www.farccep.org.
68 Chalk interview, Bogotá, September 2001. See also Rabasa and Chalk  (2001), pp. 23–
29; International Crisis Group (2002), pp. 9–10.
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and some 3,000 milicias, with most of its strength concentrated in 
the northeastern departments of Santander, Norte de Santander, the 
coastal department of Bolívar, and Antioquia.69
The bulk of Colombia’s contemporary autodefensas (self-defense) 
groups, commonly known as paramilitary groups, emerged in reaction 
to the activities of the ELN and the FARC and found strong support 
in areas where the state was unable to eﬀectively fulﬁll its local protec-
tion responsibilities.70 Although the autodefensas were initially con-
sidered by many Colombians as a necessary evil in the containment of 
left-wing inspired insurgency and terror, they increasingly have been 
viewed as a signiﬁcant domestic security threat. Despite allegations of 
collusion with the self-defense groups, the Colombian military main-
tains that it does not discriminate and treats actions against autodefen-
sas that result in numerous casualties just as it does actions against any 
other illegal armed group. At the time of writing, the AUC leadership 
had declared a ceaseﬁre and agreed to disarm in accordance with the 
so-called Justice and Peace Law that was passed by the Colombian 
congress in June 2005. The legislation provides for the demobilization 
and social reintegration of up to 20,000 ﬁghters, but it also restricts 
the crimes for which paramilitaries can be prosecuted, most of which 
carry extremely light sentences that can be served on farms as opposed 
to prisons.71
69 Chalk interview, Bogotá, September 2001. Rabasa and Chalk (2001), pp. 30–31; ICG 
(2002), p. 10. FARC and the ELN announced a tactical alliance in August 2003, the pur-
pose of which was to coordinate strikes against the government of President Uribe. The union 
never materialized, however, and the groups have eﬀectively remained as distinct entities.
70 Whereas FARC and the ELN reject the right of the state to govern, the autodefensas ques-
tion the ability of the state to govern. 
71 Not surprisingly, the law has been the subject of considerable controversy, with critics 
both in Colombia and the United States charging that it eﬀectively shields senior paramili-
tary leaders from prosecution/extradition for serious crimes, including, notably, those asso-
ciated with drug traﬃcking. See Juan Forero, “New Colombia Law Grants Concessions to 
Paramilitaries,” The New York Times, June 23, 2005; and Juan Forero, “U.S. Threat Is a Blow 
to Colombia’s Easy Terms for Death Squads,” The New York Times, July 7, 2005.
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The FARC, the ELN, and the AUC all appear on the U.S. State 
Department’s list of designated foreign terrorist organizations.72 All 
three have become intimately involved with criminal activities: the 
FARC and the AUC primarily support themselves through the drug 
trade; the FARC additionally engages in ancillary kidnappings for 
ransom (KFR) and extortion rackets, which are also a principal main-
stay and specialty of the ELN.
The Drug Trade
Both the FARC and the AUC have established strong ties to the 
Colombian drug producers and traﬃckers, the world’s largest suppliers 
of cocaine and the Western hemisphere’s largest producers of opiates 
and such opiate-based derivatives as heroin.73
Although the FARC has been engaged in narco-related activities 
at least since 1982,74 its involvement in the country’s drug business 
has substantially increased over the past decade due to the increas-
ingly dispersed nature of the illicit drug industry following the col-
lapse of the Cali and Medellín cartels in the early 1990s. The group has 
developed particularly intensive coca and opiate growing and reﬁning 
operations in the southeastern departments of Putumayo and Caquetá. 
Depending on the source, the FARC derives between US $300 million 
72 The FARC and the ELN were designated in 1997; the AUC in 2001. The placement of 
the latter on the list arguably reﬂects U.S. domestic politics and pressure by leading congres-
sional members to justify the extension of military aid to Colombia despite its poor human 
rights record.
73 In 2002, for instance, Colombia’s coca yield was suﬃcient to produce an estimated 680 
metric tons of pure cocaine, which represents some 80 percent of global illicit production. 
While Afghanistan continued to dominate the overall heroin trade, Colombia had eﬀectively 
cornered the U.S. market, supplying the bulk of all reﬁned opiates sold along America’s east-
ern seaboard. For further details see Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Aﬀairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2002, Washington, D.C.: United 
States Department of State, pp. II-3–II-5, IV-19–IV-26. See also “Coca Cultivation in 
Colombia, 2002,” Oﬃce of National Drug Control Policy Press Statement, February 27, 
2003, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/NEWS/press03/022703.html. 
74 The policy of taxing the drug industry and mobilizing and recruiting people involved 
in the lower end of the drug business was laid out formally in the Conclusions of the 
FARC Seventh Conference in 1982. Before then, the FARC condemned drug traﬃcking as 
counterrevolutionary. See Rabasa and Chalk (2001), pp. 25–26.
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and US $1 billion a year in income from criminal activities.75 About 
half of that income is from the drug trade, the other half from extor-
tion and kidnappings.76
The FARC controls and taxes the drug trade in its areas of inﬂu-
ence by enforcing its role as the sole buyer and seller of coca or cocaine 
at various stages of production and transportation. The group has a pre-
cise schedule of fees, called gramaje, for protection and services to drug 
producers and smugglers. Table 7.1 shows the FARC fees in 1999.
According to Colombian oﬃcials, about half of the FARC’s vari-
ous fronts are linked to the narcotics trade. Some 11 fronts have a special 
command element called the “ﬁnancial collective” that has the respon-
sibility to manage the income from drug production and, to a lesser
Table 7.1
FARC Proﬁts from Drug-Related Activity
Activity Fee
Production of basic paste $15.7/kilo
Chlorhydrate of cocaine $52.6/kilo
Protection of laboratories $5,263 each
Protection of coca ﬁelds $52.6/hectare
Protection of poppy ﬁelds $4,210/hectare
Security of landing strips $2,631 each
Cocaine shipments $10.5/kilo
River transportation 20% of shipment value
International drug ﬂights $5,263 each
Domestic drug ﬂights $2,631 each
SOURCE: Colombian Armed Forces brieﬁng, March 2000.
75 “Best estimates” of the income FARC derives from the drug trade generally fall in the 
range of US $200 million–$400 million. See Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle 
Foundation, Terrorism Q&A: FARC, ELN, AUC (2004), http://cfrterrorism.org/groups/
farc_print.html (as of March 23, 2006).  
76 According to Colombian military ﬁgures, in 1998 the various illegal organizations (guer-
rillas and paramilitaries) derived 620 billion pesos ($551 million) from the drug traﬃc, 350 
billion pesos ($311 million) from extortion, and 265.5 billion pesos ($236 million) from 
kidnappings  (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p. 32). The Uribe government is currently engaged 
in an attempt to more accurately gauge the extent of the group’s overall funding activities.
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extent, traﬃcking (which remains a secondary as opposed to primary 
activity). The income is split between the “bloc” to which the front is 
attached and the FARC Secretariat. Like other large corporations, the 
FARC Secretariat employs accountants who rotate among the FARC 
fronts to verify the accounts.77 However, Colombian military oﬀensives 
in 2004 and 2005 may have disrupted the FARC Secretariat’s ability to 
supervise and control the activities of the fronts.78
The FARC unit whose modus operandi was closest to that of 
a classic drug cartel is the 16th Front, based in the department of 
Vichada, under Tomás Medina Caracas, better known as “Negro 
Acacio.” This individual does business with drug traﬃckers in the 
departments of Vichada, Guainía, Casanare, and Meta, in the eastern 
plains, and has exported cocaine to the United States through busi-
ness associates in Brazil. According to Colombian authorities, the 16th 
Front derives an annual income of 144 billion pesos (US $128 mil-
lion) from drug traﬃcking. The Colombian army has mounted several 
operations against the 16th Front. In February 2001, it captured the 
group’s major Brazilian drug traﬃcking intermediary but has not suc-
ceeded in capturing Negro Acacio or shutting down the group’s drug 
traﬃcking activities.79
In contrast to the FARC, the other major Colombian leftist rebel 
group, the ELN, has shown more reluctance to become involved in the 
illegal drug trade, probably because of its roots in Christian-Marxist 
“liberation theology.” However, after the death of its long-time leader, 
el cura Pérez, a former Catholic priest, those who argue for a more 
77 Chalk interview, Colombian government, police and counternarcotic oﬃcials, Bogotá, 
September 2001. See also McDermott (2004b), pp. 29–31.
78 Rabasa’s discussion with senior Colombian military commander, Washington, D.C., 
August 2005. 
79 “Así funciona el ‘cartel’ montado por las FARC,” El País (Cali), June 4, 2003, http://
elpais-cali.terra.com.co/historico/jun042003/NALZ/A504N1.html (as of March 23, 2006); 
“Pruebas de EU Contra ‘Acacio’” El Espectador (Bogotá), March 10, 2002. According to 
Colombian military sources, as of August 2005 Negro Acacio was at large and continued to 
be involved in large-scale drug traﬃcking. Rabasa interview with senior Colombian military 
commander, Washington, D.C., August 2005.
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“pragmatic” approach to drugs gained ground within the organization. 
Nevertheless, the ELN’s drug traﬃcking does not approach the levels 
of the FARC or AUC.80
The AUC—which is more a collection of autodefensas than a 
coherent organization—also ﬁnances itself by taxing the drug trade. 
Individual components of the AUC are believed to engage more directly 
in traﬃcking operations than does the FARC (which, as noted above, 
derives most of its narco-funds through taxation on production), work-
ing in close coordination with Mexican syndicates to move cocaine 
and opiates into the United States (see below). The extent of the income 
that the autodefensas derive from the narcotics trade is not known. 
However, in a televised interview in March 2000, Carlos Castaño, the 
AUC’s national chief at the time, openly admitted that drug traﬃck-
ing and taxation of peasants producing coca in Antioquia and Córdoba 
provided up to 70 percent of the ﬁnancing for his forces.81 (Castaño 
has since disappeared and is believed to have been murdered by rivals 
within the AUC.) A 2003 Colombian peace commission report claimed 
the AUC derived possibly as much as 80 percent of its revenue from 
the drug trade and that self-defense forces in general monopolize up to 
40 percent of the country’s entire narcotics industry.82
In conjunction with Mexican cartels, the AUC moves heroin 
and cocaine into the United States by several means. Considerable 
use is made of human couriers who smuggle shipments directly into 
the United States on commercial airlines at approximately one kilo-
gram per trip (although individual batches of up to 20 kilograms have 
occasionally been intercepted). In most instances, drugs will be either 
secreted in clothing or hidden in specially designed luggage ﬁtted with 
false bottoms.83
80 Alfredo Rangel Suarez, “Un campanazo de alerta: las lecciones de Putumayo,” El Tiempo 
(Colombia), August 12, 2005, pp. 61–63.
81 “Colombian Death Squad Leader Reveals His Face,” CNN Interactive World Wide 
News, February 3, 2000. See also Bruce M. Bagley, “The Evolution of Drug Traﬃcking in 
Colombia in the 1990s,” unpublished paper provided to authors, February 2000, pp. 9–10.
82 McDermott (2003b), p. 7.
83 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Aﬀairs (2003), p. IV-24.
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Narcotics are also traﬃcked to intermediary distribution points in 
Mexico from South America, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Puerto 
Rico, and Jamaica. Consignments will be loaded at sea, typically using 
“go-fast” transport boats that operate from secluded coastal areas 
located on Colombia’s Caribbean coast and increasingly on the less-
well-patrolled Paciﬁc seaboard. They are then transported to American 
distributors either overland or via specially chartered ﬂights or private 
yachts.84
Narcotics have been smuggled into major Paciﬁc and Atlantic 
ports, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston and Baltimore, as 
camouﬂaged containerized bulk. However, there appears to be increas-
ingly less reliance on this method of traﬃcking, which the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) believes reﬂects heightened maritime 
cargo inspections instituted under the framework of the Bush admin-
istration’s Container Security Initiative.85
Recent peace overtures by the AUC formalized with the Peace 
and Justice Law in June 2005 have somewhat complicated the picture 
of the group’s involvement in the Colombian drugs trade. The legisla-
tion requires the paramilitaries to renounce involvement in cocaine and 
heroin traﬃcking, but some critics charge it contains loopholes that 
will allow leading AUC “narco-kingpins” both to escape extradition 
and to retain their drug-related proﬁts. According to Richard Lugar, 
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the law 
will “leave intact the [paramilitaries’] maﬁa-like structures” by grant-
ing commanders the protection of “double jeopardy” while failing to 
require that they fully disclose knowledge of the AUC’s operations 
84 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Aﬀairs (2004), p. IV-24; 
Rabasa and Chalk (2001), pp. 13–14; “Drugs Flood in from Mexico,” The Washington Post, 
November 29, 1999.
85 Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Aﬀairs (2004), p. IV-24. For 
details on the Container Security Initiative, see U.S. Department of State press release, “Fact 
Sheet: Securing U.S. Ports,” http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_
release_0865.xml (as of March 23, 2006).
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and ﬁnances.86 Advocates of the law, however, defend the concessions 
as necessary in order to induce the autodefensas to lay down their arms 
and reintegrate themselves into society.87
Kidnappings for Ransom and Extortion
Virtually all KFR and extortion committed in Colombia are perpetrated 
by the FARC and the ELN.88 According to Amnesty International, 
2,200 kidnappings took place in the country during 2003, or 
roughly one every four hours.89 Although ﬁgures for 2004 showed a 
sharp decline of roughly 58 percent, 1,250 cases were still recorded, 
32 percent of which took the form of KFR incidents carried out by the 
FARC and ELN (compared to 9 percent attributed to paramilitaries).90
Colombian government sources believe the two groups earn roughly 
86 See Juan Forero, “New Colombia Law Grants Concessions to Paramilitaries,” The New 
York Times, June 23, 2005. Commanders will be given the opportunity to confess to drug-
related charges in Colombia, which will prevent them from facing similar indictments in the 
United States. In addition, the law deﬁnes “paramilitarism” as a political crime, which under 
the country’s constitution would safeguard AUC leaders from standing trial in foreign coun-
tries on related traﬃcking oﬀences. Critics also maintain there is nothing in the legislation to 
ensure that commanders will, in fact, provide a full and honest confession of their criminal 
activities. 
87 See Alfredo Rangel’s sophisticated argument on the requirements and limitations of a 
peace process with the autodefensas in the context of a continued conﬂict with the FARC. 
“Una ley instrumento de paz,” El Tiempo, May 16, 2005. 
88 AUC’s kidnappings are thought to constitute no more than 8–20 percent of all abduc-
tions that take place in the country, most of which are connected to the drug trade. In most 
cases, targets are families and relatives of traﬃckers who either have been arrested or are 
suspected of diverting or stealing drug shipments. In the ﬁrst instance, hostages are held to 
ensure that detainees are not tempted to turn state’s evidence and inform on former associ-
ates; in the second, to coerce compensation for the loss of the consignment in question. ICG 
(2002), p. 18; McDermott (2003a), p. 27. 
89 Fundación Seguridad & Democracia, “Balance de seguridad en Colombia, Año 2003.”
90 Amnesty International, Colombia Report for 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/
col-summary-eng (as of March 23, 2006). See also “Kidnappings ‘Halved’ in Colombia,” 
BBC News, July 22, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3916235.stm (as 
of March 23, 2006). According to the U.S. State Department, there were 185 kidnappings 
in Colombia during the ﬁrst four months of 2005. See U.S. Department of State, Consular 
Information Sheet: Colombia, August 2005, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_
1090.html (as of March 23, 2006).
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US $230 million a year from these abductions, which has helped turn 
the nation into the KFR (and more generalized kidnapping) capital of 
the world.91
Traditionally, the bulk of FARC KFRs occurred in the agricultural 
crop and livestock production areas in the eastern part of the country. 
Most victims are cattle ranchers, farmers, and merchants. Beginning in 
the 1980s, however, the group started to expand the range and scope of 
its operations, increasingly focusing on wealthy and middle class resi-
dents of major cities such as Bogotá.92 Although high-income members 
of the urban elite are still favored targets, improved security has lim-
ited the opportunities for carrying out such abductions. As a result, the 
FARC has once again begun to shift the tactical direction of its KFRs. 
They now routinely take the form of mass random seizures in rural or 
semi-rural areas—a practice that the police euphemistically refer to as 
pesca milagrosa (literally, miraculous ﬁshing).93
ELN KFR activities have generally been more opportunistic 
in nature than those of the FARC and have largely not emphasized 
urban-based kidnappings. Most of the group’s victims are abducted 
after being stopped at staged roadblocks, with the hijacking of school 
buses emerging as an especially favored tactic (largely because parents 
have been willing to pay quickly for the safe return of their children).94
Although ransom demands are smaller than those demanded by the 
FARC, they still constitute an important source of income—roughly 
60 percent of the ELN’s total operating revenue.95
91 For a comprehensive analysis of the country’s kidnapping industry see Pax Christi 
(2001).
92 Rabasa and Chalk (2001), p. 34. 
93 Chalk interview, Cali, September 2001. See also Mauricio Rubio, “Kidnapping and 
Armed Conﬂict in Colombia,” paper presented before the International Peace Research 
Institute Workshop on Techniques of Violence in Civil War, Oslo, August 2004, p. 4.
94 In 2002, 384 minors were kidnapped by the ELN; the release for most of them took days 
or weeks to negotiate rather than months.
95 McDermott (2003a), pp. 26–27. Similar comments were made to RAND analyst Peter 
Chalk during interviews in Cali, September 2001.
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The ELN and the FARC also engage in extensive extortion activ-
ity, which nets the two organizations an estimated US $300 million 
a year. The ELN, in particular, has moved to consolidate this form 
of criminality into its overall tactical agenda, viewing it as integral 
to its policy of inﬂuencing the oil industry in Colombia’s northeast. 
Executives and high-ranking employees of petroleum companies 
have been consistently singled out for intimidation. At one point, the 
destruction of oil pipelines had become almost routine in the northern 
departments of the country, unless appropriate “revolutionary taxes” 
were paid.96 This is no longer the case because U.S. training has dra-
matically improved the eﬃciency of pipeline protection. 
More generally, the two groups have moved to coerce regular pay-
ments from wealthy individuals. The FARC’s “Law 002” of 2001 pro-
vided that all persons or families with combined assets in excess of US 
$1.0 million were required to contribute a percentage of their net worth 
to support the group. Those who did not pay would be “detained,” the 
FARC warned.97
Another form of extortion common to the FARC and the ELN 
has involved the intimidation of mayors, councilors, and other munici-
pal leaders. The purpose has been to gain inﬂuence over local govern-
ment structures in order to tap the ﬁnancial resources made available 
as part of decentralization reforms carried out in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Both groups have been relatively successful in these endeavors, espe-
cially in rural towns, where they are now able to siphon payrolls, tax 
receipts, infrastructure development funds, and various other sources 
of income.98
Rationale for Convergence with Organized Crime
The principal factor accounting for the involvement of the FARC, the 
ELN, and the AUC in organized crime in the contemporary Colombian 
96 Rabasa and Chalk (2001), p. 31; Sweig, “What Kind of War for Colombia?” p. 123; 
International Crisis Group, “Colombia’s Elusive Quest for Peace,” p. 10.
97 See “Ley 002, sobre la tributación,” http://six.swix.ch/farcep/Leyes/ley002.html (as of 
March 24, 2006). 
98 Rabasa and Chalk (2001), p. 34.
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context is their requirement for funds to pay their troops and to pur-
chase weapons, ammunition, and other battle-related materiel. The 
need for these resources has risen exponentially over the last ﬁve years 
as a result of three main trends: (1) growing guerrilla-AUC conﬂict 
for control over the country’s disputed drug-growing and resource-rich 
regions; (2) increased U.S. counternarcotics and counterinsurgency 
assistance to the Colombian military and police;99 and (3) the height-
ened willingness of the state’s security forces to crack down on mili-
tia self-defense activity. In eﬀect, an escalating internal arms race has 
arisen, the dimensions of which can only be met by a sustained and 
highly costly procurement process. Crime presents the quickest and 
easiest way to meet these requirements.100
The FARC is a good example of these dynamics at work. In August 
2000, the Colombian newsweekly, Semana, published the minutes of 
the group’s Secretariat annual meeting, which included the follow-
ing statement: “The acquisition of arms currently has permitted us a 
qualitative jump in our process of becoming the Ejercito del Pueblo 
[People’s Army or FARC-EP].”101 The assertion was important because 
it illustrates the strong psychological connection the FARC leadership 
has made between money, weapons, and power.102
This self-deﬁned nexus was perhaps best underscored three 
months later when the group instructed its fronts to increase their 
various revenue-generating activities to approximately US $600 mil-
99 The United States has provided well over US $3 billion in direct security assistance to 
Colombia since 2000 (aid currently totals more than $600 million a year), which makes the 
country the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid after Israel and Egypt. See McDermott 
(2005), p. 26; USIP (2004), p. 2; and Juan Forero, “New Colombia Law Grants Concessions 
to Paramilitaries,” The New York Times, June 23, 2005. Initially this money could only be 
used to support counternarcotics operations. However, with terrorism now occupying a 
preeminent place in American foreign and security policy, the scope of U.S. aid has been 
extended to allow assistance for directed operations against the FARC, the ELN, and para-
militaries (all of which are designated as foreign terrorist organizations). 
100 For a comprehensive analysis of small arms traﬃcking in Colombia see Cragin and 
Hoﬀman (2003).
101 “Los Planes de las FARC,” Semana, August 7, 2000.
102 Cragin and Hoﬀman (2003), p. 5.
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lion.103 The rationale behind the order was to ensure consistency in 
the receipt of arms shipments so that an eﬀective response could be 
mounted against escalating AUC attacks as well as expected assaults by 
Colombian military forces reequipped by the United States. Because 
the FARC competes with the autodefensas and the security forces for 
military supremacy, it has logically sought to counter actual and latent 
challenges stemming from each group by procuring more weapons.104
Drug money has allowed both the FARC and the AUC to purchase 
a wide assortment of military-grade weaponry including, in the former 
case, alleged caches of surface-to-air missiles. The two organizations 
have also been able to augment the volume of their respective muni-
tions stocks through bulk purchasing. Indeed, the FARC is believed to 
have been asking its international brokers and subcontractors to quote 
arms prices in singles and thousands from as early as 2000.105 Just as 
noteworthy have been several interceptions of extremely large weap-
ons consignments, including one shipment bound for the AUC that 
was seized in June 2000 and that reportedly contained 4,000 AK-47 
riﬂes.106
Even the ELN, by far the smallest and weakest of the three main 
illegal organizations in Colombia, has been able to sustain a reasonably 
concerted war footing through the acquisition of weapons and explo-
sives purchased with criminal proceeds. The group has repeatedly dem-
onstrated its ability to blow up key infrastructure targets in the north 
of the country, attacking the strategically important Caño Limón 
103 “El Otro Plan Colombia,” Cambio, March 20, 2000.
104 See, for instance, Cragin and Hoﬀman (2003), pp. 40–41.
105 “Gunrunner Sarkis Links Peruvian Army, SIN to Arms Traﬃcking,” La Republica (Lima, 
Peru), September 21, 2000.
106 “Traición en el Mercado Negro de Armas,” El Tiempo, June 28, 2000.
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Covenas oil pipeline in Arauca no less than 170 times in 2001.107 In 
October 2003, it took responsibility for the downing of a U.S. State 
Department plane that was spraying cocaine crops with defoliants.108
Beyond considerations pertaining to weapons acquisitions, the 
FARC, the ELN, and the AUC no doubt have been attracted to the 
enormous proﬁt potential that is available in Colombia. An entrenched 
criminal economy, weak state structures, and endemic civil conﬂict 
have provided an ideal environment for nonstate actors to engage in 
lucrative illicit activities that can be justiﬁed (and hidden) on the basis 
of left- or right-wing authoritarian populist rhetoric. The three groups 
have all beneﬁted from the imposition of protection levies to pay for 
security against one another’s attacks, and the FARC and the AUC 
have purportedly concluded agreements to ensure that their ﬁghting 
does not unduly aﬀect their drug business. According to one former 
paramilitary leader, Rodrigo Molano, “The self-defense forces do not 
necessarily ﬁght the guerrillas. In many cases they only have a dis-
suasive presence, respecting [established] territorial divides with the 
FARC.”109
The latter aspect has encouraged many commentators to argue 
that the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC are approaching or may have 
already reached the critical point where political motivational drivers 
are balanced with, or even superseded by, the economic imperative to 
pursue designs of a purely commercial nature. Tamara Makarenko has 
observed this dynamic with respect to the FARC. Contending that 
cash ﬂow has now become an objective in its own right, she portrays 
107 Caño Limón Covenas carries roughly 105,000 barrels of oil every day to ports on the 
Caribbean coast. Attacks on the pipeline cost the Colombian government an estimated US 
$430 million a year in lost oil revenues. See Sweig (2002), p. 135; “Once Again Colombia 
Mourns,” The Economist, February 15, 2003.
108 “Colombian Rebels Claim Responsibility for Downing U.S. Plane,” Associated Press, 
October 3, 2003.
109 Cited in McDermott (2003b), p. 8.
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the group as one that has evolved (or devolved) into a quasi-insurgent 
entity that, while not fully abandoning its political agenda, is simulta-
neously interested in maximizing criminal proﬁts.110
The growing involvement of the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC 
in organized crime carries signiﬁcant implications for peace and stabil-
ity in Colombia. The ability to acquire and maintain a sophisticated 
arms base has signiﬁcantly heightened the potential violence thresh-
old of the three groups. In the case of the FARC, it has also availed a 
general expansion of the group’s operations beyond the rural theater to 
more urban-based settings, reﬂected in the wave of terrorist bombings 
that have taken place in major metropolitan centers since 2002.111
Finally, in common with the Abu Sayyaf Group in the south-
ern Philippines, the nexus between crime, terrorism, and insurgency 
severely limits the opportunities for meaningful negotiation between 
state and nonstate actors. As noted above, the FARC, the ELN, and the 
AUC have all derived protection taxes from local populations in areas 
under their respective control. Moreover, the general chaos within 
Colombia that has been a by-product of the country’s civil conﬂict 
has transformed the country’s internal geopolitical landscape into a 
patchwork of dissident-controlled zones that have been used to support 
highly proﬁtable drug growing and reﬁning, kidnapping, and extor-
tion activities. In short, each of the three groups has a strong ﬁnan-
cial incentive to continue the violence, which obviously has signiﬁcant 
implications for the success of any eventual peace negotiation.
110 Makarenko (2003), p. 11.
111 Colombian intelligence sources believe FARC may have inserted as many as 10,000–
15,000 agents in and around major cities such as Cali, Medellín, and Bogotá. They also allege 
the group has contracted with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to provide spe-
ciﬁc training in urban-based sabotage and terrorism. See Sweig (2002), p. 127; “Once Again, 
Colombia Mourns”; “Colombia’s Peace Bid at Risk,” The Washington Post, August 25, 2001.
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Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah in Africa: The Conﬂict Diamonds 
Nexus
Even before the loss of their bases in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda leaders 
showed interest in the potential of sub-Saharan Africa for ﬁnancial 
transactions as well as a source of strategic minerals. Al-Qaeda report-
edly used sympathetic crime networks to convert funds into diamonds 
and gold, as well as in attempts to obtain nuclear, chemical, and bio-
logical material.112 Al-Qaeda’s interest in Africa also derives from the 
potential of the region’s vast ungoverned territories for training and 
basing and the opportunities presented by conditions in the region 
to exploit religious friction and to support the expansion of Islamic 
radicalism. 
The economic links between Islamic terrorism and organized 
crime in sub-Saharan Africa center on so-called conﬂict diamonds 
(also called “blood diamonds” or “terror diamonds”).113 The conﬂict 
diamond phenomenon was ﬁrst noticed during the Angolan civil war, 
when National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 
leader Jonas Savimbi realized that the country’s extensive diamond 
ﬁelds could ﬁnance his struggle against the ruling Marxist Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola. UNITA capitalized on the 
smuggling routes that the movement had developed during the inde-
pendence struggle in the 1970s. By 1993 Savimbi had in place one 
of the world’s largest diamond traﬃcking networks, earning an esti-
mated $4.1 billion between 1992 and 2000.114 Subsequent interna-
tional actions to restrict UNITA’s diamond trade seem to have been 
112 Wannenburg (2003), pp. 77–90.
113 The term blood or conﬂict diamonds refers generally to rough diamonds obtained by using 
or threatening to use coercion or military force, particularly in Africa. According to the 
European Commission, blood diamonds represent 2–4 percent of global diamond produc-
tion: “Al-Qaeda linked to blood diamonds in Africa,” Sapa-AFP, April 29, 2003.
114 InvestigativeJournalists SouthAfrica.com. Discussion Forum, Blood Diamonds, February 
2003, http://www.southafrica.com/forums/showthread.php?t=3478 (as of March 27, 2006); 
Cooper (2002). 
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relatively successful in limiting the supply of funds to the organization 
(from $700 million in 1996 to $100 million in 2002) and may even 
have contributed to its demise.115
This pattern—in which diamonds were used as war currency—
has been replicated in other African conﬂicts, particularly in Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.116 The 
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, a murderous rebel force 
that has engaged in mass killing, looting, rape, and violence of the 
worst kind, supports itself largely through the extraction and sale of 
diamonds in the areas that it controls. In the eastern Congo, diamonds 
have been integral to the Congolese Rally for Democracy and the 
Movement for the Liberation of Congo insurgencies, and to the insur-
gencies’ nexus with their external allies in Rwanda and Uganda.117
Although Central Africa does oﬀer considerable strategic mineral 
assets for plundering, the area of greatest concern is the Parrot’s Beak, 
a small wedge of land on Liberia’s border with Guinea where rebel 
factions vie for blood diamonds.118 Across the border in Sierra Leone, 
the government believes that illicit prospecting is rife, involving about 
three times the number of the 435 registered license holders. This is 
especially the case in the diamond-rich area of Kono, where the highest 
number of legal mining licenses has been distributed.119
The relationship between al-Qaeda and the terror diamond trade 
is a matter of some controversy. The 9/11 Commission Report (July 
2004) questioned whether al-Qaeda has been traﬃcking in “conﬂict” 
diamonds. The report noted, “We have seen no persuasive evidence 
that al Qaeda funded itself by trading in African conﬂict diamonds.”120
115 Cooper (2002).  
116 InvestigativeJournalists SouthAfrica.com. 
117 U.S. House of Representatives (2000a), p. 8.
118 Greg Campbell, “Blood Diamonds,” Amnesty Now, http://www.amnestyusa.org/
amnestynow/diamonds.html (as of March 24, 2006). 
119 Rod MacJohnson, “‘Blood Diamonds’ Initiative a Mixed Success in War-Scarred 
Sierra Leone,” Agence France-Presse, May 18, 2003, http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.
nsf/0/58053e67d50efe91c1256d2b0054b284?OpenDocument. 
120 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004). 
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Nevertheless, there is a wealth of open-source information linking al-
Qaeda to the illegal diamond trade in West Africa: the Sierra Leone 
Special Court (the war-crimes court investigating the conﬂict in Sierra 
Leone); the Belgian government’s own investigation (this is important 
and relevant because Antwerp, Belgium, is the world’s largest diamond 
market); the extensive investigative journalism of The Washington Post;
and the most-in-depth report on this subject, that by Global Witness, 
a nongovernmental organization that has reported extensively on al-
Qaeda’s known or alleged “terror diamonds” connections. 
The apparent discrepancy between the ﬁndings of the 9/11 
Commission and those of the other sources noted above is due to the 
fact that each appears to have been asking diﬀerent questions. The 
9/11 Commission—and the FBI and CIA investigations on which the 
commission relied121—appeared to look at the question of whether al-
Qaeda traded in diamonds to fund itself (as UNITA or other groups 
had in the past). In contrast, the other investigations looked at the 
question of whether al-Qaeda used diamonds and other precious min-
erals to hide and transfer funds. This would appear to be the reason 
why the 9/11 Commission (and other U.S. agencies) came up with a 
121 The 9/11 Commission Report cited a number of U.S. government reports only and did 
not appear to use—at least, by citation—any of the highly detailed open-source reports, 
such as those by Global Witness, cited in this report. The U.S. government reports cited by 
the commission (p. 499, footnote 129) included the FBI report, “Allegations of Al Qaeda 
Traﬃcking in Conﬂict Diamonds,” July 18, 2003; CIA analytic report, “Terrorism: Assessing 
al-Qa’ida and Hizballah Ties to Conﬂict Diamonds,” CTC 2002-40121CH, January 13, 
2003; CIA analytic report, “Couriers, Hawaladars Key to Moving Al-Qa’ida Money,” CTC 
2003-40063CH, May 16, 2003; DOS cable, Brussels 05994, “WP Reporter Claims More 
Witnesses to 2001 Al-Qaida/Conﬂict Diamonds Link,” December 12, 2002; DOS cable, 
Brussels 001054, terrorism and conﬂict diamonds, March 1, 2002; FBI situation reports and 
supporting documents from the Sierra Leone trip, February 2004. 
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negative response to their question, whereas the other investigations 
answered theirs in the aﬃrmative. This distinction is extremely impor-
tant because it ultimately shows two sides of a similar concern.122
Al-Qaeda is believed to have used diamonds (1) to develop anony-
mous, movable wealth prior to September 2001—perhaps expecting 
that known existing al-Qaeda assets would be frozen following the 
attacks—and (2) to launder funds from other sources, such as drug 
sales. Global Witness states that al-Qaeda uses diamonds for four prin-
cipal reasons: to raise funds for its cells; to hide money targeted by 
ﬁnancial sanctions; to launder the proﬁts of criminal activity; and to 
convert cash into a commodity that holds its value and is easily trans-
portable.123 Most worryingly (see below), the Global Witness report 
also clearly outlines how al-Qaeda used both corrupt oﬃcials (such as 
Liberia’s former president Charles Taylor) and the existing Hezbollah 
West African diamond-smuggling network to support its activities. 
In 1999, Mohamed Hijazi, a longtime diamond miner and dealer 
in Sierra Leone, was appointed as RUF’s agent “to negotiate with any 
person or company within or outside Sierra Leone for the prospect-
ing, mining, buying & selling of diamonds.”124 Transcripts from court 
cases against al-Qaeda members contain evidence that the network 
has people with expertise in the diamond business in these areas, 
including those who previously were involved in the gemstone and dia-
mond trade in Tanzania, which al-Qaeda has allegedly used to ﬁnance 
122 A recent trip (May 2005) to Sierra Leone by RAND researcher Kevin O’Brien to inves-
tigate this and other concerns regarding an al-Qaeda presence in West Africa further solidi-
ﬁed this distinction and conclusion. In interviews with members of the U.S., UK, and other 
Western missions, the complexity of this question was notable: Although very few respon-
dents believed that al-Qaeda had used Sierra Leone diamonds to fund its activities, most 
acknowledged that al-Qaeda operatives may have used such diamonds to provide readily 
transportable value, and that known al-Qaeda and Hezbollah operatives had been in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia during the period in question.
123 Global Witness (2003), p. 28.
124 “Lawmakers Back Bill Curbing ‘Blood Diamonds,’” Reuters, June 24, 2001, http://
webnetarts.com/socialjustice/diamonds.html (as of March 24, 2006). 
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operations.125 The U.S. government made similar charges, linking the 
sale of tanzanite, a gemstone found only in Tanzania, to al-Qaeda 
ﬁnancing.126
Al-Qaeda’s use of precious gems is reported to have begun in 
1993 when bin Laden was establishing his base in Sudan. To ﬁnance 
the organization, he allegedly bought and sold gems.127 According to 
Lyman and Morrison, al-Qaeda subsequently took advantage of the 
Congolese civil war to extend its activities to the Congo. Al-Qaeda’s 
illegal trade in gems has since spread to other countries in Africa, alleg-
edly colluding with the governments of Burkina Faso and Liberia to buy 
diamonds mined by the RUF in Sierra Leone.128 Both President Blaise 
Campaore of Burkina Faso and Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhaﬁ 
are also mentioned in connection with both the Sierra Leonean and 
Liberian ends of these operations.129 Although the RUF has denied 
having any links with al-Qaeda or selling diamonds to it, it has report-
edly acknowledged that such sales could have taken place without its 
knowledge.130
In September 1998, following international eﬀorts to freeze al-
Qaeda and Taliban accounts after the August 1998 bombings of the 
U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, senior al-Qaeda ﬁnancial oﬃcer 
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah arrived in Monrovia, Liberia, to meet with 
Ibrahim Bah (an Afghan veteran from Senegal who went on to deal 
diamonds for Liberian president Taylor with the rebels in Sierra Leone) 
and talk with senior Liberian and RUF oﬃcials. At this time, Abdullah 
attempted a $100,000 arms-for-diamonds deal. Although the deal fell 
125 Douglas Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade Sale of Gems from Sierra Leone 
Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say,” The Washington Post, November 2, 2001.
126 “Africa Overview,” U.S. Department of State (2002a). 
127 Lucy Jones, “Al-Qaeda ‘Traded Blood Diamonds,’” BBC News Online, February 20, 
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2775763.stm. 
128 Lyman and Morrison (2004), pp. 83–84. 
129 Douglas Farah, “Report Says Africans Harbored Al Qaeda: Terror Assets Hidden In 
Gem-Buying Spree,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2002, p. A01; Morrison (2001), pp. 
15, 18, and 19.
130 Dagne (2002), p. 21; Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade Sale.” 
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through, Abdullah maintained contact with the network he found 
there.131 Fragments of correspondence alleged to be between Ayman al-
Zawahiri and “Abu Mohammed al-Masri” (an alias used by Abdullah), 
found by The Wall Street Journal in a computer in Afghanistan, indi-
cate that the subsequent diamond deals were controlled by al-Qaeda 
at the highest levels. Zawahiri is reported to have said that these deals 
will “transfer our activities to the stage of multinationals and [bring] 
joint proﬁt.”132
A joint investigation by European intelligence agencies,133
reported in The Washington Post in December 2002, alleged that three 
men—Aziz Nassour, a Lebanese diamond merchant,134 his cousin 
Samih Ossailly, and the aforementioned Bah—were the primary con-
duits linking al-Qaeda to the Liberian leadership and a company in 
Belgium that polished and sold conﬂict diamonds. In 2000, more than 
$14 million worth of diamonds were sold. Buyers’ identities are known 
only to Bah and to a few others.135 According to FBI sources quoted 
in the story, two al-Qaeda operatives implicated in the 1998 attacks, 
a Tanzanian called Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and a Kenyan, Fazul 
Abdullah Mohammed, both on the FBI’s wanted list, traveled between 
Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone and Afghanistan and Pakistan 
exchanging cash for diamonds. (Ghailani was arrested in Pakistan in 
131 Amelia Hill, “Terror in the East: Bin Laden’s Dollars 20m African ‘Blood Diamond’ 
Deals,” Observer News, October 20, 2002, p. 6.
132 Farah, “Report Says Africans Harbored Al Qaeda.”
133 Much of the evidence comes from Western intelligence reports and from the trials of al-
Qaeda suspects after the  September 11 attacks and the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in 
East Africa. See Jones, “Al-Qaeda ‘traded blood diamonds.’”
134 Belgian intelligence also reported that Nassour and his family were implicated in the 
trade of diamonds with UNITA and are suspected of having links with the Amal Shi’ite 
militia and Lebanese leader Nahib Berri. The subnational groups that extend al-Qaeda’s 
web of inﬂuence include Abu Sayyaf in the Phillipines, which controls territory and can 
levy taxes on citizens, and is known for counterfeiting (linked to the laundering of fake 
$100 bills in Hong Kong); the Albanian maﬁa (used as logistical support to the Balkan cells 
of al-Qaeda), which is linked to the Kosovo Liberation Army and is involved in heroin and 
cocaine trading; and Indian maﬁa ﬁgures. See Wannenburg (2003).
135 Wannenburg (2003).
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July 2004.) Bah is alleged to have begun using ASA Diam, a company 
associated with Ossailly and Nassour, in July 2000 to “front” diamonds 
secured in West Africa; ASA Diam’s diamond trading subsequently 
took a sharp upward turn to over $14 million worth of diamond sales 
in 2000. In February 2001, Nassour and Bah met to discuss increasing 
these diamond purchases. Ghailani and Mohammed supervised the 
transaction. Judging from reports of diamond sales in both West Africa 
and Belgium in 2000, the pace of this activity had accelerated to such a 
point that, by August 2000, these operatives “appear to have cornered 
most of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian diamond markets.” Local dia-
mond merchants were hard-pressed to buy diamonds, and new buyers 
were paying a premium of between 15 and 30 percent.136
In January 2001, Nassour and Ossailly were trying to buy 
weapons—allegedly including SA-8 surface-to-air missiles and sophis-
ticated rockets for BM-21 multiple rocket launchers—from the 
Nicaraguan army via an Israeli arms dealer based in Panama named 
Simon Yelnik. Other reports allege that al-Qaeda attempted to buy 
similar items via Bulgaria using precious gems. An intercepted email 
from the Israeli arms dealer to a Russian arms merchant, listing assault 
riﬂes, ammunition, ground-to-air missiles, and 200 rockets for multiple 
rocket launchers, said the consignment was for “our friends in Africa.” 
The weapons were to be delivered to Liberia with an Ivorian end-user 
certiﬁcate. Nassour and Ossailly later acknowledged to Belgian oﬃ-
cials that the transaction was discussed but never completed.137
In April 2001, however, when ASA Diam’s purchasing in 
West Africa was at its height, it stopped reporting diamond sales in 
Antwerp.138 Nassour and Ossailly were believed to have used couriers 
to exchange $300,000 for diamonds every week between December 
2000 and September 2001.139 In 2000, Ossailly and a Boston-based 
used car dealer, Ali Darwish, set up a safe house in Monrovia to funnel 
136 Farah, “Report Says Africans Harbored Al Qaeda”; Campbell, “Blood Diamonds.” 
137 Farah, “Report Says Africans Harbored Al Qaeda”; “West African Leaders ‘in al-Qaida 
Plot,’” Guardian Unlimited, December 30, 2002.
138 Farah, “Report Says Africans Harbored Al Qaeda.”
139 Hill, “Terror in the East.” 
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the wealth from the diamond ﬁelds to rebel organizations through-
out the world;140 Ghailani and Mohammed moved into the house in 
March 2001.141 During the summer of 2001, Ghailani and Mohammed 
stayed in the compound of the president of Burkina Faso in the capital, 
Ouagadougou, before moving to Camp Gbatala, a military camp in 
Liberia near Taylor’s private farm; for this, the Liberian president was 
allegedly paid US $1 million.142
By September 2001, al-Qaeda had laundered an estimated $20 
million in diamonds, most of which were under United Nations sanc-
tions aimed at preventing their use in fueling civil wars. Payment to 
al-Qaeda for the diamonds was made in cash or weapons.143 According 
to David Crane, the chief prosecutor for the Special Court on Sierra 
140 According to sources, small packets of diamonds, often wrapped in rags or plastic sheets, 
are taken by senior RUF commanders across the porous Liberian border to Monrovia. There, 
at a safe house protected by the Liberian government, the diamonds are exchanged for brief-
cases of cash brought by diamond dealers who ﬂy several times a month from Belgium to 
Monrovia, where they are escorted by special state security through customs and immigra-
tion control. See Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade Sale.” 
141 According to the Belgian oﬃcials, couriers took weekly ﬂights from Antwerp on the 
now-defunct Sabena airline to Abidjan. There, they hired light planes from Weswua Airlines 
to ﬂy to Monrovia, Liberia, and then went on to meet rebel RUF commanders in Sierra 
Leone. Nassour, now living in Beirut, is being investigated concerning claims he conducted 
deals with al-Qaeda with his cousin Ossailly, who was arrested on weapons-related charges 
in June 2002 by Belgian oﬃcials. Nassour, Ossailly, and Bah all deny involvement with al-
Qaeda. See Wannenburg (2003). Nassour told Global Witness that he met Liberian presi-
dent Taylor in July 2001 to discuss setting up a mobile phone business and an airline com-
pany. Nassour claims he waited for four days for a meeting with Taylor before he gave up and 
left. An eyewitness maintains Nassour’s visit was linked to problems that were threatening 
to destroy the arrangement. The source claims that Nassour arrived the day after a colleague 
ﬂed with $500,000 of al-Qaeda money. The witness maintains Aziz Nassour, the Lebanese 
diamond merchant, met Taylor at Harpur port, where arms are delivered and timber ille-
gally exported, and handed over US $200,000, apparently to ensure continuation of the 
smuggling trade. The alleged deal ended with the September 11 attacks two months later, 
although Global Witness is convinced al-Qaeda has continued its trade. Hill, “Terror in the 
East.” 
142 The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency allegedly monitored Ghailani and Mohammed in 
preparation for a Special Forces team in neighboring Guinea to snatch the two, but the mis-
sion was not carried out, because the team could not conﬁrm the targets’ identities, accord-
ing to Douglas Farah (“Report Says Africans Harbored Al Qaeda”). 
143 Jones, “Al-Qaeda ‘Traded Blood Diamonds.’” 
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Leone established in January 2003 to try people accused of war crimes 
during that country’s long civil war in the 1990s, al-Qaeda continued 
to operate in West Africa, principally to buy diamonds: 
They’re all interconnected. They all work together. They know 
each other. It’s a common plan, a scheme, to move diamonds as a 
commodity, to do whatever they need to trade it for cash, arms, 
or to launder money. . . . Diamonds fuel my conﬂict, and dia-
monds fuel the war on terrorism. Charles Taylor is harboring ter-
rorists from the Middle East, including al Qaeda and Hezbollah, 
and has been for years . . . he is a player in the world of terror and 
what he does aﬀects lives in the United States and Europe.144
In August 2004, a conﬁdential Sierra Leone Special Court inves-
tigation was leaked to the South African press. The leaked report stated 
that “a series of witnesses place six top al-Qaeda fugitives in Africa 
buying up diamonds before the September 11 attacks.” These ﬁgures 
“dealt directly with Liberia’s former President Charles Taylor and other 
leaders and warlords in what was then a rogue West African nation 
from 1999 onwards,” according to the accounts of witnesses inter-
viewed by the Special Court. Its ﬁndings concluded that ﬂight records 
and some “undisclosed evidence in Europe” appeared to support the 
accounts of pre–September 11 al-Qaeda diamond business in Liberia. 
The report further states that “al-Qaeda has been in West Africa since 
September 1998 and maintained a continuous presence in the area 
through 2002.”145
U.S. government oﬃcials cited by the report stated that al-Qaeda 
proceeds from the diamond dealings were estimated to be $15 mil-
lion. The al-Qaeda ﬁgures said to be involved in the network included 
144 Mike Blanchﬁeld, “Al-Qaeda Funded by ‘Blood Diamonds’: Illicit Stones Traded to 
Pay for Terror Operations, UN Says,” The Ottawa Citizen, Sunday Final Edition, February 
9, 2003; Rod MacJohnson, “‘Blood Diamonds’ Initiative a Mixed Success in War-Scarred 
Sierra Leone,” Agence France-Presse, May 18, 2003, http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/
58053e67d50efe91c1256d2b0054b284?OpenDocument  (as of March 24, 2006).
145 Much of the evidence comes from Western intelligence reports and from the trials of al-
Qaeda suspects after the September 11, 2001, attacks and the 1998 bombings of U.S. embas-
sies in East Africa. See Jones, “Al-Qaeda ‘Traded Blood Diamonds.’” 
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Ghailani; Mohammed; Mohammed Atef (killed in Afghanistan in 
2001); the Pakistani Aaﬁa Siddiqui, al-Qaeda’s only prominent female 
ﬁgure;146 Kenyan Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, wanted for the 1998 
attacks in East Africa; and Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah. Abdullah was 
alleged by the report to have continued operating in Guinea into 2002, 
long after other reports had al-Qaeda operatives leaving West Africa. 
The report also cites Charles Taylor’s extensive involvement with al-
Qaeda in making arrangements for gems, weapons, and cash. Abdullah 
was later reported to have ordered Ghailani and Mohammed to do al-
Qaeda’s diamond buying “because they were of African descent and 
would not arouse any suspicion.”147
Hezbollah and Africa
Lebanese Hezbollah was, in many ways, the precursor to al-Qaeda’s 
activities in this area. Regardless of its Lebanese focus, Hezbollah is 
known to maintain a global network to support fundraising and opera-
tional and logistical requirements for its operations abroad. It is sus-
pected that much of this is done in close cooperation with Iranian 
intelligence services. Similar to, and perhaps imported from, its opera-
tions in North and South America, Hezbollah raises and launders large 
amounts of money in Africa. It recruits and trains new operatives for 
both target selection and surveillance and operations, all with the aim 
of supporting its principal goals in the Middle East.
Hezbollah has also established numerous front companies in 
Africa, once again reﬂecting its practice elsewhere in the world. 
According to one source, many Hezbollah activists previously based 
in the tri-border region of South America relocated to Africa because 
of the “increased attention” on its activities there following the 1992 
and 1994 bombings in Argentina. Other activists ended up in Europe, 
146 The presence of Siddiqui in Monrovia at this time, alongside Sheikh Ahmed Salim 
Swedan, an al-Qaeda leader on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist list, indicates just how 
important al-Qaeda’s leadership considered the West African diamond operation. Glenn 
R. Simpson, “U.N. Ties al Qaeda Figure to Diamonds,” The Wall Street Journal, June 28, 
2004.
147 Edward Harris, “Al-Qaeda in Africa,” The Mail and Guardian, August 8, 2004, http://
www.mg.co.za/Content/l3.asp?ao=120020 (as of March 24, 2006). 
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Asia, and less conspicuous parts of South America.148 Some analysts 
hold the view—reportedly supported by Israeli intelligence—that, 
with the assistance of Tehran, Hezbollah has speciﬁcally been fun-
neling religious students into Uganda and other African countries 
to recruit and train potential new operatives.149 An example is Shaﬁ 
Ibrahim, arrested by Ugandan authorities in late 2002 for being the 
leader of a cell of Ugandan Shi’ites believed to be working for both 
Hezbollah and Tehran.150
European, Israeli, and American intelligence sources have long 
known that Hezbollah has raised signiﬁcant amounts of money in 
West Africa through the largely Shi’ite Muslim Lebanese communi-
ties in Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Togo. There are 
an estimated 120,000 Lebanese in West Africa, mostly involved in 
import-export businesses.151
This fundraising is accomplished through a number of diﬀer-
ent means: First, Hezbollah has raised signiﬁcant amounts of funds 
over the past 20 years through diamond sales from Sierra Leone, with 
Ibrahim Bah (noted above) suspected of brokering diamond deals 
through buyers connected to Hezbollah, assisted by sympathetic 
Lebanese businessmen across the region. As with al-Qaeda, the illegal 
diamond industry has provided Hezbollah with a means to raise and 
148 Matthew Levitt, “Hizbullah’s African Activities Remain Undisrupted,” RUSI/Jane’s 
Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor, March 1, 2004, http://www.washingtoninstitute.
org/media/levitt/levitt020404.htm. 
149 Levitt, “Hizbullah’s African Activities Remain Undisrupted.”  
150 He and his comrades in the theology school were taught to use small arms, produce 
explosive devices, collect preoperational intelligence, plan escape routes, and withstand inter-
rogation techniques. The students were given ﬁctitious covers, money, and means of com-
munication, then “instructed to collect intelligence on Americans and Westerners present 
in Uganda and other countries.” See Matthew Levitt, “Hizbullah: A Case Study of Global 
Reach,” Conference on Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats, 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Israel, September 8, 2003, http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/media/levitt/levitt090803.htm.  
151 “Hizbullah (Part I),” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Center for Special 
Studies, June 2003, http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/hizbullah/Hizballah.htm; Levitt, 
“Hizbullah’s African Activities Remain Undisrupted.”
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launder money.152 Indeed, it has also been claimed that Hezbollah and 
other radical Islamic groups transferred millions of dollars made from 
Congolese diamond sales to their organizations.153
Second, Hezbollah raises large amounts of funds from the expa-
triate Lebanese community in West Africa, both through voluntary 
donations and by what one analyst refers to as “Maﬁa-style shake-
downs.” Across West Africa, Hezbollah is believed to raise the most 
funds in the Ivory Coast, followed closely by Senegal—these two 
have the highest concentrations of Hezbollah activity in Africa.154 The 
importance of these networks to Hezbollah would appear to be so high 
that when, on December 25, 2003, Union Transport Africaines ﬂight 
141 to Beirut crashed on take-oﬀ in Benin with three key Africa-based 
Hezbollah activists on board, carrying (according to Arab press reports) 
$2 million in contributions raised from wealthy Lebanese in Africa, 
Hezbollah “immediately sent an envoy to Benin to console the sons 
of the Lebanese community”—indicating the value these networks 
hold for Hezbollah.155 However, when such donations do not suﬃce, 
Hezbollah gangs attack the commercial properties of local Lebanese 
nationals who resist demands for solicitations.156
152 Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade Sale.” 
153 “Africa Overview,” U.S. Department of State (2002a). 
154 “Hezbollah: Proﬁle of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach 
Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria (Part A),” Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center, Center for Special Studies, June 2003, http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/
hizbullah/hezbollah.htm.
155 Arab media reported that $2 million “represented the regular contributions the party 
receives from wealthy Lebanese nationals in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Benin, and other 
African states,” Hamid Ghiryaﬁ, “Hizbullah Oﬃcials Carrying Donations Reportedly 
Killed in Lebanese Plane Crash,” al-Siyasah (Kuwait), December 29, 2003; Miriam Karouny, 
“Benin Plane Crash Deaths Rise to 111,” Reuters, December 26, 2003.
156 Lansana Gberie, “War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the 
Lebanese Connection,” The Diamonds and Human Security Project—Partnership Africa 
Canada, International Peace Information Service, Network for Justice and Development, 
Occasional Paper #6, November 13, 2002, http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/898ad5b9
f3f339a585256c7200799005?OpenDocument (as of March 26, 2006). 
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Hezbollah and Crime in North America
As the preceding discussion shows, Hezbollah’s convergence with orga-
nized crime spans continents. The most important locus of Hezbollah’s 
criminal activity is the Bekaa Valley, which has provided a continuous 
source of narcotics that Hezbollah has commercialized, despite inter-
national eﬀorts to shut down opium cultivation there. With funding 
from Iran dwindling, Hezbollah is seeking to increase its drug traﬃck-
ing niche by tapping new markets abroad.157 This trend is now seen in 
North America.
Hezbollah in Canada
Hezbollah has used Canadian territory for ten years to recruit, laun-
der money, raise funds, forge documents, and purchase military-related 
equipment for use in attacks on Israel. It has also built up a network of 
agents across the country. Mohammed Hussein al-Husseini, a Hezbollah 
member, told Canadian security oﬃcials that “Hezbollah has mem-
bers in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto—all of Canada.”158 One of these 
Canada-based agents, Fauzi Ayub, was arrested by Israeli authorities 
after being sent to the West Bank to engineer attacks against Israelis. 
Two others, wanted for terrorist acts committed elsewhere, were hiding 
out in Canada. One has since been charged in connection with the 
1996 bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 Americans.
Canadian police and intelligence reports show the group has been 
using Canada in recent years to buy materiel, forge travel documents, 
raise money, and steal luxury vehicles. In 1999 and 2000, Hezbollah sent 
detailed shopping lists to agents who were allegedly part of a network in 
Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal to ﬁll the orders and ship the equip-
ment back to Lebanon in courier packages. Hundreds of thousands 
of dollars were moved through various Canadian banks, such as the 
Bank of Nova Scotia, to ﬁnance purchases for what the participants 
157 U.S. House of Representatives (2000b).
158 Stephen Brown, “Canada—Terrorist Haven,” FrontPagemagazine.com, December 9, 
2002, http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=5007 (as of March 27, 
2006); Byman (2003).
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referred to as the “resistance” and the “brave people.” Canadian 
Hezbollah agents also discussed a scam they called a “miracle strike,” 
which involved taking out life insurance policies on people and then 
having them killed in Lebanon.159
Two of the alleged Hezbollah Canadian agents, Lebanese immi-
grants identiﬁed as Mohammad Dbouk and his brother-in-law Amhaz, 
shopped at a “military supply warehouse and looked at some military 
supplies and instruments in Vancouver.” Mr. Dbouk inquired at one 
company about buying “any equipment used to blow up rocks.” The 
agents were cautious to protect the secrecy of their work, although 
apparently unaware that every phone call was being recorded by 
Canadian intelligence. “Amhaz expressed his concern about depositing 
large sums of money in the bank account and suggested that Dbouk 
give him smaller sums of money to avoid suspicion [by the banks],” 
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service wrote, “Dbouk advised 
Amhaz that he would give instructions that the money be transferred 
to Ali Bassal in Montreal, after which time Dbouk would ﬂy/travel 
to Montreal to get the cash and return to B.C.” Dbouk ﬂed Canada 
and returned to Lebanon, but Amhaz still resides in Burnaby, British 
Columbia. He has denied any involvement with Hezbollah.160
The extent of Hezbollah operations in Canada ﬁrst came to light 
in the 1990s, when Mohammed Hussein al-Husseini was arrested for 
deportation. He told the CSIS about a cross-Canada network and con-
fessed that agents had spied on Canadians and reported on Canadian 
life and infrastructure. In two cases, alleged Hezbollah agents were 
found hiding out in Edmonton and Ottawa. One of them has been 
charged with taking part in the 1996 bombing attack in Saudi 
Arabia. “Hezbollah has members in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto—all 
of Canada,” al-Husseini told CSIS before he was deported in 1994. 
Hezbollah wants to collect information on Canada, on life in Canada 
and its infrastructure, “in case there’s a problem with Canada.” He 
159 Stewart Bell, “Hezbollah Uses Canada as Base: CSIS Agency Wiretaps Show Suspected 
Operatives Using Laundered Money to Buy Materiel,” http://www.clhrf.com/documents/
hezbollah.canada.htm (as of March 27, 2006). 
160 Bell, “Hezbollah Uses Canada as Base.”
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was reportedly referring to videotapes of Canadian landmarks sent to 
Hezbollah headquarters in Lebanon. The RCMP has also linked auto 
theft rings in Ontario and Quebec to Hezbollah, saying that a portion of 
the criminal proceeds were funneled to the group, and that luxury sport 
utility vehicles stolen in Canada were being driven by high-ranking
Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon. The CSIS reports on Hezbollah’s 
Canadian activities were made available recently to U.S. attorneys 
prosecuting accused operatives involved in a North Carolina cigarette 
smuggling ring.161
Another indication of how highly Hezbollah’s leaders value their 
Canadian operation is that money raised from a Hezbollah cigarette-
smuggling ring in North Carolina was sent to Canada. Mohammad 
Dbouk, the Hezbollah operative mentioned above, was sent from 
Lebanon to run the Vancouver cell. According to a U.S. Senate com-
mittee, Dbouk was so highly regarded by Hezbollah that his applica-
tion to become a “martyr” was rejected ﬁve times. None of the members 
of Vancouver’s Hezbollah cell has been charged in Canada. American 
attempts to extradite one cell member ended in frustration, prompting 
a couple of Senate hearing participants to remark that it’s hard to extra-
dite from Lebanon—and from Canada, too.162
The Hezbollah Criminal Nexus in the United States and Mexico
A new criminal nexus between Hezbollah and Mexican drug rings has 
emerged in Washington state (speciﬁcally the Olympic Peninsula), in 
central California, and in the American Midwest. Based on statements 
from informants and wiretaps, oﬃcials at the DEA said the Mexican 
cartels appear to have ﬁnancial ties to Middle Eastern groups.163 Bill 
Ruzzamenti, director of California’s High Intensity Drug Traﬃcking 
Area (HIDTA) program, states, “We have a number of metham-
phetamine cases where we’ve made a direct connection between the 
161 Bell, “Hezbollah Uses Canada as Base”; Brown, “Canada—Terrorist Haven”; DEA/
RCMP Joint Report, “Chemical Diversion and Synthetic Drug Manufacture,” September 
2001, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/crimint/chemical_e.htm (as of March 27, 2006).
162 Brown, “Canada—Terrorist Haven.”
163 “Drug Money for Hezbollah?” Associated Press, September 1, 2002.
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Hezbollah and Mexican cartels.” 164 The DEA suspects that associates 
of the Lebanon-based Hezbollah have been smuggling large amounts 
of pseudoephedrine tablets in cars and trucks across the Canadian 
border for sale to the drug cartels in California. DEA and Cana-dian 
authorities arrested 65 people, including a number of Jordanian cit-
izens, suspected of smuggling pseudoephedrine, a key ingredient of 
methamphetamine, bound for California.165 The state narcotics bureau 
has come to suspect that the cartels are using proﬁts from the resale 
of the pseudoephedrine to bankroll the sharp increase in marijuana 
cultivation on public land. Currently, there are three ongoing investi-
gations concerning the involvement of Hezbollah-related activity with 
Mexican drug cartel activity in central California alone.166
The DEA says the trail starts in Canada and ends with Mexican 
drug cartels based in California. Cartel members travel to the Midwest 
to meet brokers, who smuggle cold tablets across the border. The cold 
tablets are then used in labs in Washington state. U.S. authorities 
determined that about one-third of foreign terrorist organizations are 
traﬃcking in narcotics on a large scale, providing insight into how 
two of the nation’s most serious threats are connected.167 In Southern 
California, the DEA San Diego Field Division and the California 
Border Alliance Group reported that Middle Eastern criminals (Iraqis, 
Jordanians, Yemenis, and Israelis) were distributing pseudoephedrine 
tablets in numerous U.S. urban centers.168
164 Julie Cart, “Park’s Pot Problem Explodes: Oﬃcials Say Mexican Cartels Linked to 
Mideast Terrorists Run the Operation,” Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2003.
165 Cart, “Park’s Pot Problem Explodes.”
166 Karasik’s interview with HIDTA oﬃcial, December 2003.
167 Josh Meyers, “Drug Trade Funding Terrorist Group Actions, U.S. Says,” Los Angeles 
Times, July 31, 2002.
168 U.S. Department of Justice (2000), p. 12.
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The Middle Eastern Terrorist-Criminal Nexus in the 
Tri-Border Area of South America
The tri-border area, where Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil meet, has 
long been a location of terrorist activity (see Figure 7.1). There are about 
630,000 inhabitants in the region, some 25,000 of whom are of Syrian, 
Lebanese, and Palestinian descent. The Paraguayan city of Ciudad del 
Este and the Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu are separated only by the 
short Puente de la Amistad (Friendship Bridge). This is the area where 
the ﬁrst immigrants from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and the 
Palestinian territories settled about 50 years ago.169 In the 1980s, there 
was an additional inﬂux of Lebanese migrants seeking to escape the 
Lebanese civil war.
The area is considered the most important center for ﬁnancing 
Islamic terrorism outside the Middle East.170 The permeable border 
between the three countries hosts one of the most active black mar-
kets in the world. The commercial district of Ciudad del Este, on the 
Paraguayan side of the Paraná River, is a mosaic of businesses owned 
mostly by merchants of Arab origin. The city is viewed by Argentine and 
Brazilian authorities as a regional hub where organized criminal enter-
prises, insurgent groups, and terrorist organizations enjoy safe haven 
and opportunities for strategic alliances. On the Brazilian side, in Foz 
do Iguaçu, two mosques are suspected of harboring radical activity.171
169 “Middle East Terror Groups Find Sanctuary, Revenue in South America,” The Jewish 
Institute for National Security Aﬀairs (JINSA), January 15, 2004. Accessible online at http://
www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/1701/documentid/2331/
history/3,2360,655,1701,2331 (as of March 27, 2006). 
170 Jose Meirelles Passos, “Tri-Border: U.S. Steps Up Investigation of the Muslim Com-
munity,” O Globo (Rio de Janeiro), October 15, 2001.
171 “Search Extends to Latin America,” STRATFOR, September 19, 2001; Daly (2003); 
“Sources: Middle Eastern Terrorists Have South American Links,” CNN, November 9, 
2001; “Terrorist Sanctuary in South America? Tales from the ‘Triple Border,’” Pravda On-
Line, November 20, 2001. 
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Figure 7.1
Tri-Border Region, with Access to the River Plate
SOURCE: Col. William W. Mendel, “Paraguay‘s Ciudad del Este and the New Centers of






















Middle Eastern terrorist organizations—primarily Lebanese 
Hezbollah, but also Hamas, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad—have been 
detected in the tri-border area for at least a decade. These groups engage 
in black market operations, arms purchases, and planning for terrorist 
attacks on U.S., Israeli, and Jewish targets.172 Argentina, home to the 
largest Jewish community in Latin America, about 300,000 strong, 
has taken the brunt of Islamic terrorism in the region. Hezbollah is 
suspected of carrying out the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos 
172 In October 1998, a suspected Hezbollah member was arrested in front of the U.S. 
Embassy in Asunción, Paraguay, while surveying the facility in advance of a possible terror-
ist attack. “Search Extends to Latin America.”
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Aires in 1992, in which 29 persons died and 242 were injured, and the 
bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires on July 
18, 1994, that killed 85 people and injured more than 200. The modus 
operandi of the terrorists was similar in both attacks. In both cases, 
car bombs were used while the buildings were undergoing repairs, and 
police oﬃcers on security details inexplicably disappeared before the 
bombings.173
According to a New York Times report of a secret deposition by a 
high-level defector from the Iranian intelligence service, who gave his 
name as Adbolghassem Mesbahi, the Iranian government organized 
the bombing and paid former Argentine President Carlos Menem US 
$10 million to say that there was no evidence of Iranian involvement. 
Menem’s former chief of staﬀ denied the allegations and suggested 
they were politically motivated.174 The bombing remains unsolved in 
the Argentine judicial system. After a ﬂurry of initial arrests, only one 
person was found to have a direct link to the bombing—a dealer in 
stolen motor vehicles accused of selling the white Renault used for the 
car bomb and reﬁtting it for the bombing. There were allegations that 
local police and corrupt oﬃcials were involved in the bombing of the 
Jewish Community Center, as well as in the bombing of the Israeli 
embassy. Several senior policemen and a retired military oﬃcer were 
arrested as accessories in 1996 and 1997 but later released.175
According to a published report, Argentine State Intelligence 
Secretariat detected al-Qaeda operatives in the region following the 
173 “Search Extends to Latin America”; Daly (2003); “Sources: Middle Eastern Terrorists 
Have South American Links.”
174 “Iran Blew Up Jewish Center in Argentina, Defector Says,” The New York Times, July 
22, 2002. Mr. Mesbahi said that the money was paid from a $200 million Swiss account 
controlled by Iran’s then president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and a son of the late 
Ayatollah Khomeini. According to the New York Times article, Argentine and German oﬃ-
cials describe the defector as a senior operative who provided valuable information about 
Iranian terrorist operations in Europe and Asia through the mid-1990s. He defected to 
Germany in 1996, reportedly because he was upset at his agency’s involvement in the killing 
of dissident intellectuals in Iran and abroad.
175 Yael Shahar, “Investigation Plagued by Allegations of Cover-Ups,” Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, July 22, 2002.
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bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Al-Qaeda 
operatives reportedly did indoctrination and fundraising, provided 
cover for fugitives, and gave basic explosives training. According to 
intelligence oﬃcials, Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, al-Qaeda’s reputed 
operations chief, visited Foz do Iguaçu in December 1995. Police data 
reportedly show that Mohammad entered Brazil via São Paulo from 
Pakistan on December 4 and left Rio de Janeiro for the Netherlands 
on December 25. (There was no warrant for Mohammad’s arrest at the 
time of his visit to Brazil.) After the September 11 terrorist attacks, al-
Qaeda and Hezbollah operatives apparently left Ciudad del Este and 
Foz do Iguaçu and moved to more-remote locations or back to the 
Middle East.176
In February 2003, Paraguayan security raided a store owned by 
Ali Khalil Mehri, a 32-year-old businessman of Lebanese descent. They 
recovered Hezbollah propaganda and documentation of money trans-
fers to Canada, Chile, the United States, and Lebanon totaling more 
than $700,000. Also found were fundraising forms for the Middle East 
organization al-Shahid, which is dedicated to the “protection of fami-
lies of martyrs and prisoners.” Paraguayan prosecutors charged Mehri 
with selling millions of dollars of pirated software and channeling the 
proceeds to Hezbollah. Mehri, released on bail after his arrest, crossed 
into Brazil and then ﬂew from São Paulo to Paris. Authorities now 
believe he is in Syria.177
There are also reports of an al-Qaeda presence in Uruguay and 
along the Uruguayan-Brazilian border. A leading Brazilian newspa-
per, O Estado de São Paulo, reported that Uruguay’s intelligence ser-
vices had shared information with the Brazilian government linking 
the mayor of Chui, a Brazilian town separated only by a street from the 
Uruguayan town of Chuy, to bin Laden (the mayor, Mohamad Kassem 
Jomaa, denied the allegations).178
176 Daly (2003); “Police: Mohammed Visited Brazil in 1995,” CNN São Paulo, March 9, 
2003. 
177 “Middle East Terror Groups Find Sanctuary”; “Revenue in South America.” 
178 “Search Extends to Latin America.”
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In April 2002, the Brazilian police arrested an Egyptian militant 
named Mohamed Ibrahim Soliman in Foz do Iguaçu at the behest of 
the Egyptian government. Soliman was accused of carrying out attacks 
in Egypt with Said Hasan al-Mohammed (or Said Hasan Mukhlis), a 
suspected member of the Egyptian terrorist organization al-Gama’a al-
Islamiyya who was arrested in Chuy in 1999 trying to enter Uruguay 
from Brazil carrying a false Malaysian passport.179 Two months before 
September 11, Argentine intelligence oﬃcials reported that they had 
arrested an Arab on smuggling charges and that the suspect had dis-
cussed upcoming terrorist attacks in the United States.180
In October 2002, the Argentine intelligence service issued a ter-
rorist warning, noting that intelligence pointed to increased terror-
ist activity. According to intelligence sources in the Middle East, the 
eﬀort was aimed at U.S. and Israeli targets and was being coordinated 
by Hezbollah terrorist mastermind Imad Mugniyeh.181
Smuggling, Black Market Activities, and Money Laundering 
Operations
Smuggling and black market activities are the principal source of 
income from Islamic extremists in the tri-border region. In 1987 the 
leader of a business association of commercial and industrial interests 
estimated that contraband accounted for two-thirds of Paraguay’s for-
eign trade.182 Paraguayan police estimate that about 70 percent of the 
600,000 cars in Paraguay were purchased on the black market, with at 
least a portion of the proﬁts likely going to terrorist groups. Recently, 
President González Macchi was exposed in the press as owning a stolen 
179 “Egyptian Militant Arrested in Southern Brazil,” Reuters, April 16, 2002. Al-Mohammed 
was charged with having participated in the massacre of 58 foreign tourists and at least four 
Egyptians at the Egyptian temple of Luxor, in November 1997, the worst atrocity of the al-
Gama’a al-Islamiyya campaign of terror in Egypt in the 1990s. 
180 Daly (2003).
181 Mugniyeh masterminded the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks and the French para-
troopers headquarters in Beirut in 1983. He carried out several assassinations and attempted 
assassinations. He is believed to be living in Iran. See Gunaratna (2002), pp. 142, 147.
182 “Paraguay: Crime,” http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/paraguay/paraguay
121.html (as of March 27, 2006). 
158    Beyond al-Qaeda: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe
BMW and his wife a stolen Mercedes. Both cars had the same title 
document, which belonged to a Toyota.183
The smuggling and associated commercial activity also provide 
cover for money laundering operations. Argentine oﬃcials point to evi-
dence of terrorist ﬁnancial activity in the form of thousands of U.S. 
dollars stamped by Lebanese currency dealers from Lebanese currency 
exchange banks, tens of thousands of counterfeit dollars, and receipts 
from wire transfers made between the tri-border area and the Middle 
East.184
In 2002, the Hezbollah ﬁnancial chief in Ciudad del Este, 
Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, was convicted on charges of tax evasion. 
The Paraguayan authorities requested the extradition from Brazil 
of Hezbollah’s reputed chief of operations in Latin America, Assad 
Ahmad Barakat, on similar charges. Barakat was the co-owner of one 
of Ciudad del Este’s largest shopping malls, which intelligence sources 
believe he used as a front for fundraising and recruitment. He is sus-
pected of being a major player in the bombing of the Israeli embassy 
and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires. Barakat was 
caught and extradited to Paraguay in November 2003.185 Two of his 
associates, Mazen Ali Saleh and Saleh Mahoud Fayoud, were arrested 
and charged with falsifying immigration documents and dealing in 
pirated compact discs.186
Drug Trafﬁcking and Arms Smuggling
During the early 1980s, Paraguay emerged as a transit point in the 
international drug trade. Colombian and other international drug traf-
ﬁckers operate in Paraguay in association with corrupt military oﬃcers 
183 Mendel (2002), p. 52.
184 “South America’s ‘Tri-Border’ Back on Terrorism Radar,” CNN, November 7, 2002.
185 “Alleged Hizbullah Financier Extradited by Brazil to Paraguay,” Naharnet, November 20, 
2003, http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/Newsdesk.nsf/0/41BE05F953ABCE5542256
DE300318F15?OpenDocument&PRINT (as of March 27, 2006).
186 “Sources: Middle Eastern Terrorists Have South American Link.” Criminal charges were 
ﬁled against the former Paraguayan Consul General in Miami, Carlos Weiss, for having 
issued 150 irregular visas, 18 to Arab citizens living in Ciudad del Este.
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and politicians of the ruling Colorado Party. The U.S. Department of 
State estimates that Paraguay moves ten metric tons of cocaine annually 
to markets in Europe and the United States. Paraguay also produces 
some of the highest-grade marijuana in the continent and exports most 
of it to Brazil, which ranks as the largest market in Latin America for 
cocaine, heroine, marijuana, and boutique drugs such as Ecstasy.187
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Hezbollah smug-
gles cocaine from South America to Europe and the Middle East.188
On May 10, 2003, Paraguayan authorities arrested Hassan Abdallah 
Dayoub as he was preparing to ship an electric piano stuﬀed with more 
than ﬁve pounds of cocaine to Syria. Dayoub is a relative of Assad 
Barakat, the chief Hezbollah operative in South America. Dayoub 
was subsequently sentenced to ﬁve and a half years in prison for drug 
smuggling.189
A guns-for-cocaine connection between Paraguayan gunrunners 
and the FARC was uncovered and one FARC operative was arrested.190
Jeﬀrey Goldberg, author of “In the Party of God,” which appeared in 
The New Yorker in October 2002, spent three weeks in the tri-border 
area researching Hezbollah and its international funding and activities. 
He recounted crossing the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay 
with extreme ease, and being oﬀered an AK-47 riﬂe for $375. The price 
even included a hotel delivery. When he asked about acquiring explo-
sives, he was told that was also possible.191
Rationale for Convergence with Organized Crime
Several factors account for the involvement of a Middle East terror-
ist organization in criminal activity in the tri-border area. First, there 
are demographic and geostrategic factors: the presence of a substantial 
Levantine community with links to their home countries, living in a 
187 “DEA boosts its role in Paraguay,” The Washington Times, August 21, 2001.
188 TerrorismAnswers.org (as of March 27, 2006).
189 “Middle East Terror Groups Find Sanctuary.”
190 Cited in Mendel (2002), p. 54.
191 Mendel (2002), p. 54.
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remote and yet strategic area—on the Pan American Highway strad-
dling the Argentine-Brazilian border. The area has ﬂuvial communica-
tions by way of the Paraná River to the River Plate, Buenos Aires, and 
Montevideo, as well as the Atlantic Ocean. Second, an existing crimi-
nal infrastructure exists (smuggling has been the economic mainstay 
of this region since the establishment of independent states in the area). 
Third, Paraguay’s weak political institutions and investigative and law 
enforcement capabilities, as well as pervasive oﬃcial corruption, have 
created the conditions for the unchecked growth of terrorist and crimi-
nal networks.192 Fourth, and perhaps most important, Hezbollah and 
other Middle East militant and terrorist organizations have established 
a global presence. The last factor is likely to increase in importance 
as the international pressure and denial of sanctuaries in traditional 
host countries forces organizations like al-Qaeda to look for alternative 
bases of operations.
192 Transparency International lists Paraguay as 144 in its 2005 Corruption Perception 
Index, with a score of 2.1 on a scale of 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt), http://www.




From a policy perspective, the ﬁrst-order question is whether the tra-
jectory of insurgent and terrorist groups outside the global jihadist 
movement will bring them closer to that movement. To answer this 
question, we examine what factors could aﬀect this outcome and what 
the U.S. policy response should be. The second-order question is the 
level of threat these groups represent for U.S. regional interests, includ-
ing the security of U.S. friends and allies, and what the U.S. policy 
response should be. Finally, we discuss how to harmonize U.S. policies 
to address these two questions.
With regard to convergence with al-Qaeda, the groups of great-
est concern are, of course, the Islamist groups that share aspects of 
al-Qaeda’s worldview. Of the groups examined, only two—Egypt’s al- 
Wa’ad and the Iraqi insurgents—developed after bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa 
against “Jews and Crusaders.” The other groups were well established, 
active, and had articulated their own agendas prior to al-Qaeda’s emer-
gence in the international arena. Therefore, they can be assumed to be 
less receptive to al-Qaeda’s ideology of global jihad than the groups 
that emerged since that time. 
Among these groups, the majority interpret their jihad much 
more narrowly than groups aﬃliated or associated with al-Qaeda. 
Hezbollah’s interests center on Lebanon and its immediate vicinity; 
Hamas is focused on the Palestinian issue; and the GIA on overthrow-
ing the Algerian government. For the groups to which association 
with al-Qaeda might be operationally attractive, external and internal 
factors have held such tendencies in check. Hezbollah appears to be 
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inﬂuenced by its ties to Syria and Iran as well as by its involvement 
in Lebanese politics. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya appears to be concerned 
about carving out some political space to operate in Egypt. 
Even some of the non-Islamist groups could decide to cooper-
ate with al-Qaeda or other Islamist groups for their own reasons. For 
example, many of these militant groups now maintain representatives 
in the criminal and black market world. This interconnectivity allows 
terrorists to acquire weapons as necessary, perhaps even to expand their 
capabilities. At this point, it is important to stress that some terrorist 
groups could shift their worldview, thus adopting an agenda similar to 
al-Qaeda’s. Alternatively, others could simply capitalize on a perceived 
anti-U.S. trend, shifting the focus of their attacks toward U.S. targets 
to increase their potential by making alliances with more capable al-
Qaeda–aﬃliated groups or simply to gain greater recognition. 
A recent RAND study analyzed factors that caused terrorist groups 
to adjust their intentions (e.g., their ideology or worldview) and capa-
bilities. The study isolated three key factors that cause terrorist groups 
to shift from their chosen paths: (1) counterattacks by security forces; 
(2) external support from states or other militant organizations; and 
(3) gain or loss of popular support.1 To those, we could add a fourth: 
general shifts in the international security environment—such as that 
brought about by the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. Some extremist 
organizations, such as the MILF in the Philippines, have tried to dis-
tance themselves from al-Qaeda to reduce their exposure to the global 
war on terrorism.2 Similarly, according to a well-informed Sri Lankan 
source, the global war on terrorism has reduced international toler-
ance of LTTE terrorism. There has been a crackdown on LTTE activi-
ties in the United Kingdom and Canada, and Thailand has become 
1 Cragin and Daly (2004).
2 The issue of the MILF-JI relationship is contested. The MILF denies it and, as of August 
2005, was cooperating with the Philippines military against the Abu Sayyaf Group (as it is 
obliged to do under the terms of the ceaseﬁre between the MILF and the Manila govern-
ment). Other authorities, however, such as Rohan Gunaratna and Zachary Abuza, believe 
that there is a continuing relationship between the MILF and JI. Rabasa’s correspondence 
with Gunaratna and Abuza, September 2005.
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more active in intercepting arms shipments to the group. These devel-
opments apparently inﬂuenced the LTTE’s decision to enter into peace 
negotiations with the Sri Lankan government.3
A potentially dangerous shift can be seen in the emerging Hamas-
Hezbollah nexus, as shown by the March 14, 2004, attack in the Israeli 
port of Ashdod. As discussed earlier, the signiﬁcance of this attack was 
not the number of casualties but the demonstration of Hamas’s ability 
to hit more strategic targets.4
This degree of aid and coordination is greater than anything prior 
in the Hamas-Hezbollah relationship. It demonstrates that Sunni and 
Shi’ite militants will work together, given a mutual enemy. Second, the 
pattern of behavior demonstrated by Hamas could be duplicated by 
other, nonaﬃliated terrorists. That is, just as Hamas accepted linkage 
with Hezbollah, so other groups could accept guidance from al-Qaeda. 
Finally, a potential explanation for Hezbollah’s behavior in this case 
is the need to sustain attention and support since Israel pulled out of 
southern Lebanon. Greater involvement in the Palestinian resistance 
could achieve this goal. It is possible, then, that Muslim anger at the 
U.S. presence in Iraq could provoke similar shifts in Hezbollah or other 
groups’ agenda vis-à-vis the United States as these groups continue to 
vie for local recruits and support.
The bottom line is that most of the extremist groups discussed in 
this report—terrorists and insurgents alike—have a limited or local-
ized political agenda, and this means that they are likely to accept 
political rules and social norms acceptable to a majority as opposed to 
al-Qaeda and its utopian vision of a restored global caliphate. 
Several of the groups covered in the study have not welcomed 
the attention that al-Qaeda has brought to their various causes. This 
is particularly true of nonaﬃliated organizations but also, arguably, 
of associated entities such as JI and elements of the MILF (both of 
which now seem to be debating the overall value of being linked to bin 
3 Discussion with retired international institution oﬃcial, Washington, D.C., October 
2004.
4 Discussion with retired international institution oﬃcial, Washington, D.C., October 
2004, and Cragin interviews, Israeli counterterrorism experts, April 2004.
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Laden’s network in terms of availing their own respective objectives 
in Southeast Asia and Mindanao). In certain ways, this has acted as a 
useful brake on their militant actions and encouraged a greater dispo-
sition toward negotiation and compromise (to some extent illustrated 
by talks and ceaseﬁres in former chronic terrorist theaters such as Sri 
Lanka and Colombia). The United States should seek to capitalize on 
these tensions and the movement that they have created, both as an 
adjunct to its general war on ideas against extremist ideologies, as well 
as in the context of more speciﬁc regional security eﬀorts and assis-
tance programs.
Nevertheless, beyond the question of convergence, it is important 
that we not dismiss groups as unthreatening just because they have not 
joined the global jihadist movement. Some represent deadly threats to 
the states that they seek to subvert; others, like Hezbollah, could sud-
denly emerge as global threats.
Implications for the U.S. Military and the U.S. Air Force
In the ﬁrst volume, we discussed the use of air power as an option to 
attack terrorists in diﬃcult or inhospitable terrain, as well as the use 
of air transport in counterterrorist or counterinsurgency operations in 
countries with widely dispersed populations and poor land transporta-
tion infrastructure. These considerations apply as well to many of the 
cases discussed in this volume. However, there is a diﬀerence: With the 
exception of the Iraqi insurgency, the United States is not—and as a 
general principle should not be—involved in direct military operations 
against these groups. 
Therefore, the emphasis should be on strengthening the capabili-
ties of friendly governments to confront insurgent and terrorist groups. 
U.S. Air Force Special Operations Forces (active duty, Reserve, and 
National Guard units)—at approximately 11,000 personnel, second 
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only to Army SOF at 29,000—can be particular pertinent to the coun-
terinsurgency and counterterrorism training role required by the new 
environment.5
The judgment in Part 1 of this study that these local wars have 
to be fought and won by local governments and security forces, with 
the United States in a supporting role, is even more valid in the case of 
those conﬂicts driven by local grievances and those in which the rebel 
movements enjoy signiﬁcant support. By the same token, since some 
of these groups have limited political agendas, under the right circum-
stances they could become part of a negotiating process leading to a 
political solution of the conﬂict—a major diﬀerence from groups that 
are part of the global jihadist movement, which have to be destroyed or 
forced to leave the ﬁeld. 
To develop eﬀective strategies against insurgent and terrorist 
groups, it is important to look at them in a broad context, even if 
they operate locally, because the migration of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) is creating a regionalization of violence—terrorists 
and insurgents and political opportunists. Many of these groups are 
learning what works best and adopting those best practices. These tac-
tical models contribute to the proliferation of eﬀective styles of uncon-
ventional warfare throughout diﬀerent zones of conﬂict. Innovations 
include the use of IEDs by Hezbollah and their evolution into sophis-
ticated weapons designed to interrupt supply lines. Hamas has been 
known to use ambulances as a cover for suicide bombers or logistical 
support. MANPADs and now suicide bombers with suicide vests ﬁrst 
used by Palestinian groups against targets in Israel and the Palestinian 
territories are now used as mass casualty weapons by Chechens against 
Russian military aircraft.
The ﬁrst implication for the U.S. military and the Air Force is a 
clear understanding that the TTPs used by all groups, whether they are 
5 U.S. Air Force Special Operations Forces are made up of the following: (1) the active-
duty 16th Special Operations Wing; (2) two Air Force Reserve units: the 919th Special 
Operations Wing and the 920th Rescue Wing; and (3) three Air National Guard units: the 
106th Rescue Wing (New York Air National Guard), the 129th Rescue Wing (California 
Air National Guard), and the 193rd Special Operations Wing (Pennsylvania Air National 
Guard).
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part of the global jihad or not, are beginning to mimic each other. This 
means that from a tactical standpoint U.S. military doctrine needs to 
anticipate the dissemination of those tactics across theaters in the war 
on terror.
The second implication is that, although the United States has a 
supporting role in opposing those groups in the “al-Qaeda universe,” 
the potential role for the United States in countering extremist groups 
beyond al-Qaeda is even more indirect. The challenge for the U.S. 
military is to be prepared either to provide increased levels of sup-
port to key allies should they require it or to engage these extremist 
groups should they shift their attention toward the United States—
while simultaneously avoiding direct involvement in these conﬂicts. 
This strategic challenge has particular relevance to the U.S. Air Force. 
Understanding the circumstances that might stimulate change in these 
extremist groups, for example, may require the allocation of intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources. It may also neces-
sitate broad global readiness, incorporating regions such as Southeast 
Asia and Latin America, in addition to the Middle East, in the war on 
terrorism.
For the U.S. military and the U.S. Air Force in particular, tools 
for targeting terrorist groups can also be used in cooperation and coor-
dination with host-state operations against terrorist, insurgent, and 
criminal groups. It is important to note that the criminal transport 
of narcotics, arms, illegal migrants, explosives, etc., occurs in hubs 
and spokes concurrent or co-located with terrorist groups—especially 
the FARC (at the crossroads of Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, 
and Venezuela) and Maoists (in Nepal, for example, at the crossroads 
between Russia, China, and India; and in the Philippines and Peru). This 
argues for the “dual use” of U.S. security assistance for both counter-
terrorism and counternarcotics purposes. Older aircraft with high-tech 
intelligence-collection capabilities can be used against both terrorist 
havens and criminal nodes. In addition, air support for host country 
coast guard operations in and around waterways is a critical compo-
nent of coastal and riverine surveillance and interdiction of smuggling 
routes used by terrorists and criminal networks. 
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